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vAmong species, human beings seem to be a peculiar lot. Why is it, for exam-
ple, that certain members of the species routinely put their survival at risk by 
puffing on a small stick of nicotine? Why is it that some females of the species 
make locomotion difficult for themselves by donning high-heel footwear? Are 
there hidden or unconscious reasons behind such strange behaviors that seem 
to be so utterly counter-instinctual, so to speak?
For no manifest biological reason, humanity has always searched, and con-
tinues to search, for a purpose to its life. Is it this search that has led it to 
engage in such bizarre behaviors as smoking and wearing high heels? And is it 
the reason behind humanity’s invention of myths, art, rituals, languages, 
mathematics, science, and all the other truly remarkable things that set it 
apart from all other species? Clearly, Homo sapiens appears to be unique in the 
fact that many of its behaviors are shaped by forces other than the instincts. 
The discipline that endeavors to understand these forces is known as semiotics. 
Relatively unknown in comparison to, say, philosophy or psychology, semiot-
ics probes the human condition in its own peculiar way, by unraveling the 
meanings of the signs that undergird not only the wearing of high-heel shoes, 
but also the construction of words, paintings, sculptures, and the like.
This is not a comprehensive textbook on semiotic theory and practice. My 
aim is to present the basic notions of semiotics that help us probe how humans 
“produce meanings” and how these constitute small-scale versions of the 
larger-scale need to unravel the “meaning of life.” Studying the raison d’être of 
the latter has always been—and continues to be—the aim of philosophy, the-
ology, and various other disciplines; studying the raison d’être of the former is 
the specific goal of semiotics, which can be defined simply as the “study of 
produced meaning.” I have left out many of the technical details of sign  theory 
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and I have not gone into any in-depth discussion of the pivotal contributions 
made by theorists, since these belong to a more comprehensive treatment. My 
hope is that this book will engender in the reader the same kind of inquisitive 
frame of mind with which a semiotician would closely examine people and 
cultures and why they search for meaning. Perhaps the greatest mental skill 
possessed by Homo sapiens, literally the “knowing animal,” is the ability to 
know itself. Semiotics helps sharpen that skill considerably.
The first edition of this book came out in 1999. To my pleasant surprise, it 
struck a chord among many readers. One of the reasons may have been that, 
in it, I decided to contrive my presentation of semiotics around a seemingly 
trivial scene, but one that nonetheless appears to reveal a lot about the human 
need for meaning. The scene was a fashionable modern-day restaurant—an 
urban courtship setting where wooing rituals are performed in a “sign-based” 
manner. The fictional actions in that scene allowed me to tell the semiotic 
version of the human condition in concrete terms. A second edition was pub-
lished in 2009. Much has changed in the world since that edition. Therefore, 
in this updated third edition I have retained that scene as a framework for 
describing semiotic ideas, although even there some radical changes have 
taken place such as, for instance, the virtual elimination of smoking from 
public venues due to changes in social attitudes towards cigarettes and their 
meanings. The world has also become much more digitalized and technologi-
cally sophisticated since then, with the Internet practically replacing all other 
media systems for the routine transmission and recording of information. 
Such changes have informed the revision of this book.
Similar to the previous editions, however, I have taken nothing for granted. 
I have defined in clear language and illustrated with common examples any 
concept that is basic to semiotic theory. I have also avoided making constant 
references to the technical literature. The works that have informed my com-
mentaries, descriptions, and analyses are found in the endnotes. I have tried 
to cast as wide a net as possible, attempting to exemplify within two covers 
how semiotics can be used effectively to probe human nature in specific ways. 
As in previous editions, I wish to assure the reader that I have made every pos-
sible attempt to emphasize method of analysis, rather than my personal views. 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with any or all of my commentaries is, in 
fact, beside the real purpose of this book, which is to spur readers to identify 
and reflect upon the unconscious meanings that flow through the system of 
everyday life in which they take part on a daily basis.
The first edition of this book was the idea of the late Professor Roberta 
Kevelson of Penn State University, a leading semiotician. She will be missed 
greatly. It was Michael Flamini of St. Martin’s Press who brought it to fruition 
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as editor. The invitation to put together a second edition comes from Farideh 
Koohi-Kamali, also of the Press. This edition is made possible by Shaun Vigil, 
my editor at Palgrave. I cannot thank them all enough for their support and 
enthusiasm. I am also deeply grateful to Victoria College of the University of 
Toronto for granting me the privilege of teaching semiotics for many years. 
This has allowed me to learn a great deal about human nature from the enthu-
siastic students I have taught. I have learned more from them than they have 
from me. Finally, a heartfelt thanks goes out to my family, Lucy, Alexander, 
Sarah, Danila, Chris, and Charlotte, for all the patience they have had with 
me over the years. I would like to dedicate this book to my late father, Danilo. 
He was a simple and kind soul who inspired generosity and benevolence in all 
those around him.
Toronto, ON, Canada Marcel Danesi
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1
Cigarettes and High Heels: 
The Universe of Signs
A cigarette is the perfect type of a perfect pleasure. It is exquisite, and it leaves one 
unsatisfied. What more can one want?
—Oscar Wilde (1854–1900)
It’s eight o’clock on a Saturday night. Two cool-looking people, both in their 
late twenties, are sitting across from each other at an elegantly set table in a 
trendy restaurant, located in the downtown area of a North American city. For 
convenience, let’s call them Cheryl and Ted. Other couples are seated at tables 
in other parts of the eatery. The lights are turned down low. The atmosphere is 
unmistakably romantic, sustained by the soft, mellifluous sounds of a three-
piece jazz band playing in the background. Cheryl and Ted are sipping drinks, 
making small talk, looking coyly into each other’s eyes. At a certain point, they 
decide to step outside for a few moments and engage in a shared activity—
smoking cigarettes in a secluded area outside the restaurant, set aside for smok-
ers. Smoking is a tradition that this particular restaurant has decided to preserve, 
despite great opposition to it from city legislators, not to mention society. The 
scene overall is distinctly reminiscent of a classic Hollywood romantic movie.
What Cheryl and Ted do not know is that nearby is a semiotician, whom 
we shall call Martha, quietly and unobtrusively capturing their actions and 
conversations on a smartphone both inside and outside the restaurant. Martha 
is our research assistant, assigned to record our couple’s words, facial expres-
sions, body language, and other behaviors on her mobile device, so that we 
can dissect them semiotically. Her device transmits the images and sounds 
simultaneously to a remote monitoring computer to which we have access.
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Let’s start by first examining the smoking gestures that our two subjects 
made. As the video starts, we see Cheryl taking her cigarette out of its package 
in a slow, deliberate manner, inserting it coquettishly into the middle of her 
mouth, then bringing the flame of a match towards it in a leisurely, drawn-out 
fashion. Next to Cheryl, we see Ted also taking his cigarette from its package, 
but, in contrast, he employs a terse movement, inserting it into the side of his 
mouth, and then lighting it with a swift hand action. As the two puff away, we 
see Cheryl keeping the cigarette between her index and third fingers, periodi-
cally flicking the ashes into an outside ashtray provided by the restaurant for 
smokers, inserting and removing the cigarette from her mouth, always with 
graceful, circular, slightly swooping motions of the hand. Occasionally, she 
tosses her long, flowing hair back, away from her face. Ted is leaning against 
a nearby wall, keeping his head taut, looking straight, holding his cigarette 
between the thumb and middle finger, guiding it to the side of his mouth 
with sharp, pointed movements. Cheryl draws in smoke slowly, retaining it in 
her mouth for a relatively longer period than Ted, exhaling the smoke in an 
upwards direction with her head tilted slightly to the side, and, finally, extin-
guishing her cigarette in the ashtray. Ted inhales smoke abruptly, keeping the 
cigarette in his mouth for a relatively shorter period of time, blowing the 
smoke in a downward direction (with his head slightly aslant), and then extin-
guishing the cigarette by pressing down on the butt with his thumb, almost as 
if he were effacing or destroying evidence.
 Cigarettes and Courtship
Welcome to the world of the semiotician who is, above all else, a “people- 
watcher,” observing how individuals and groups behave in everyday situa-
tions, always asking: What does this or that mean? Meaning is the sum and 
substance of what semioticians study, no matter in what form it comes, small 
or large, so to speak. So, let’s start our excursion into the fascinating world of 
semiotics by unraveling what the various gestures and movements recorded by 
Martha might mean. But before starting, it might be useful to check whether 
there is some historically based link between smoking, sex, and romance.
Tobacco is native to the Western Hemisphere and was part of rituals of the 
Maya and other Native peoples, believing that it had medicinal and powerful 
mystical properties. As Jason Hughes has aptly put it, “Tobacco was used to 
appease the spiritual hunger, thereby gaining favors and good fortune.”1 The 
Arawak society of the Caribbean, as observed by none other than Christopher 
Columbus in 1492, smoked tobacco with a tube they called a tobago, from 
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which the word tobacco is derived. Brought to Spain in 1556, tobacco was 
introduced to France in the same year by the French diplomat Jean Nicot, 
from whose name we get the term nicotine. In 1585 the English navigator, Sir 
Francis Drake, took tobacco to England, where the practice of pipe smoking 
became popular almost immediately, especially among Elizabethan courtiers. 
From there, tobacco use spread throughout Europe and the rest of the world. 
By the seventeenth century it had reached China, Japan, the west coast of 
Africa, and other regions.
By the early twentieth century cigarette smoking became a routine activity 
in many societies. In America alone more than one thousand cigarettes per 
person each year were being consumed. American society at the time believed 
that smoking was not only highly fashionable, but that it also relieved ten-
sions and produced physical health benefits. During World War II, physicians 
encouraged sending soldiers cigarettes in ration kits. However, epidemiolo-
gists started noticing around 1930 that lung cancer—rare before the twenti-
eth century—had been increasing dramatically. The rise in lung cancer rates 
among the returning soldiers eventually raised a red flag. The American 
Cancer Society and other organizations initiated studies comparing deaths 
among smokers and nonsmokers, finding significant differential rates of can-
cer between the two. In 1964 the U.S. Surgeon General’s report affirmed that 
cigarette smoking was a health hazard of sufficient importance to warrant the 
inclusion of a warning on cigarette packages. Cigarette advertising was banned 
from radio and television, starting in 1971. In the 1970s and 1980s several 
cities and states passed laws requiring nonsmoking sections in enclosed public 
and work places. In February 1990 federal law banned smoking on all domes-
tic airline flights of less than six hours. Today, there are laws throughout North 
America that prohibit smoking in public places, buildings, and vehicles. The 
goal of society over the last decades has been to achieve a smoke-free world.
Yet in spite of the health dangers and all the legislative and practical obsta-
cles, a sizeable portion of the population continues to smoke. Although there 
has been a dramatic shift in how tobacco is perceived across the world, many 
still desire to smoke.2 Why do people smoke, despite the harm that smoking 
poses and despite its prohibition virtually everywhere? People smoke, or at 
least start smoking, because it is socially meaningful (or at least fashionable). 
To the semiotician, this comes as no surprise, since cigarettes have, through-
out their history, been perceived as signs of something desirable or attractive. 
Let’s consider what these might be.
The smoking scene that Martha captured on video is identifiable essentially 
as an ersatz courtship display, a recurrent, largely unconscious, pre-mating 
ritual rooted in gesture, body poses, and physical actions that keep the two 
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sexes differentiated and highly interested in each other. As Margaret Leroy has 
suggested, such actions are performed because sexual traditions dictate it.3 
Let’s scrutinize Cheryl’s smoking gestures more closely. The way in which she 
held the cigarette invitingly between her index and middle fingers, fondling it 
gently, and then inserting it into the middle of her mouth, slowly and delib-
erately, constitutes a sequence of unconscious movements that convey sexual 
interest in her partner. At the same time, she exhibits her fingers and wrist to 
her suitor, areas of the body that have erotic overtones. Finally, her hair- tossing 
movements, as she simultaneously raises a shoulder, constitute powerful erotic 
signals as well.
Ted’s gestures form a sequential counterpart to Cheryl’s, emphasizing mas-
culinity. Her movements are slow, his movements are abrupt; she puffs the 
smoke upwards, he blows it downwards; she holds the cigarette in a tantaliz-
ing dangling manner between her index and middle fingers, he holds it in a 
sturdy way between his thumb and middle finger; she puts out the cigarette 
with a lingering hand movement, he crushes it forcefully. Overall, her gestures 
convey smooth sensuality, voluptuousness, sultriness; his gestures suggest 
toughness, determination, and control. She is playing the female role and he 
the male one in this unconscious courtship display—roles determined largely 
by culture, and especially by the images of smoking that come out of classic 
Hollywood movies, which can be analyzed in exactly the same way.
Smoking in contexts such as this one is essentially romantic fun and games. 
Moreover, because it is now socially proscribed, it is probably even more fun 
to do (at least for some people). The history of smoking shows that tobacco 
has, in fact, been perceived at times as a desirable activity and at others as a 
forbidden one.4 But in almost every era, as Richard Klein5 has argued, ciga-
rettes have had some connection to something that is erotically, socially, or 
intellectually appealing—musicians smoke; intellectuals smoke; artists smoke; 
and to this day romantic partners smoke (despite all the warnings). Movies 
have always told us that cigarettes are meaningful props in sex and romance, 
as do advertisements for cigarettes. Smoking is, in a word, a sexual language, 
which, as Michael Starr puts it, is designed to convey “certain qualities of the 
smoker.”6
Ever since it fell out of the social mainstream, smoking has entered the 
alluring world of the verboten. Anytime something becomes taboo it takes on 
powerful symbolism—the more forbidden and the more dangerous, the sexier 
and more alluring it is. Smoking communicates rebellion, defiance, and sexu-
ality all wrapped into one. No wonder then that regulations aimed at curbing 
the marketing and sale of tobacco products to young people have failed miser-
ably in deterring them from smoking. As Tara Parker-Pope has aptly put it: 
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“For 500 years, smokers and tobacco makers have risked torture and even 
death at the hands of tobacco’s enemies, so it’s unlikely that a bunch of lawyers 
and politicians and the looming threat of deadly disease will fell either the 
industry or the habit.”7
The smoking gestures that Martha recorded are performed in parallel situ-
ations throughout many secular societies as part of urban courtship rituals; 
they form what semioticians call a code. Codes are systems of signs—gestures, 
movements, words, glances—that allow people to make and send out mean-
ingful messages in specific situations. Codes mediate relationships between 
people and are, therefore, effective shapers of how we think of others and of 
ourselves. The smoking routines caught on Martha’s video are part of a court-
ship code that unconsciously dictates not only smoking styles, but also how 
individuals act, move, dress, and the like, in order to present an appropriate 
romantic persona.
The particular enactment of the code will vary in detail from situation to 
situation, from person to person, but its basic structure will remain the same. 
The code provides a script for social performances. No wonder, then, that 
teenagers tend to take up smoking, early on in their tentative ventures into 
adulthood.8 In several research projects that I undertook in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, I noticed that adolescents put on the same type of smoking per-
formances that our fictional restaurant protagonists did, using cigarettes 
essentially as “cool props,” albeit in different situations (in school yards, in 
malls, at parties).9 Cigarette smoking in adolescence is, in a phrase, a coming- 
of- age rite, a ritualized performance designed to send out signals of maturity 
and attractiveness to peers.
Smoking performances raise key questions about ritualistic behaviors. In 
biology, the word sex alludes to the physical and behavioral differences that 
distinguish most organisms according to their role in the reproductive pro-
cess. Through these differences, termed male and female, the individual mem-
bers of a species assume distinct sexual roles. Therefore, sensing the other 
person’s sex is an innate or instinctual biological mechanism, as it is called. 
This mechanism is sensitive to mating signals emitted during estrus (going 
into heat). However, at some point in its evolutionary history the human spe-
cies developed a capacity and need to engage in sex independently of estrus. 
Other animals experience chemical and physical changes in the body during 
estrus, which stimulate desire. Humans, however, often experience desire first, 
which then produces changes in the body.
The biologist Charles Darwin (1809–82) called courtship displays “sub-
missive,” because they are designed to send out the message, Notice me, I am 
attractive and harmless. In effect, Cheryl’s coy glances are opening gambits in 
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courtship. Her shoulder shrug and her head-tilting are examples of submissive 
gestures. However, human courtship is not controlled exclusively by biologi-
cal mechanisms. Smoking has nothing to do with biology. A cigarette is an 
imaginary prop, not a biological mechanism. Smoking unfolds as a text—lit-
erally, a “weaving together” of the signs taken from a specific code. Together 
with the gestures, bodily postures, and other actions shown on Martha’s video, 
smoking constitutes a courtship text—an unconscious script that is performed 
at locales such as restaurants.
Therefore, the human story of courtship has many more chapters in it than a 
purely biological version of it would reveal. Nature creates sex; culture creates 
gender roles. This is why there are no gender universals. Traditionally, in Western 
society, men have been expected to be the sex seekers, to initiate courtship, and 
to show an aggressive interest in sex; but among the Zuñi peoples  of New 
Mexico, these very same actions and passions, are expected of the women. 
Recently a society-wide process that can be called “degendering,” or the ten-
dency to blur and even eliminate traditional gender roles, has been occurring in 
many contemporary cultures. Moreover, today transgendered individuals, that 
is, those who identify with a gender other than the biological one, have made it 
obvious that gender, rather than sex, is indeed a human construct.
The views people develop of gender shape feelings and guide their attempts 
to make sense of a kiss, a touch, a look, and the like. These are products of a 
culture’s history. This is why there is so much variable opinion across the 
world, and even within a single society, as to what is sexually appropriate 
behavior and what body areas are erotic. The people of one culture may regard 
legs, earlobes, and the back of the neck as sexually attractive. But those of 
another may find nothing at all sexual about these body parts. What is con-
sidered sexual or appropriate sexual behavior in some cultures is considered 
nonsense or sinfulness in others.
 Enter the Semiotician
Now that we have identified the smoking gestures made by Cheryl and Ted as 
signs in a courtship code, our next task is to unravel how this code came 
about. The association of smoking with sexual attractiveness can probably be 
traced back to the jazz night club scene of the first decades of the twentieth 
century. The word jazz originally had sexual connotations; and to this day the 
verb form, to jazz, suggests such connotations. The jazz clubs, known as 
“speakeasies,” were locales where young people went to socialize and to smoke, 
away from the eyes of social elders during Prohibition. The latter was intended 
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to curtail sexual and obscene behaviors, in addition to prohibiting alcohol 
consumption. As mentioned, anything that is forbidden becomes attractive. 
And this is what happened in the 1920s, when speakeasies became the rage at 
night. The cigarette-smoking courtship code was forged then and there. 
Although smoking is diminishing in the face of a society-wide onslaught on 
it, it still goes on because, as in the 1920s, it is part of a code that is perceived 
to be enjoyable, sexy, and subversive against systems that want to prohibit it.
Certainly, the movies and advertisers have always known this to their great 
advantage. Director Gjon Mili, for instance, captured the night club allure of 
smoking memorably in his 1945 movie, Jammin’ the Blues. In the opening 
segment, there is a close-up of the great saxophonist Lester Young inserting a 
cigarette gingerly into his mouth, then dangling it between his index and 
middle fingers as he plays a slow, soft, style of jazz for his late-night audience. 
The makers of Camel cigarettes strategically revived this scene in their adver-
tising campaigns of the early 1990s, with ads showing images of a camel, 
dressed in an evening jacket, playing the piano in a club setting, a cigarette 
dangling suggestively from the side of his mouth. Those ads were clearly 
designed to evoke the cool smoothness and finesse embodied by jazz musi-
cians of a bygone and now mythical era.
The sexual subtleties of the jazz club scene were captured as well by Michael 
Curtiz in his 1942 movie, Casablanca. Cigarettes are the dominant props in 
Rick’s café. There is a particularly memorable scene at the start of the movie. 
Swaggering imperiously in his realm, with cigarette in hand, Rick (Humphrey 
Bogart) goes up to Ingrid Bergman, expressing concern over the fact that she 
had had too much to drink. Dressed in white, like a knight in shining armor, 
Bogart comes to the aid of a “damsel in distress,” sending her home to sober 
up. As he admonishes her, Bogart takes out another cigarette from its package, 
inserting it into his mouth. He lights it, letting it dangle from the side of his 
mouth. So captivating was this image of coolness to cinema-goers, that it 
became an instant paradigm of masculinity imitated by hordes of young men 
throughout society. In a scene in Jean Luc Godard’s 1959 movie, Breathless, 
Jean-Paul Belmondo stares at a poster of Bogart in a movie window display. 
He takes out a cigarette and starts smoking it, imitating Bogart in Casablanca. 
With the cigarette dangling from the side of his mouth, the tough-looking 
Belmondo approaches his female mate with a blunt, “Sleep with me tonight?”
The “Bogartian cigarette image,” as it can be called, has found its way into 
the scripts of many movies. For instance, in the car chicken scene of Nicholas 
Ray’s 1955 movie, Rebel without a Cause, James Dean, one of two combatants, 
can be seen behind the wheel of his car, getting ready for battle, with a ciga-
rette dangling in Bogartian style from the side of his mouth. In Michelangelo 
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Antonioni’s 1966 movie, Blow Up, Vanessa Redgrave swerves her head 
e xcitedly to the jazz rock music that David Hemmings, her paramour, has put 
on his record player. He then gives her the cigarette he had in his own mouth. 
She takes it quickly, eager to insert it into her own mouth. But, no, Hemmings 
instructs her, she must slow the whole performance down; she must go 
“against the beat,” as he puts it. Leaning forward, Redgrave takes the cigarette 
and inserts it slowly and seductively into the middle of her mouth. She lies 
back salaciously, blowing the smoke upwards. She gives Hemmings back the 
cigarette, giggling suggestively. He takes it and inserts it into his own mouth, 
slightly to the side, in Bogartian style, visibly overcome by the erotic power of 
her smoking performance.
Such images have become emblazoned in the collective memory of our 
culture, even though starting in the mid-1990s, Hollywood became politi-
cally correct, producing fewer and fewer movies with cigarettes in them. 
Nevertheless, the “history of smoking,” as captured by the movies, explains 
why, in situations that call for romance, a skillful use of the cigarette as a prop 
continues to be perceived as enhancing romance. All this reveals something 
truly extraordinary about the human species. People will do something, even 
if it puts their lives at risk, for no other reason than it is interesting. Smoking 
in modern-day societies makes courtship interesting. A colleague of mine 
once quipped that semiotics can be defined as the study of “anything that is 
interesting.”
 Cigarettes Are Signs
As the foregoing discussion was meant to suggest, cigarettes are hardly just 
cigarettes (nicotine sticks). As mentioned, the cigarette is a sign that conjures 
up images and meanings of sexual cool. It also has (or has had) other mean-
ings. When females started smoking in the early part of the twentieth century, 
the cigarette was perceived as a threatening symbol of equality and indepen-
dence to the patriarchal culture at the time. A particular brand of cigarettes, 
Virginia Slims, has always played precisely on this meaning, equating cigarette 
smoking with female power and women’s liberation. From the outset, the 
brand has emphasized that smoking, once considered a “male thing,” has 
empowered females, providing them with a symbolic prop through which 
they can tacitly communicate their independence from social patriarchy. For 
women to smoke “their own brand” of cigarette has, in fact, been promoted 
by the company as a subversive social act. It is relevant to note, however, that 
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women in previous centuries smoked things such as cigars and pipes, not ciga-
rettes. As Hughes puts it, cigarette smoking was likely the result of male smok-
ers’ attempts “to distance their forms of tobacco use from that of women.”10
The basic goal of semiotics is to identify what constitutes a sign and to infer, 
document, or ascertain what its meanings are. First, a sign must have distinctive 
physical structure. The shape of a cigarette, for example, allows us to differenti-
ate it from other smoking materials such as cigars and pipes. This is called vicari-
ously the signifier, the representamen, or even just the sign. The term signifier will 
be used in this book simply for the sake of convenience. Second, a sign must 
refer to something. In the case of the cigarette, it can be sexual cool, jazz clubs, 
Humphrey Bogart, and the like. This is designated the referent, object, or signi-
fied. The term signified will be used in this book. This is more precise than the 
term “meaning,” because it entails an inextricable psychological connection 
between the form (signifier) and what it encodes (signified). Finally, a sign 
evokes particular thoughts, ideas, feelings, and perceptions differentially in peo-
ple. This is called, alternately, signification, interpretation, or simply meaning. All 
three terms will be used in this book. Cigarettes are clearly signs because they 
have all three aspects—they have physical structure, they refer to specific ideas, 
and, of course, they evoke different interpretations in different people.
A sign carries within it a slice of a culture’s history. Take Salem cigarettes as 
a case in point. In the late 1990s the makers of the cigarettes created an 
abstractly designed package, imitative of symbolist or expressionist style. The 
company mailed out a sample package along with four gift packages—a box 
of peppermint tea, a container of Chinese fortune cookies, a bottle of mint- 
scented massage gel, and finally a candle—throughout the country. Each 
package came with a coupon for a free pack of cigarettes. The package’s new 
design, along with the occult nature of the gifts, were designed to impart a 
mystical aura to the cigarettes. It is no coincidence that the name of the brand 
itself is suggestive of the occult. The Salem witchcraft trials—the result of the 
largest witch hunt in American history—were held in 1692 in Salem, a town 
in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The cigarette’s name is, in effect, a signifier 
that suggests an emotionally charged period in American history (the signi-
fied), no matter what interpretation we assign to the cigarette and its epony-
mous historical event.
The scholar who coined the terms signifier and signified was the Swiss lin-
guist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). For Saussure, the meanings of a 
sign were fixed socially by convention. Moreover, he believed that the choice 
of a particular sign to stand for something was largely an arbitrary process; 
that is, he did not think that it was motivated by any attempt to make it 
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r eplicate, simulate, or imitate any perceivable feature of the entity to which it 
referred. For Saussure, onomatopoeic words—words that imitate the sound of 
the concept to which they refer (chirp, drip, boom, zap, and so on)—were the 
exception, not the rule, in how language signs are constructed. Moreover, the 
highly variable nature of onomatopoeia across languages suggested to him 
that even this phenomenon was subject to arbitrary social conventions. For 
instance, the sounds made by a rooster are rendered by cock-a-doodle-do in 
English, but by chicchirichì (pronounced “keekeereekee”) in Italian; similarly, 
the barking of a dog is conveyed by bow-wow in English but by ouaoua 
 (pronounced “wawa”) in French. Saussure argued that such signs were only 
approximate, and more or less conventional, imitations of perceived sounds.
However, Saussure, a brilliant historical linguist, appears to have ignored 
the historical nature of sign-making processes. While the relation of a word to 
its referent can be argued logically to be arbitrary, the historical record often 
reveals a different story. It seems that the inventors of many words have, in 
fact, attempted to capture the sounds of the things to which they referred. 
Thus, even a word such as flow, which means “to run like water or to move in 
a current or stream,” has phonic qualities that clearly suggest the movement 
of water. It is unlikely that a hypothetical word such as plock would have been 
coined in its stead, for the simple reason that it is counterintuitive in referen-
tial terms.
Similarly, the phallic form of a cigarette and its association with sexuality is 
hardly an arbitrary matter—at least to human perception. It is what stands 
out in Rick’s Café, in which it clearly suggests masculinity, and in Virginia 
Slim ads, where it subverts this meaning. The view that signs are forged ini-
tially to simulate something noticeable about a referent was, in fact, the one 
put forward by the American philosopher Charles Peirce (1839–1914), who 
argued that signs are attempts to resemble reality, but are no longer perceived 
as such because time and use have made people forget how they came about. 
For example, the cross in Christian religions is now perceived largely as a sym-
bolic, conventional sign standing for “Christianity” as a whole. However, the 
cross sign was obviously created as an attempt to resemble the actual shape of 
the cross on which Christ was crucified.11
Most people, whether or not they speak English or Italian, will notice an 
attempt in both the words described earlier, cock-a-doodle-do and chicchirichì, 
to imitate rooster sounds. The reason why the outcomes are different is, in part, 
because of differences in the respective sound systems of the two languages. 
Such attempts, as Peirce suggested, can be easily recognized in many words, 
even though people no longer consciously experience them as imitative forms.
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 Binary Versus Triadic Models of the Sign
There is one more technical matter to discuss here before proceeding. Saussure’s 
model of the sign is called binary, because it involves two dimensions—form 
and meaning. And, as discussed, the connection between the two is seen as 
arbitrary. Nevertheless, it is a theory of mind, since it suggests that the par-
ticular thoughts that come to mind are evoked by the particular forms we 
have created to encode them and, vice versa, if a specific thought comes to 
mind then we instantly search for the appropriate word that encodes it. So, if 
we see a particular plant in our line of vision and we have the word tree in our 
mental lexicon, the image in our mind and the word form a blend. Vice versa, 
when we use the word tree the image is also evoked simultaneously.
Although this seems to be a simple model of cognition today, it is still inter-
esting and useful on several counts. First, it does make a connection between 
form and meaning in a concrete way. A signifier cannot exist without a signi-
fied, and vice versa. Plants are perceived as indistinct impressions. They cone 
into mental focus when we have a word that makes a selection among these 
impressions. This is what happens when we use the word tree. It selects from 
among an infinite set of possibilities and thus allows us to focus specifically on 
a particular domain of reference. Putting aside the fact that the connection 
may not be arbitrary, as Saussure maintained, it is still a remarkable yet simple 
theory of cognition. Binary structure is manifest in many artificial systems as 
well, such as alarm systems with their “on-off” structure, binary digits, digital 
computers, and others.
Peirce’s model of the sign is called triadic because, essentially, it adds a third 
component to the binary model—interpretation. As we shall see, there is 
much more to the Peircean model. For the present purpose, suffice it to say 
that it suggests an inherent connection between form and reference—the two 
interact dynamically with each other, as we saw with the word flow. So, rather 
than being called arbitrary, the model is called motivated. This means essen-
tially that when we create signs we are attempting to reproduce some sensory 
aspect of their referent (which Peirce called object) into their structure. The 
word flow is an attempt to simulate the sound that moving water makes to our 
ears. Because of this, interpretations of the sign will vary considerably, as we 
shall also see. Peirce called these interpretants, which are the meanings that a 
sign accrues in some context, at some point in time. Although the distinction 
between binary and triadic may seem somewhat irrelevant at this point, it is 
really critical, especially today within disciplines such as cognitive science. The 
triadic model suggests that we come up with signs not arbitrarily, but by 
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 amalgamating the body and the mind; in the binary model we can easily sepa-
rate the two (given the arbitrary nature of the connection). The triadic one 
describes human intelligence rather nicely; the binary one describes artificial 
intelligence much better instead.
 High Heels Are Signs Too
Martha’s video of the restaurant scene has captured many more interesting 
things for us to examine semiotically. At one point, Martha zeroed in with her 
device on Cheryl’s shoes. As you might have guessed, Cheryl was wearing high 
heel shoes. Why? In prehistoric times people went barefoot. The first foot 
coverings were probably made of animal skins, which the peoples of the 
Bronze Age (approximately  3000  BCE) in northern Europe and Asia tied 
around their ankles in cold weather. Such footwear was the likely ancestor of 
the European and native North American skin moccasin and the leather and 
felt boots still worn by many throughout the world. The original purpose of 
such footwear was, no doubt, to protect the feet and to allow people to walk 
comfortably, or at least painlessly, on rough terrain. Now, consider high heel 
shoes. They are uncomfortable and awkward to wear, yet millions of women 
wear them. Obviously, the semiotic story of such shoes has parts to it that 
have little to do with protection and locomotion. Similar to cigarettes, they 
are signs, as are all kinds of shoes—the strength of the Roman army was built 
practically and symbolically on the walking power symbolized by the soldier’s 
boots; many children’s stories revolve around shoes or boots that magically 
enable some hero to cover great distances at great speed; Hermes, the Greek 
god, traveled in winged sandals; and the list could go on and on.
High heel shoes are elegant, stylish, and sexy. The perception of high heels 
as stylish footwear dates back to fourteenth-century Venice when aristocratic 
women donned them to set themselves apart socially from peasant and ser-
vant women. In the sixteenth century, Caterina de’ Medici (1519–89), the 
Florentine-born queen of France, donned a pair of high heel shoes for her 
marriage to Henry II in Paris in 1533. The event engendered a fashion craze 
among the French aristocracy (male and female), encouraged by Louis XIV of 
France, who apparently wore them to increase his modest height. The high 
heel shoe was, semiotically speaking, a signifier of nobility, and the higher the 
heel the higher the rank of the wearer. It was in the mid-nineteenth century 
that heeled shoes—low-cut, laced or buttoned to the ankle—became the fash-
ion craze among all classes of females, who wore them to keep up their dresses 
from dragging along the ground. During that period, known as the Victorian 
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era, the shoes became, for the first time in their history, gendered signs of 
female beauty and sexuality. The reason for this is obvious to this day—high 
heels force the body to tilt, raising the buttocks and giving prominence to the 
breasts. They also give glimpses of the woman’s feet in a tantalizing manner, 
thus accentuating the role of female feet in the history of sexuality, as the 
social historian William Rossi has documented.12 In fairy tales, the “lure of 
the shoe” is found in stories such as Cinderella and The Golden Slipper.
This history would explain why high heels are often perceived to be 
fetishes—signs that evoke devotion to themselves, rather than what they stand 
for. In some cultures, this devotion results from the belief that the shoes have 
magical or metaphysical attributes, as is evidenced by cross-cultural narratives 
in which shoes are portrayed as magical objects. In psychology, the term fetish 
refers instead to objects or body parts through which sexual fantasies are 
played out. Common fetishes are feet, shoes, stockings, and articles of inti-
mate female apparel. Psychologists believe that fetishism serves to alleviate 
feelings of sexual inadequacy, usually among males. However, in a fascinating 
book, Valerie Steele13 has argued that we are all fetishists to an extent, and that 
the line between the “normal” and the “abnormal” in sexual preferences and 
behaviors is a blurry one indeed. Fashion designers, for instance, steal regu-
larly from the fetishist’s closet, promoting ultra-high heels, frilly underwear, 
latex suits, and the like. The appropriation has been so complete that people 
wearing such footwear, garments, and apparel are generally unaware of their 
fetishist origins.
The high heels worn by Cheryl in our fictitious scene allowed her to send 
out various interpretants connected to their semiotic history—stylishness, 
fetishness, and eroticism—all meanings that are reinforced in media and pop 
culture representations of various kinds, from movies to ads. It would appear 
that the human mind is fundamentally a historical sensor of meanings, even 
when these are buried somewhere deeply within it. High heel shoes are part of 
fantasy. Claire Underwood, as the ruthless political wife in House of Cards, 
would be perceived as less alluring and thus dangerous without her killer 
heels. On the screen and in ads, high heels can make a woman look more 
powerful.
 The System of Everyday Life
Cigarettes and high heel shoes provide human beings with unique kinds of tools 
to act out their constantly varying roles on the stage of everyday life. The 
s ociologist Erving Goffman (1922–82) drew attention to the idea that everyday 
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life is very much like the theater,14 because it involves a skillful staging of 
 character according to social context. The two protagonists in our imaginary 
scene are indeed “character actors” who employ gestures, props, and conversa-
tion to impress each other for a specific reason—romance. The Latin term for 
“cast of characters” is dramatis personae, literally, “the persons of the drama,” a 
term betraying the theatrical origin of our concept of personhood.15 We seem, 
in a phrase, to perceive life as a stage.
The question of how this perception came about in the first place is an 
intriguing one. The scientific record suggests that life in early hominid groups 
revolved around duties associated with hunting, crop-gathering, and cooking. 
These were shared by individuals to enhance the overall efficiency of the 
group. As the brain of these early hominids developed, their ability to com-
municate their thoughts increased proportionately. Plaster casts of skulls dat-
ing back approximately one hundred thousand years, which allow scientists to 
reconstruct ancient brains, reveal that brain size was not much different from 
current brain size. Cave art starts appearing shortly after, and linguists specu-
late that human speech had also emerged. About ten thousand years ago, 
plants were domesticated, followed shortly after by the domestication of ani-
mals. This agricultural revolution set the stage for the advent of civilization.
The first human groups with language developed an early form of culture, 
to which archeological scientists refer as the tribe, a fully functional system of 
group life to which even modern humans seem instinctively to relate. The 
basis of such cultures was ritual—a set of actions accompanied by words 
intended to bring about certain events or to signify such critical events as 
birth, the coming-of-age, matrimony, and death. Ritual is the predecessor of 
theater. In complex societies, where various cultures, subcultures, countercul-
tures, and parallel cultures are in constant competition with each other, and 
where the shared territory is too large to allow for members of the society to 
come together for salient ritualistic purposes, the tendency for individuals is 
to relate instinctively to smaller tribal-type groups (communities, clubs, and 
so on) and their peculiar rituals. This inclination towards tribalism, as the 
communications theorist Marshall McLuhan (1911–80) emphasized, 
 reverberates constantly within humans, and its diminution in modern urban 
societies may be the source of the sense of alienation that many people who 
live in complex and impersonal social settings experience.
Archaeological evidence suggests that as the members of the early tribes 
became more culturally sophisticated, that is, as their expressive capacities and 
technological systems grew in complexity, they sought larger and larger terri-
tories in order to accommodate their new and growing social needs. The tribes 
thus grew in population and diversity, cooperating or amalgamating with 
other tribes in their new settings. The anthropologist Desmond Morris has 
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called the complex tribal systems that came into existence super-tribes, because 
of expansion and amalgamation.16 The first super-tribes date back only around 
five thousand or so years, when the first city-states emerged.
A modern society is a super-tribe, a collectivity of individuals who do not 
necessarily trace their ancestral roots to the founding tribe, but who neverthe-
less participate in the cultural rituals of that tribe as it has evolved over time. 
Such participation allows individuals to interact in both spontaneous and 
patterned ways that are perceived as “normal.” Unlike tribes, however, the 
mode of interaction does not unfold on a personal level because it is impos-
sible to know, or know about, everyone living in the same super-tribe. 
Moreover, a society often encompasses more than one cultural system. 
Consider what people living in the society known as the United States call 
loosely “American culture.” This culture traces its origins to an amalgam of the 
cultural systems of the founding tribes of European societies who settled in 
the U.S. American society has also accommodated aboriginal and other paral-
lel cultural systems, with different ways of life, different languages, and differ-
ent rituals. Unlike their tribal ancestors, Americans can therefore live apart 
from the dominant cultural system, in a parallel one, or become members of 
a subculture; they can also learn and utilize different semiotic  codes, each 
leading to the adoption of different communication and lifestyle systems.
 The Science of Signs
Semiotics has never really caught on widely as an autonomous discipline in 
academia (or in society at large), as have other sciences of human nature, such 
as anthropology and psychology. There are various reasons for this, but  perhaps 
the most understandable one is that it is difficult to define semiotics and to 
locate it within the traditional academic landscape. Yet, to a large extent, 
everybody is a semiotician, whether they know it or not. As we have seen 
earlier, semiotic method is something we engage in all the time. When we 
instinctively pose the question of what something means, in effect, we are 
engaging in basic semiotic thinking. In addition, as mentioned, we find this 
interesting. Semiotics constitutes a “questioning form” of investigation into 
the nature of things that is not unlike the type of reasoning used by detectives, 
fictional or real-life. In fact, detective stories are really semiotic investigations 
in disguise. This is probably what makes them so popular. In 2003, Dan 
Brown’s The Da Vinci Code became a runaway international bestseller and pop 
culture phenomenon in large part because it was based on semiotic method, 
and certainly not on historical fact. The hero, a Harvard professor named 
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Robert Langdon, attempts to solve a historical mystery connecting Jesus and 
Mary Magdalene by using his knowledge of “symbology,” which the novel 
defines as the study of signs and symbols. A large part of the allure of that 
novel comes, arguably, from the hero’s ability to interpret the signs of the 
mystery in the same tradition of other fictional detective “symbologists,” from 
C.  Auguste Dupin to Sherlock Holmes and Poirot. “Symbology” is Dan 
Brown’s rendering of “semiotics.”
The term semiotics was applied for the first time to the study of the symp-
toms produced by the body. Hippocrates (c. 460–c. 377 BCE), the founder 
of Western medical science, defined a symptom as a semeion (“sign” or “mark” 
in Greek) of changes in normal bodily functions and processes. He argued 
that the visible features of the semeion help a physician identify a disease, 
malady, or ailment, calling the technique of diagnosis semeiotike. The basic 
analytical concept implicit in semeiotike was extended by philosophers to 
include human-made signs (such as words). The Greek philosopher Plato 
(c. 427–c. 347 BCE), for instance, was intrigued by the fact that a single word 
had the capacity to refer not to specific objects, but to objects that resemble 
each other in some identifiable way. For example, the word circle does not 
refer to a unique thing (although it can if need be), but to anything that has 
the property “circularity”—a particular circle can be altered in size, but it will 
still be called a circle because it possesses this property. Plato’s illustrious pupil 
Aristotle (384–322 BCE) argued that words start out as practical strategies for 
naming singular things, not properties. It is only after we discover that certain 
things have similar properties that we start classifying them into categories 
(such as “circularity”). At such points of discovery, Aristotle argued, we create 
abstract words that allow us to bring together things that have the similar 
properties: plants, animals, objects, and so on.
It was St. Augustine (354–430 CE), the early Christian church father and 
philosopher, who provided the first detailed “theory of the sign.” St. Augustine 
argued that are three types of signs. First, there are natural signs, which include 
not only bodily symptoms such as those discussed by Hippocrates, but also 
the rustling of leaves, the colors of plants, the signals that animals emit, and 
so on. Then there are conventional signs, which are the product of human 
ingenuity; these include not only words, but also gestures and the symbols 
that humans invent to serve their psychological, social, and communicative 
needs. Finally, St. Augustine considered miracles to be messages from God 
and, thus, sacred signs. These can only be understood on faith, although such 
understanding is partly based on specific cultural interpretations of them.
Interest in linking human understanding with sign-production waned after 
the death of St. Augustine. It was only in the eleventh century that such 
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i nterest was rekindled, mainly because of the translation of the works of the 
ancient philosophers. The outcome was the movement known as Scholasticism. 
The Scholastics asserted that conventional signs captured practical truths and, 
thus, allowed people to understand reality directly. But within this movement 
there were some—called nominalists—who argued that “truth” was itself a 
matter of subjective opinion and that signs captured, at best, only illusory and 
highly variable human versions of it—a perspective that is strikingly akin to 
some modern theories of the sign. At about the same time, the English phi-
losopher and scientist Roger Bacon (c. 1214–1292) developed one of the first 
comprehensive typologies of signs, claiming that, without a firm understand-
ing of the role of signs in human understanding, discussing what truth is or is 
not would end up being a trivial matter.
For some reason, Bacon’s proposal to study signs separately elicited little or 
no interest until 1690, when British philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) 
revived it in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke was, in fact, 
the first ever to put forward the idea of an autonomous mode of philosophical 
inquiry called semeiotics, which he defined as the “doctrine of signs.” However, 
his proposal too garnered little interest, until the nineteenth century when 
Saussure used the term semiology, instead, to suggest that such a doctrine or 
science was needed.17 Today, Locke’s term, spelled semiotics, is the preferred 
one—the term that Peirce used and put into broad circulation. Modern prac-
tices, theories, and techniques are based on one, the other, or both of the 
writings of Saussure and Peirce—that is, on binary or triadic semiotic meth-
ods. Following on their coattails, a number of key intellectuals developed 
semiotics in the twentieth century into the sophisticated discipline that it has 
become today. Only a few will be mentioned in passing here. The  monumental 
treatise on the development of sign theory by John Deely, The Four Ages, is 
recommended as a resource for filling in the gaps.18
The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) suggested that signs 
were pictures of reality, presenting it as if it were a series of images. This view 
continues to inform a large part of semiotic theory and practice today. The 
American semiotician Charles Morris (1901–79) divided semiotic method 
into the study of sign assemblages (which he called syntax), the study of the 
relations between signs and their meanings (semantics), and the study of the 
relations between signs and their users (pragmatics). The Russian-born 
American semiotician Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) studied various facets 
of sign construction, but is probably best known for his model of communi-
cation, which suggests that sign exchanges are hardly ever neutral but involve 
subjectivity and goal-attainment of some kind. The French semiotician 
Roland Barthes (1915–80) illustrated the power of using semiotics for 
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d ecoding the hidden meanings in pop culture spectacles such as wrestling 
matches and Hollywood blockbuster movies. French semiotician Algirdas 
J. Greimas (1917–92) developed the branch of semiotics known as narratol-
ogy, which studies how human beings in different cultures invent similar 
kinds of narratives (myths, tales, and so on) with virtually the same stock of 
characters, motifs, themes, and plots. The late Hungarian-born American 
semiotician Thomas A. Sebeok (1920–2001) was influential in expanding the 
semiotic paradigm to include the comparative study of animal signaling sys-
tems, which he termed zoosemiotics, and the study of semiosis in all living 
things, which has come to be called biosemiotics. Semiosis is the innate ability 
to produce and comprehend signs in a species-specific way. The interweaving 
and blending of ideas, findings, and scientific discourses from different disci-
plinary domains was, Sebeok claimed, the distinguishing feature of biosemi-
otics. Finally, Italian semiotician Umberto Eco (1932–2016) contributed 
significantly to our understanding of how we interpret signs. He also single-
handedly put the term semiotics on the map, so to speak, with his best-selling 
novel, The Name of the Rose published in the early 1980s.
An interesting definition of semiotics has, actually, been provided by Eco 
himself, in his 1976 book, A Theory of Semiotics. He defined it as “the disci-
pline studying everything that can be used in order to lie,” because if “some-
thing cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth; 
it cannot, in fact, be used to tell at all.”19 Despite its apparent facetiousness, 
this is a rather insightful definition. It implies that signs do not tell the whole 
story, or the whole “truth,” as the nominalists claimed. Humans, in fact, talk 
convincingly all the time about things that are entirely fictitious or imaginary. 
In a sense, culture is itself a big lie—a break from our biological heritage that 
has forced us to live mainly by our wits. As Prometheus proclaimed propheti-
cally in Aeschylus’ (525–456 BCE) drama Prometheus Bound, one day “rulers 
would conquer and control not by strength, nor by violence, but by cunning.” 
In a similar vein, the ancient Chinese sage Confucius (c. 551–479  BCE) 
wrote: “Signs and symbols rule the world, not words or laws.”
Semiotic method has been defined as structuralist, because of its focus on 
recurring patterns of form and meaning that are captured and expressed by 
recurring structures in sign systems (as will be discussed in the next chapter). 
In the 1960s, however, the late influential French semiotician Jacques Derrida 
(1930–2004) rejected this structuralist premise, proposing a counter-approach 
that came to be known widely as post-structuralism, by which he denounced 
the search for universal structures in human sign systems. According to 
Derrida all such systems are self-referential—signs refer to other signs, which 
refer to still other signs, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, what appears stable and 
M. Danesi
 19
logical turns out to be illogical and paradoxical. Many semioticians have 
severely criticized Derrida’s radical stance as ignoring veritable discoveries 
made by structuralism. It has nevertheless had a profound impact on many 
different fields of knowledge, not just semiotics, including the sciences. Today, 
semioticians continue to endorse structuralist principles exploring new 
domains of inquiry, such as cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and the Internet. 
Some of their ideas are discussed subsequently in this book.
The view of semiotics as a science is not the traditional one. Traditionally, 
this term has designated the objective knowledge of facts of the natural world, 
gained and verified by exact observation, experiment, and ordered thinking. 
However, the question as to whether or not human nature can be studied with 
the same objectivity has always been a problematic one. Indeed, many semio-
ticians refuse to call their field a science, for they believe that any study of the 
human mind can never be totally objective, preferring instead to characterize 
it as a doctrine—a set of principles—or a method. In this book, semiotics will 
be considered a science in the broader sense of the term—namely, as the orga-
nized body of knowledge on a particular subject.
 Principles of Semiotic Analysis
Three general principles underlie semiotic analysis. These will inform the dis-
cussion in the remainder of this book. The first is that all meaning-bearing 
behaviors and forms of expression have ancient roots, no matter how modern 
they may appear to be. The first task of the semiotician is, therefore, to unravel 
the history of signs, just as we did in the case of cigarettes and high heel shoes.
The second principle is that sign systems influence people’s notions of what 
is “normal” in human behavior. The second task of the semiotician is, thus, to 
expose the sign-based processes behind perceptions of normalcy. In North 
America it is perceived as “normal” for women to wear high heels and put on 
lipstick, but “abnormal” for men to do so. In reality, the classification of a 
clothing item or a cosmetic technique in gender terms is a matter of histori-
cally based convention, not of naturalness or lack thereof. In the sixteenth 
century, high heels, as we saw earlier, were the fashion craze for both female 
and male aristocrats. This principle is, clearly, a corollary of the first.
The third principle is that the particular system of signs in which one has 
been reared influences worldview, which is yet another corollary of the first 
principle. Consider the case of health. In our culture we say that disease “slows 
us down,” “destroys our bodies,” or “impairs” body functions. Such expres-
sions reflect a mechanistic view of the body. Tagalog, an indigenous language 
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of the Philippines, has no such equivalents. Instead, its expressions reveal a 
holistic view of the body as connected to spiritual forces, to social ambiance, 
and to nature. People reared in English-speaking cultures are inclined to eval-
uate disease as a localized phenomenon, within the body, separate from the 
larger social and ecological context. On the other hand, Tagalog people are 
inclined to evaluate disease as a response to that very context.
The foregoing discussion does not imply that there are no objectively deter-
minable symptoms or diseases. Humans the world over possess an innate 
physiological warning system that alerts them to dangerous changes in body 
states. Many of the symptoms produced by this system have been documented 
by the modern medical sciences. However, in daily life the human being’s 
evaluation of, and response to, the body’s warning signals are mediated by 
culture. In a perceptive book, Illness as Metaphor, the late writer Susan Sontag 
(1933–2004) cogently argued that it is indeed culture that predisposes people 
to think of specific illnesses in certain ways. Using the example of cancer, 
Sontag argued that in the not-too-distant past the very word cancer was an 
emotionally unsettling disease, not just a dangerous physical one: “As long as 
a particular disease is treated as an evil, invincible predator, not just a disease, 
most people with cancer will indeed be demoralized by learning what disease 
they have.”20 In a similar vein, Jacalyn Duffin has argued that diseases are 
often pure cultural constructs.21 “Lovesickness,” for instance, was once con-
sidered a true disease, even though it originated in the poetry of antiquity. Its 
demise as a disease is due to twentieth-century skepticism. At any given point 
in time, concepts of disease crystallize from cultural factors, not just from any 
scientific study of disease. The ways in which a culture defines and represents 
health will largely determine how it views and treats disease, what life expec-
tancy it sees as normal, and what features of body image it considers to be 
attractive, ugly, normal, or abnormal. Some cultures view a healthy body as 
being a lean and muscular one, others a plump and rotund one. Certain cul-
tures perceive a healthy lifestyle as one that is based on rigorous physical activ-
ity, while others perceive it as one that is based on a more leisurely and 
sedentary style of living.
The third principle does not in any way exclude the role of nature in the 
makeup of humanity in any way. To semioticians, the nature-versus-culture 
debate is irrelevant, since they see both as partners in semiosis—the ability of 
the human brain to convert perceptions into signs. In other words, cultures 
are reflections of who we are, not forces constructing us tabula rasa. Differences 
in worldview are, thus, superficial differences in sign-based emphases. It is in 
exposing those differences that semiotics is best suited, allowing us to under-
stand each other better in the process.
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To the semiotician, subjects such as cigarettes and high heels, which might 
at first appear to be trivial, are highly useful in exposing differences in world-
view. Semiotics allows us to filter the signs that swarm and flow through us 
every day, immunizing us against becoming passive victims of a situation. By 
understanding the signs, the situation is changed, and we become active inter-
preters of that situation.
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2
What Does It Mean?: How Humans 
Represent the World
The whole visible universe is but a storehouse of images and signs to which the 
imagination will give a relative place and value; it is a sort of pasture which the 
imagination must digest and transform.
—Charles Baudelaire (1821–67)
Martha’s video of the restaurant scene contains many more interesting e pisodes 
for the semiotician to digest and ponder. In one segment, Ted’s attention is 
caught by a pin that Cheryl has on her dress. Noticing its unconventional 
shape, he inquires: “What an interesting design. What does it mean?” Cheryl 
answers as follows: “It represents a water spirit in Chinese culture, which sym-
bolizes the vitality of life.”
Interest in objects and the design of things is common, even though we 
rarely give it much consideration, beyond the fact that we perceive it as part 
of natural curiosity. But human curiosity is a remarkable thing. The crux of 
semiotic analysis is, in effect, to satisfy our curiosity by unraveling what some-
thing means, or more accurately, represents. As discussed in the first chapter, 
notions such as sign, code, and text allow us to understand with much more 
accuracy how we extract meaning from the things that we come across rou-
tinely in our daily lives. Culture is really a system (or network) of signs, codes, 
and texts that inform people how to carry out their daily social interactions 
and what values to ascribe to objects.
Signs also are more than information-bearing devices. They are interpreta-
tions of the world. They are more than responses to stimuli. Moreover, they 
are highly variable devices. There really is no way to pin down what something 
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truly means; all that can be said is that it is used to represent something in a 
specific way. In fact, a sign is defined as something that stands for something 
else in some way. The process of interpreting some sign form is not a com-
pletely open-ended process, however. It is constrained by social conventions, 
by communal experiences, and by many other contextual factors that put 
limits on the range of meanings or interpretations that are possible in a given 
situation. A task of semiotic analysis is to figure out what that range is. In 
itself, information is literally meaningless, unless it is connected to some code 
or system of interpretation, so that it can be utilized for some purpose, or else 
given an interpretation and meaning so that it can be connected to other 
forms of meaning. In other words, information without a semiotic key for 
interpreting and using it is mindless. It is, as its etymology suggests—from 
Latin informatio “a sketch, an outline”—nothing more than meaningless form. 
Deriving meaning from this form requires knowledge of how it has been rep-
resented and how it has been used, and what its signifying properties are.
 The Meaning of Meaning
Let’s consider one crucial word in Ted’s question—namely the verb mean in 
“What does it mean?” This is a word we use often in everyday conversation 
without hardly ever reflecting on it. What does meaning mean? As it turns 
out, the word has many meanings itself. In 1923 two scholars, C. K. Ogden 
and I. A. Richards, found sixteen common meanings for this word in English.1 
In the sentence “Does life have a meaning?” for instance, the term is equiva-
lent to “purpose.” In sentences such as “What does love mean to you?” or “A 
green light means go,” the word has a more down-to-earth meaning. In such 
uses it designates “conveyance” or “indication.” Clearly, the meaning of mean-
ing is a problematic thing.
So, the term “meaning” is left undefined in semiotics. This is not a mere 
avoidance strategy. Similar to mathematics, certain notions are simply 
announced as such because they are self-evident. These are called axioms. To 
the semiotician there is no such thing as absolute meaning, for the simple 
reason that meaning cannot be separated from signs and their relations  to 
each other. To grasp what this means (no pun intended), consider the world 
of plants and animals as food sources. In theory, human beings are capable of 
classifying them by simple trial and error into edible (non-perilous) and ined-
ible (perilous)—that is, people living anywhere on earth are capable of 
s eparating any species of plant or animal by experimentation into two 
 categories—those that are perilous and those that are not. However, that’s not 
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the end of the story. People also classify non-perilous plants and animal meat 
as inedible. Rabbits, many kinds of flowers, and silkworms, for instance, 
would be classified (by and large) as “inedible” by people living in many mod-
ern urban societies, even though they cause no harm to health. On the other 
hand, many Europeans regularly consume rabbit meat and various types of 
flowers and Mexicans eat cooked silkworms with no adverse physical reactions 
whatsoever. These people obviously live in cultures that classify them as 
“e dible.” Classificatory disparities such as these exist because the cultural 
meanings of “rabbit” or “silkworm” are different. However, the fact that a par-
ticular culture predisposes its users to attend to certain meanings as necessary 
does not imply that members of other cultures are incapable of perceiving (or 
tasting) the world in similar ways. Although people from a certain culture 
might construe a cigarette differently from how cigarette-using cultures per-
ceive it, they can easily understand what it means if we simply explain to them 
its social functions, as was done in the first chapter. They might react with 
surprise or consternation, but they will nevertheless be able to grasp the mean-
ing. Practical knowledge of the world is culture-specific, built on the categories 
used to classify the world in a specific social context; but the theoretical capac-
ity for knowing is limitless, and can easily transcend the very culture-specific 
categories that commonly guide it.
The act of classification entails a corresponding act of interpretation. Simply 
defined, this is the ability to extract an appropriate meaning from some sign or 
text. Although interpretation is subject to much individual variation, it is not 
an open-ended process; it involves familiarity with the meanings of signs in 
specific contexts, with the type of code to which they belong, and with the 
nature of their referents—concrete referents (such as cat, dog, boy, girl, and so 
on) are less subject to variation than are abstract ones (such as justice, fairness, 
equality, patience, and so on). Without such familiarity, communication and 
interpersonal interaction would be virtually impossible in common social set-
tings. In essence, interpretation is a purposeful selection of specific meanings 
among the boundless ones of which the human mind is capable for some spe-
cific purpose or in some particular situation. In art and performance, one talks 
of interpretation as if it were less than the original creation of the work of art. 
But this is not correct. The interpreter is a creator of meanings as well. The late 
Canadian pianist Glen Gould (1932–82) was no less an artist for not having 
composed The Goldberg Variations, which he so masterfully played. He effaced 
himself the better to serve Bach’s model. The more successful he was at his task, 
the more deeply involved did he become in Bach’s art form. Every touch, every 
turn of phrase, became a mirror of his own creative imagination.
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 Types of Meaning
Now, let’s take a closer look at meaning, the way a semiotician would. First, 
there are two levels of meaning in human sign systems—the denotative and the 
connotative. You already have a sense of what this involves when you use every-
day words. Think of the word red. What does it mean? At one level, it refers to 
a specific kind of color different from, say, blue or green. But at another level, it 
refers to such things as an emotional state (“I’m red with embarrassment”), a 
financial predicament (“I’m in the red”), or a political ideology (“He’s been a 
red ideologue all his life”). Virtually all words have these two levels of meaning. 
So, the discussion that follows will not be totally foreign to you. It is intended 
simply to formalize what you already know intuitively.
A sign encodes something observed, perceived, felt, or thought. This is 
what it denotes, or calls attention to at a primary level of interpretation. The 
word house, for example, calls attention to a “structure for human habitation.” 
The kind of “structure” that it denotes is not specific, but rather, typical within 
a cultural context—house denotes something different to someone living in 
New York than it does to someone living in Calcutta or Namibia. The word 
house (and its equivalent in other languages) denotes many different types of 
structure—large, small, cubical, or spherical. In many societies today, this 
word will normally evoke the image of a cubical, rather than a spherical habi-
tation structure, because that is the prototypical shape of most modern-day 
houses. But, in others, such as the Dogon society of the Sudan or the settle-
ments of Zambian herders, the equivalent words will denote a spherical or 
conical structure.
Now, consider the use of the word house in sentences such as “The house is 
in session,” “The house roared with laughter,” and “They sleep in one of the 
houses at Harvard University.” These meanings clearly function at a different 
level. That level is called connotative. In the three sentences, the word house 
connotes a “legislative quorum,” an “audience,” and a “dormitory” respec-
tively. These extend the concept “structure for human habitation” to encom-
pass other situations in which humans come together (as if they were in a 
house). These meanings allow people to use a manageable set of signs to rep-
resent a large array of potential meanings. Connotation thus reveals a  particular 
principle of structure, which can be formulated simply as “doing a lot with a 
little.” More technically, this is called the principle of economy.
Connotation has many functions. The word yes in English denotes “affir-
mation,” but one can communicate doubt or incredulity through this same 
word by simply raising one’s voice as in a question: Yes? Similarly, one can 
convey conviction or excitement by stressing it: Yessss! These are emotive 
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c onnotations that can always be added to signs of various types through 
i ntonation. Consider house again. In sentences such as “Are you sure that’s a 
house? It looks more like a garage” incredulity and conviction are conveyed in 
a similar manner through a modulation in tone of voice.
Finally, the use of house in expressions such as “the house of God” and the 
“house of ill repute” reveals a different source of connotation. The meaning of 
house as a “church” or a “prostitution establishment” respectively manifests a 
specific kind of process that can be called, simply, historical connotation. 
Historically acquired meanings differ from other types of connotations, such 
as those produced by tone of voice, because they cannot be figured out solely 
in terms of extensions of denotative meaning, but must be gleaned from their 
use in social context. The meanings of cigarettes, high heels, perfumes, brand 
names of cars and clothes, and other such things, are all reflective of histori-
cally based connotative processes.
Consider again the color red. In cultures across the world, it is much more 
than a word denoting a specific hue of color. It is linked with life, magic, 
warmth, love, and fertility. The Anglo-Saxons painted trees and animals red, 
believing that this would protect them against evil, while warriors painted 
their hatchets and spears red believing that this would endow them with 
superhuman powers. In ancient Rome, brides wore a fiery red veil (the flam-
meum) to symbolize love and fertility—a custom also practiced in parts of 
China. In ancient Egypt, red was a sign of evil and wickedness, associated 
with the destructive god Set. Evil doings were called red affairs and scribes 
used red liquid to write about warnings—a practice that continues even in 
modern-day societies, revealing why we use such expressions as “being in the 
red.” All such connotative meanings of red are historical.
In 1957 the psychologists C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum 
developed an interesting technique for fleshing out the social (historically 
based) connotations of words, known as the semantic differential.2 By posing a 
series of questions to subjects about a specific concept—Is it good or bad? 
Weak or strong?—as seven-point scales, with the opposing adjectives at each 
end, they were able to sift out general patterns from them using statistical 
techniques. As an example, suppose you ask a group of people to evaluate the 
concept United States President in terms of opposite categories such as young–
old, practical–idealistic, modern–traditional, attractive–bland, friendly–stern, 
each on a scale of 1 to 7. What will the result be?
Those who feel that the president should be modern would place a mark 
towards the corresponding end of that scale. Those who believe that the president 
should not be too young or too old would place a mark near the middle of the 
young–old scale. People who think that the president should be bland- looking, 
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would place a mark towards the corresponding end of the attractive–bland scale, 
and so on. If one were to ask larger and larger groups of people to rate the presi-
dency in terms of such scales, one would then be able to draw a “connotative 
profile” of the presidency in terms of what this concept means  to people. 
Remarkably, research utilizing the semantic differential has shown that, although 
the connotations of specific concepts are subject to personal interpretation and 
subjective perceptions, the range of variation is rarely random or haphazard. In 
other words, the experiments using the semantic differential have shown that 
connotation is constrained by culture. For example, the word noise turns out to 
be a highly emotional concept for the Japanese, who rate it consistently at the 
end points of the scales presented to them; whereas it is a fairly neutral concept 
for Americans who place it in the midrange of the same scales.
For the sake of accuracy, it should be mentioned that denotation and con-
notation go under various names in the technical literature. The former is also 
called reference and the latter sense, terms used by the German philosopher 
Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) who was among the first to point out the impor-
tant role of connotation in theories of meaning. Frege’s famous example was 
that of the “fourth smallest planet and the second planet from the Sun” as 
being named both Venus and the Morning Star. The two terms referred to the 
same thing, he observed, but they had different senses—Venus refers to the 
planet in a straightforward referential way (nevertheless with implicit refer-
ences to the goddess of sexual love and physical beauty of Roman mythology), 
while Morning Star brings out the fact that the planet is visible in the east just 
before sunrise. Knowledge of signs, Frege maintained, clearly includes aware-
ness of the senses that they bear culturally. The philosopher Rudolf Carnap 
(1891–1970) used the terms intension (= denotation) and extension (= con-
notation) instead. Although there are subtle differences among these terms, it 
is beyond the present purpose to compare them. Suffice it to say that in cur-
rent semiotic practice they are virtually synonymous:
reference = denotation = intension
sense = connotation = extension
The use of the denotation-versus-connotation dichotomy is often credited 
to philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–73) but it can be traced back to the 
medieval Scholastics, and in particular to William of Ockham (1285–1347). 
This distinction was introduced into linguistics by the American linguist 
Leonard Bloomfield (1887–1949) in his influential 1933 book called 
Language,3 and into semiotics proper by the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev 
(1899–1965) a little later.
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In a way, the semiotician is a “scientist of connotations.” The aim of our 
analysis of Cheryl and Ted’s smoking performance in the previous chapter 
was, in fact, to sift out the connotations that cigarettes and high heel shoes 
have in specific situations. Connotation is the operative meaning-making and 
meaning-extracting mode in the production and decipherment of most signs 
and texts. Connotation is not an option, as some traditional philosophical 
and linguistic theories of meaning continue to sustain to this day; it is some-
thing we are inclined to extract from a sign in specific contexts. What does 
this imply? Recall that it would not have been possible to decipher the mean-
ings of cigarettes and high heels without taking into account the physical and 
social context of the scene in which they were recorded. If you came across a 
crumpled up and discarded cigarette butt on a sidewalk, you would probably 
interpret it as a piece of rubbish. But if you saw the very same cigarette encased 
in a picture frame, hanging on a wall in an art gallery, autographed by some 
artist, and given the title Waste, then you would hardly perceive it as garbage. 
You would interpret it in a markedly different way—as a symbol of a “throw- 
away society,” as a metaphor for a “materialistic culture,” or in some other 
connotative way. Clearly, the package’s context of occurrence—its location on 
a sidewalk versus its insertion in a picture frame displayed in an art gallery—
determines the kind of meaning you will extract from it. As this example 
shows, symbolism and connotation are really two sides of the same semiotic 
coin, figuratively speaking.
 Types of Signs
Much work within semiotics has been devoted to identifying the main types 
of signs produced by humans. Charles Peirce identified sixty-six species of 
signs—the most comprehensive ever. However, for practical applications of 
semiotic theory, only a handful of these are used regularly. The late Thomas 
A. Sebeok actually collated the sixty-six signs into six generic types—symptom, 
signal, index, icon, symbol, and name—that now form a kind of basic semiotic 
taxonomy for analytical purposes.4 Although some semioticians would exclude 
the first two from the purview of their discipline, Sebeok correctly insisted 
that their inclusion would force semioticians to consider the relation of bio-
logical factors to cultural ones more seriously in their investigation of semiosis 
(the ability to produce and comprehend signs).
Let’s consider Sebeok’s typology concretely. Symptoms are bodily signs that 
are indicative of physical states or conditions. However, their interpretation is 
influenced by culture. Facial acne, for example, is recognized as a chronic dis-
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ease of the skin afflicting adolescents and young adults, linked in large part to 
lifestyle factors (diet, stress, and so on). The symptoms associated with this 
condition are pimples (furuncles) on the face, back, and chest. But pimples are 
not perceived as symptoms of disease in some cultures, as attested by the lack 
of words equivalent to acne in many of the world’s languages. Analogously, the 
native societies of northern Manitoba do not have a word for rickets—a soften-
ing and, often, bending of the bones usually caused by a lack of vitamin D and 
insufficient exposure to sunlight. Traditionally, the people living in those soci-
eties did not perceive this pattern of bone formation as indicative of an abnor-
mality of the skeletal system. They realized it by learning the word rickets. This 
is analogous to our lack of recognition of the syndrome that Malaysian, 
Japanese, Indonesian, and Thai peoples call latah, which results from sudden 
fright. Lacking an equivalent term for this state, we simply do not recognize it 
as a condition, although it clearly exists (as people living in these cultures 
avow). As such examples show, the whole process of diagnosing a disease is a 
semiotic one, since it involves deciphering and establishing what constitutes a 
symptom in both physical and cultural terms—that is, in terms of its physical 
signifiers and its cultural and medical signifieds. A symptom carries informa-
tion that must be interpreted in order for it to make medical sense.
A signal is a bodily emission (sound, odor, and so on) or movement (head 
tilt, eye wink, and so on). In most species, signals have several primary 
 functions of identifying the sex and species of an animal’s potential mate. For 
example, a fish called the stickleback uses a system of interlocking releaser 
signals to orchestrate its mating. When its breeding season arrives, the under-
side of each male turns bright red. This color attracts females, but also pro-
vokes attacks by other males. Red objects of almost any description will trigger 
male stickleback aggression. A female responds to the male’s red signal with a 
curious approach posture that displays her swollen belly full of eggs. This 
incites the male to perform a zigzag dance that leads the female to the tunnel- 
like nest he has built for her. The female snuggles into the nest, whereupon 
the male touches her tail with his nose and quivers. The ensuing vibration 
causes the female to release her eggs for the male to fertilize. If the male fails 
to perform the last part of the dance, the female will not lay her eggs. Vibrating 
the female with a pencil will work just as well, but the male in this case, not 
having gone through the last stage of the ritual, will refuse to fertilize the eggs, 
eating them instead.
Signaling has other functions, of course. Worker honey bees, for instance, 
are endowed with a sophisticated system for signaling the location of a cache 
of food to their hive members. Upon returning to the hive from foraging 
trips, these bees have the extraordinary capacity to inform the other bees in 
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the hive, through movement sequences, about the direction, distance, and 
quality of the food with amazing accuracy. This signaling system is known as 
a dance because its movements resemble the actions of human dancing. The 
remarkable thing about it is that it shares with human signs the feature of 
conveying information about something even though that something is 
absent from direct perception. Several kinds of dance patterns have been doc-
umented by zoologists. In the “round” dance, the bee moves in circles, alter-
nating to the left and to the right. This dance is apparently used by the bees to 
signal that the cache of food is nearby. When the food source is farther away, 
the bee dances in a “wagging” fashion, moving in a straight line while wagging 
its abdomen from side to side and then returning to its starting point. The 
straight line in this dance points in the direction of the food source, the energy 
level of the dance indicates how rich the food source is, and the tempo pro-
vides information about its distance from the hive.
Despite their noteworthiness, such examples of signaling are not deliberate in 
the human sense of that word. They are instinctual, even though they some-
times do not appear to us to be so. A classic example of how easily we are duped 
by our own perceptions of animal signaling is the well-documented case of 
Clever Hans. Clever Hans was a world-famous German “talking horse” who 
lived at the turn of the twentieth century. He appeared to understand human 
language and communicate human answers to questions by tapping the alpha-
bet with his front hoof—one tap for A, two taps for B, and so on. A panel of 
scientists ruled out deception by the horse’s owner. The horse, it was claimed, 
could talk! Clever Hans was awarded honors and proclaimed an important sci-
entific discovery. Eventually, however, an astute member of the committee of 
scientists who had examined the horse, the Dutch psychologist Oskar Pfungst, 
discovered that Clever Hans could not talk without observing his questioners. 
The horse decoded signals that humans transmit and over which they have no 
conscious control. Clever Hans sensed when to tap his hoof and when not to 
tap it in response to inadvertent cues from his human handler, who would vis-
ibly relax when the horse had tapped the proper number of times. To show this, 
Pfungst simply blindfolded Clever Hans who, as a consequence, ceased to be so 
clever. The “Clever Hans phenomenon,” as it has come to be known in the 
annals of psychology, has been demonstrated with other animals—for instance, 
a dog will bark in response to inadvertent human signals.
Many human signals are also instinctual. Psychological studies have shown, 
for instance, that men are sexually attracted to women with large pupils, 
which signal strong sexual interest, and make a female look younger. This 
might explain the vogue in central Europe during the 1920s and 1930s of 
women using a pupil-dilating crystalline alkaloid eye-drop liquid derived 
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from the drug known popularly as belladonna (“beautiful woman” in Italian) 
as a cosmetic to enhance facial appearance. But human beings also have the 
ability to send out signals consciously and intentionally. A look or tilt of the 
head can be used to indicate to someone the presence in the room of a certain 
person; a wink of the eye can be used to communicate the need to maintain 
secrecy or sexual interest; and so on. Human signaling is a blend of the forces 
coming from nature and nurture, a kind of amalgamation of the brain’s 
instinctual limbic system and its more reflective neocortex.
 Indexes, Icons, and Symbols
The signs that humans make are essentially abstractions that allow them to 
carry the world “around in their heads,” because they permit the recall of the 
things, beings, events, feelings to which they refer, even if these are displaced 
in space and time, that is, not physically present for people to observe and 
perceive. This “displacement property” of signs has endowed the human spe-
cies with the remarkable capacity to think about the world beyond the realm 
of instinctual responses to stimuli to which most other species are constrained, 
and thus to reflect upon it at any time or in any context whatsoever.
Consider, for instance, the action of pointing a finger at an object such as, 
say, a ball. This action will invariably direct someone’s eye to its location. The 
pointing index finger is an example of a remarkable type of sign known, logi-
cally enough, as an index. But there is more to indexicality than just finger- 
pointing. Words such as here, there, up, down are also indexical signs. When 
someone says “I am here, you are there,” they are referring to the relative posi-
tion of persons to each other. Personal pronouns such as I, you, he, she, and 
they are also indexes because they refer to different people in relation to where 
they are located in the line of sight.
Indexicality can also have highly abstract, imaginary functions. Consider the 
English expressions think up, think over, and think out: “When did you think up 
that preposterous idea?” “You should think over carefully what you just said;” 
“They must think out the entire problem together.” Even though these refer to 
abstract ideas, they do so in ways that suggest imaginary physical location and 
movement: think up elicits a mental image of upward movement, portraying 
thinking as an object being extracted physically from an imaginary mental ter-
rain; think over evokes the image of an internal eye scanning the mind; think out 
suggests the action of taking a deeply buried thought out of the mind so that it 
can be held up, presumably, for examination. The presence of such expressions 
in languages across the world suggests something rather intriguing about the 
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origins of language. The indexical extension of the laws of physical perception 
to abstract referents  suggests an evolutionary link between language and the 
senses. In Sanskrit the word maya (“perceiving form in thought”) contains the 
particle ma (“to measure or lay out”); in Italian, the verb pensarci (“to think 
about something, to think over”), is constructed with the indexical particle ci 
(“here, there”); in English, perceive derives from Latin cipio (“to seize”) and per 
(“through”), examine from agmen (“to pull out from a row”) and ex (“from”), 
and prospect from Latin spectus (“looking”) and pro (“forward, ahead”).
Now, consider the object known as a ball. We might wish to communicate 
what it looks like. To do this, we could use the simple gesture of cupping our 
hands and moving them as if we were “drawing” the ball in space: that is, 
moving the left hand in a counterclockwise circular motion and the right one 
in a clockwise motion at the same time. We could do the same thing on a 
piece of paper with a pencil in each hand. In both cases, the sign that results 
is a circular figure resembling the outline of a ball. The figure-sign is known as 
an icon. An icon is a sign that simulates, replicates, reproduces, imitates, or 
resembles properties of its referent in some way. A portrait, for instance, is 
contrived as a reproduction of the actual face of a person from the perspective 
of the artist; a perfume scent is made chemically to simulate a natural aroma 
or fragrance; words such as drip, bang, and screech are obvious attempts to 
imitate certain sounds. Iconicity (the capacity for iconic representation) is 
defined as the transformation of perception into representation. If you have a 
computer, you will see icons displayed on a screen, representing available 
functions or resources in a visual way. On the doors of public toilets, you will 
see figures representing males and females also in a visual way. If you send text 
messages with emoji figures, you are using a new form of iconic language (as 
we shall see) to convey feelings such as friendliness or criticism. If you listen 
carefully to Beethoven’s Pastoral symphony or Rossini’s William Tell Overture, 
for instance, you will hear musical icons that are evocative of the sounds found 
in nature (bird calls, thunder, wind).
Charles Peirce saw iconicity as the primary, or default, way of representing 
the objects of the world and the thoughts of the mind, precisely because it is 
tied to sensory perception. This is why its handiwork shows up in prehistoric 
etchings, small sculptures, and relief carvings of animals and female figures 
found in caves throughout Europe that go back some thirty thousand years. 
The appearance of such art is probably the end result of something that is not 
much different from the kind of hand gesture made to represent the ball 
described previously. With some cutting, sculpting, or drawing instrument in 
one’s hands, it would be a fairly straightforward task to transfer the imaginary 
picture of the ball made through gesture onto some surface, using the same 
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kinds of movements. Indeed, this is arguably what may have happened in 
human prehistory. The hand movements used to make those early works of 
art became more abbreviated later. At that point, figures became more con-
densed and abstract, leading to the invention of picture writing. Archaeological 
research suggests, in fact, that the origins of writing lie in elemental shapes 
that were used in our prehistory—much like the molds that figurine and coin- 
makers use today. Only later did they take on more abstract meanings.5
The persistence of gesture in human communication is a residue of what 
can be called an “ancient iconicity”—the use of the hands to draw, make man-
ual signs, and so on. Although vocal language is a primary mode of commu-
nication, the evolutionary link between speech and gesture is still clearly 
noticeable. The linguist David McNeill has shown that when people speak 
they gesture unconsciously, literally “drawing” the concepts they are convey-
ing orally.6 For instance, when people talk of “large” things, they typically cup 
their hands moving them outward in imitation of a swelling motion. When 
they talk of “small” things, they typically cup their hands moving them 
inward, mimicking a shrinking motion. McNeill’s research suggests that, 
although vocal language has become a dominant form of communication in 
humans, the use of the hands has not vanished, but remains a functional semi-
otic subsystem. However, the story of gesture as a servant of vocal communi-
cation is incomplete. Indeed, gesture persists today as the default form of 
communication when an interaction is otherwise impossible. This happens 
typically when two people speak different languages. Of course, in individuals 
with impaired vocal and hearing organs, gesture constitutes the primary mode 
of communication.
The innate propensity for iconicity is evident in children. The ability to 
draw the outlines of rudimentary figures emerges approximately at the same 
time as the first words. If a drawing instrument is put in a child’s hand at this 
point in life, they will instinctively make random scribbles on a surface. As 
time passes, the scribbling becomes more and more controlled; shapes become 
suggestive of undeveloped figures that, with adult prompting, are soon labeled 
in some way (as “suns,” “faces,” and so on). At first, children do not appear to 
draw anything in particular, but instead spontaneously produce forms, which 
become refined through practice into precise, repeatable shapes. They draw 
for the pleasure of it, without larger or more explicit associations of meaning. 
Drawing in early childhood is, in effect, an example of “art for art’s sake.”
In a generic sense, all signs are symbols. Consider the ball again. The easiest 
and most efficient way to refer to the object in question is to use the word ball. 
But this can be done only if one knows the English language. The word ball 
is, in fact, a symbol that stands for a referent in a conventional way and which, 
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therefore, must be learned in context. Words, in general, are symbols. But any 
signifier—an object, a sound, a figure—can be used symbolically. A cross can 
symbolize the concept “Christianity,” a “V” configuration made with the 
index and middle fingers can symbolize the concept “peace,” and so on. 
Symbolism may also be the end product of a previous semiotic process (index-
ical or iconic). Take, for instance, a word such as flow (mentioned in the previ-
ous chapter). It probably was coined iconically, because the sounds that 
comprise it suggest an attempt to represent the sound made by moving water. 
Indeed, a word made with other kinds of sounds would seem, intuitively, to 
be inappropriate for referring to moving water (as we saw)—klop, twing, yoot, 
for example, do not seem suitable; flow does. Over time, the word has become 
detached from its sonority.
As Peirce argued, signs are typically amalgams of iconic, indexical, and 
symbolic modes of thinking. Take, as an example, the common traffic sign for 
a crossroads. The cross figure on this sign is simultaneously iconic, symbolic, 
and indexical. It is iconic because its form visually mirrors the outline of a 
crossing. However, since the cross figure could be used to represent a church 
in other contexts (with minor changes to its shape), it is also conventional 
insofar as we need to know that it has been chosen to refer specifically to a 
crossing. Finally, the sign is an index because when it is placed near a railway 
crossing it indicates that we are about to reach it. In parallel ways, most signs 
are amalgams, and will be interpreted as more or less iconic, indexical, or 
symbolic, depending on their uses, their forms, and their purposes.
Nowhere has the use of symbols borne more remarkable fruits than in math-
ematics and science. Mathematical symbols have given us a unique opportu-
nity to represent the physical world in abstract (displaced) ways, and then 
experiment with the world in a purely intellectual and imaginary fashion. The 
results of this mental experimentation can then be redirected to the real world 
to see what they yield. Often, this leads to real discoveries about that world. 
Symbolic reasoning in such areas of human thought carries the burden over trial 
and error. One of the early impressive examples of what this type of reasoning 
can achieve is the calculation of the earth’s circumference by the Greek astrono-
mer Eratosthenes (275–194 BCE). Standing during the summer solstice at 
Alexandria, and knowing that it was due north of the city of Syene, with the 
distance between the two cities being five hundred miles, Eratosthenes used an 
ingenious method for measuring the earth’s circumference—without having 
physically to do so. At the summer solstice he knew, as an astronomer, that the 
noon sun was directly overhead at Syene, shining directly down upon it. Thus, 
he drew a diagram, showing the earth as a circle, labeling the center of the 
equator and the cities of Alexandria and Syene with other letters and the sun’s 
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rays on it. From this he could use his knowledge of triangles and circles advan-
tageously. Without going into the geometrical details here, Eratosthenes calcu-
lated the circumference as 24,000 miles. His calculation of 24,000 miles was, 
in fact, in close agreement with the modern value of 24,901 miles.
This classic episode in the history of science shows how powerful symbolic 
representation is. Symbolic texts such as diagrams can replace physical inter-
vention, allowing humans to model the world in abstract ways and then dis-
cover real properties of that world. But it must not be forgotten that the reason 
why diagrams such as the one by Eratosthenes produce the results that they do 
is because they are extrapolations of experiences and observations. The original 
meaning of the term geometry is “measuring the earth,” and this is, in fact, an 
accurate description of what the early geometers did: they measured the size of 
fields and laid out accurate right angles for the corners of buildings. This type 
of empirical geometry, which flourished in ancient Egypt, Sumer, and Babylon, 
was refined and systematized by the Greeks. It was in the sixth century BCE 
that the Greek mathematician Pythagoras (c. 580–c. 500 BCE) laid the cor-
nerstone of scientific reasoning by showing that the various measurements 
made by geometers held a hidden pattern in them. When he tied three pieces 
of string or rope together to form a right-angled triangle the square on the 
hypotenuse of the triangle was always equal to the sum of the squares on the 
other two sides. Pythagoras’ great achievement was essentially to demonstrate 
logically that this pattern could be symbolized in a generic way.
 Names
There is one kind of sign that merits particular  consideration, as Sebeok 
also argued—the name, a sign that stands for a person, place, or by connota-
tive extension, a brand, an animal, a tropical storm, and so on. Names are 
identity signs. In fact, it is impossible to think of a human being without a 
name—if an individual is not given a name by their family, then society steps 
in to do so. Names define the human person in more ways than one. This is 
why children tend to become rather upset when someone calls them by a 
name other than their birth name, or else makes fun of that name.
The personal name, known technically as an anthroponym, constitutes a 
truly significant part of being human. Throughout the world newly born chil-
dren are not considered persons until they are given a name. In Inuit cultures 
a person is perceived as having a body, a soul, and a name; and is not seen to 
be complete without all three. This is true, to varying degrees, in all cultures. 
A few decades ago, a British television program, The Prisoner, played on this 
theme. It portrayed a totalitarian world in which people were assigned 
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n umbers instead of names—Number 1, Number 2, and so on—so that they 
could be made to conform more submissively and to become more control-
lable. The use of numbers to identify prisoners and slaves throughout history 
has constituted an act designed to negate the humanity or the existence of 
certain people. The Prisoner was, in essence, a portrayal of the struggle that 
humans feel to discover the meaning of self.
Some names are derived from religious traditions (John, Mary, Abraham, 
Sarah); others from the names of the months (April, June), precious stones 
(Ruby, Pearl), popular personalities (Elvis, Britney), flowers (Rose, Violet), 
places (Georgia), and legendary figures (Diana, Alexander). American society 
permits all kinds of names, but in some countries there are approved lists of 
names that must be given to children if they are to be legally recognized. In 
some religious cultures, children must be given an appropriate religious name 
before they will be issued a birth certificate.
One name is not sufficient to identify and keep individuals distinct. 
Historically, surnames—literally “names on top of names”—became necessary 
when name duplications in expanding urbanized societies made it difficult to 
differentiate among individuals. Surnaming accomplished this typically by 
representing individuals with reference to their place of origin, occupation, or 
descendancy. In England, for example, a person living near or at a place where 
apple trees grew could easily have been described, say, as John “where-the- 
apples-grow,” hence, John Appleby (for short). Regional or habitation sur-
names, such as Wood, Moore, Church, or Hill are products of the same kind of 
naming process. Surnames denoting an occupation are Chapman (merchant 
or trader), Miller, and Baker. Parentage surnames in Scotland or Ireland are 
often indicated by prefixes such as Mac, Mc—McTavish, McManus, and so 
on—or in England by suffixes such as son—Johnson, Harrison, and Maryson 
(son of John, son of Harry, son of Mary). Compound surnames are also used 
in some countries where retaining both family names is the custom. Thus, in 
Spain, Juan the son of Manuel Chávez and Juanita Fernández would be named 
Juan Chávez (y) Fernández. The surname is also an index of ethnicity, since it 
reveals to which family, society, or culture the individual probably belongs—
the surname Smith indicates that the person is likely of Anglo-American heri-
tage, Bellini Italian, Lamontaigne French, and so on.
 Mafia Nicknames
The story of naming does not stop at surnames. People invent nicknames, for 
instance, to emphasize a physical characteristic (Lefty) or a personality trait 
(Cranky), and pseudonyms (false names) to conceal sex (George Sand, pseudonym 
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of Amandine Aurore Lucie Dupin), the past (O. Henry, pseudonym of William 
Sydney Porter), or simply a personal whim (Mark Twain, a Mississippi River 
phrase meaning “two fathoms deep,” pseudonym of Samuel Clemens). Some 
pseudonyms have become better known than the real names, as in the case of 
Mark Twain or Lewis Carroll, whose real name was Charles Dodgson.
Nicknames are especially powerful personal brands in organized criminal 
gangs. They are part of how gangsters define themselves, alluding to some-
thing in a gangster’s character, appearance, or background that is considered 
important. Lucky Luciano, born Salvatore Lucania, was called “Lucky” 
because of the large scars around his neck that permanently recorded his 
 fortunate escape from death after being slashed and left dead by criminal 
rivals. “Scarface” was the nickname given to Al Capone because he too was 
involved in a fight that left him with three noticeable scars on his face. Mafiosi 
have been long aware of the brand value of names. Frank Costello, known as 
the “Prime Minister” of Cosa Nostra in the 1930s and 1940s in the United 
States, was quoted by Time magazine as confirming this as follows7:
I’m like Coca-Cola. There are lots of drinks as good as Coca-Cola. Pepsi-Cola is 
a good drink. But Pepsi-Cola never got the advertising Coca-Cola got. I’m not 
Pepsi-Cola. I’m Coca-Cola because I got so much advertising.
A gangster is semiotically a nobody until he is given a nickname. As Nicaso and 
Lemothe aptly observe, all gangsters worth their criminal salt have nicknames8:
Those who are brought into the formal underworld may have had nicknames in 
their former lives; however, when initiated they’re given new names or allowed to 
choose one. Some names describe a physical characteristic—Vyacheslav Ivankov, 
for example, was called Yaponchik because of the Asiatic cast to his eyes. Others 
might be for a thief ’s attitude: Tank or Dashing. A home invader might be called 
Madhouse because of his single-minded wrecking of a victim’s house.
Many Mafia nicknames are essentially character profiles, constituting a 
form of antonomasia, or the substitution of an epithet or title for a proper 
name. Because of its connotative power, in some cases it is a signifier of self- 
importance and braggadocio. Many criminals try to live up to their names, 
perhaps fulfilling the omen present in them. An example is the Sicilian 
Michele “The Cobra” Cavataio, a brutal killer who got his nickname from his 
deceitfulness and the fact the he carried a Colt Cobra revolver. He acted and 
lived his life as a snake might, sneakily yet viciously. Other nicknames of 
famous Mafiosi that show how they are intended to bring out some feature of 
the Mafioso’s character, appearance, or personality are as follows9:
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• Vincent “Chin” Gigante (who had a prominent chin)
• Richard “Shellackhead” Cantarella (from his hair pomade)
• Vincent “Vinny Gorgeous” Basciano (who always dressed in dapper clothes 
and slicked his hair in style)
• Earl “Squint” Coralluzzo (because he squinted a lot)
• Anthony “Fat Tony” Salerno (for his corpulent body)
• Thomas “Tough Tommy” Contaldo (because of his brutality)
• Salvatore “Sammy the Bull” Gravano (who had a neck like a bull and was 
a capable fighter)
• Ettore “Killer” Coco (for his ruthlessness)
• Thomas “Tommy Karate” Pitera (because he used martial arts in his vicious 
killing sprees)
Interestingly, some names have an ironic tinge to them, describing some 
weakness, such as Earl “Squint” Coralluzzo  (mentioned previously) and 
Carmine “Papa Smurf” Franco. It is not clear how Franco got his nickname. 
But photographs show a grandfatherly looking man and seemingly wise like 
the cartoon character Papa Smurf. Forensic linguists and other crime experts 
have found that the nickname is given early in a criminal’s career. Interestingly, 
in 2011 as more than one hundred mobsters were rounded up by American 
authorities, nicknames such as Vinny “Carwash,” Tony “Bagels,” and Junior 
“Lollipops” stood out ludicrously.
 Culture and Names
People create anthroponyms for things other than human beings. Throughout 
the world, they give names to deities, vehicles (ships, boats), and geographical 
spaces and formations—countries, states, islands, rivers, streets, houses, fields, 
mountains, valleys—known technically as toponyms. Toponyms may have his-
torical significance (Washington, a city named after the first president of the 
United States), religious significance (Santa Cruz means “holy cross”), or 
some other symbolic value. Some are simply descriptive: Honolulu means 
“safe harbor,” Dover “water,” Doncaster “camp on the Don.” A rough estimate 
is that 3.5 million place names exist in the United States alone, one for each 
square mile. Many of these reflect Native American influence (Niagara, 
Potomac, Tennessee). Others are of various origins: Spanish (Florida, Santa Fe), 
French (Lake Champlain, Baton Rouge), Dutch (Brooklyn, Harlem), Russian 
(Kotzebue, Tolstoi Point), and so on. Nations typically have regulatory agencies 
that supervise geographical naming. In the United States, the agency is the 
Board on Geographic Names of the Department of the Interior.
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Naming has also been applied to identify products (brand names), to char-
acterize teams (New York Yankees, Dallas Cowboys), to refer to tropical storms 
(Hazel, Harry, Katrina, Irma, Maria), and so on. Aware that a product with a 
name has a more personal quality to it, marketing and advertising people pay 
close attention to the choice of a brand name. The intentional creation of a 
name for a product engenders a personality for that product that is meant to 
appeal to specific consumers. Sometimes the brand name becomes so well 
known that it is used to represent the whole category of products: examples 
are Scotch tape for adhesive tape, Skidoo for snowmobile, and Kleenex for facial 
tissue. The names given to cosmetics and beauty products are typically created 
to elicit desirable connotations such as natural beauty (Moondrops, Natural 
Wonder, Rainflower, Sunsilk, Skin Dew), scientific authority (Eterna 27, 
Clinique, Endocil, Equalia), gender qualities (Brut, Cossak, Denim, Aramis, 
Devin), and many more.10
Traditionally, names given to children are part of sacred culture—giving a 
child the name of an ancestor is thought to bestow upon that child the ances-
tor’s spirit, protection, and thus guarantee familial continuity and tradition. 
This spiritual dimension is the reason why name-giving ceremonies are found 
throughout the world, many of which are linked to religious rites. The Ancient 
Egyptians believed that if an individual’s name was forgotten on earth, the 
deceased would have to undergo a second death. To avoid this danger, names 
were written multiple times on walls, tombs, and papyri. Political rulers would 
often erase the names of previous monarchs as a means of rewriting history in 
their favor. In Hebrew culture, the ancient art of gematria was based on the 
belief that the letters of any name could be interpreted as digits and rear-
ranged to form a number that contained secret messages encoded in it. The 
Romans, too, thought that names were prophetic, claiming in one of their 
proverbs that nomen est omen—a “name is an omen.” Would the Roman view 
explain names such as Cecil Fielder who was a fielder  in baseball, Rollie 
Fingers who was a pitcher, William Wordsworth who was a poet, Francine 
Prose who was a novelist, and Mickey Bass who was a musician? Perhaps such 
occurrences simply indicate that some people are inspired subliminally by 
their names to gravitate towards occupations suggested by them. The Puritans 
also believed that one’s name was a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is why they 
commonly chose a name like Obedience, hoping that the child would exem-
plify the virtue of obedience. In a 2002 study, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones 
found that individuals were more likely to choose jobs, careers, and  professions 
with names that were similar to their own names.11 Similarly, in 2010, Abel 
and Kruger found that doctors and lawyers were more likely to have surnames 
that referred to their professions: people with the surname Doctor were more 
likely to be doctors than lawyers, and those with the surname Lawyer were 
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more likely to be actual lawyers.12 Frank Nuessel, a professor of linguistics at 
the University of Louisville, has coined the tongue-in-cheek term aptonym to 
refer to names that mirror the name-holder’s profession, although he claims 
that aptonyms are more coincidental than psychologically motivated.13
We cannot help but wonder, at an intuitive level, whether we would have 
turned out differently if our names had been different. I understand that my 
mother wanted to name me Raul. Why would an Italian mother want to give 
her only child (as it turned out) such an exotic sounding name? Precisely for 
that reason. She used to read what are now called Harlequin romances and 
one of the characters in them was a dashing, debonair, intelligent, and charm-
ing “Lawrence of Arabia” personage named Raul. I suppose she wanted to 
pass on those characteristics to me through the name.
Fortunately or not, I ended up being named Marcello. My mother must 
have had a last-minute qualm of conscience, getting the idea to call me 
Marcello from the name of the hospital in which I was born. I grew up in 
Toronto. I knew very little English because that was the era before television, 
the great teacher of colloquial real-life language. Interaction with English- 
speaking childhood peers was also very limited. It was in elementary school in 
the early 1950s that I first received full exposure to English. I remember being 
completely lost at first, since I simply could not follow what was being said in 
the classroom. It was in school that my peers started calling me Marshmallow. 
It was not an offensive nickname, at least not in my perception. First, my 
name Marcello was not as easy to pronounce. Except for a few who knew 
Italian, most of the children in the class were English-speaking. Second, I had 
very blond hair and, I guess, the name fit rather nicely with my appearance. I 
believe it was a teacher who started calling me Marcel. As I became accus-
tomed to this name at school, I started to like it, for it separated me from my 
home persona and brought me closer linguistically to the other children. I had 
developed, in effect, a dual identity—one for the home and extended Italian 
community consisting of Italian-speaking aunts, uncles, cousins, and the like, 
and one for the outside English-speaking world of school and peers. My new 
name mirrored the dualism of immigrant life in that era perfectly. To this day, 
people ask me whether I am French. And I continue to think that it is socially 
powerful to be able to portray different personas through the name.
Given their association with  cultural identity, naming trends tend to be 
remarkably stable in most societies. According to the United States’ Social 
Security Administration, in 2015 the top ten names for boys and for girls are 
essentially the same ones given in the 1800s: boys (Noah, Liam, Mason, Jacob, 
William, Ethan, James, Alexander, Michael, Benjamin); girls (Emma, Olivia, 
Sophia, Ava, Isabella, Mia, Abigail, Emily, Charlotte, Harper).
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 Structure, Codes, and Perception
Recall Ted’s question at the beginning of this chapter regarding the meaning 
of the design of the pin Cheryl was wearing (a Chinese water spirit). Ted’s 
question was motivated by lack of knowledge of the design’s physical form or 
structure. For any sign to bear meaning, it must have some recognizable dif-
ferential physical feature that individuals recognize as part of the sign’s mean-
ing. Consider words such as pin, bin, fun, run, duck, and luck. As a speaker of 
English, you will instantly recognize these as separate, meaning-bearing words 
because you perceive the initial sounds of successive pairs (p versus b in pin- 
bin, f versus r in fun-run, d versus l in duck-luck) as differential. In technical 
terms, this feature in the makeup of these words is known as paradigmatic 
structure. We are intuitively aware of paradigmatic structure, even though we 
may never have consciously reflected upon it. It is the reason why, for exam-
ple, we can easily recognize the signs {a, b, c, d, e, …} and {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, …} 
as pertaining to separate codes (the Roman alphabet code, the positive integer 
code) and as distinct elements of each code.
Words such as pin and bin are not only recognizable as distinct words 
through their different initial sounds, but also by the way in which their con-
stituent sounds have been put together. In technical terms, this combination 
feature in the makeup of signs is called syntagmatic structure. For any sign to 
bear meaning, it must not only have some physical feature in its make-up that 
keeps it distinct, but also be constructed according to some recognizable pat-
tern. The word pin is a legitimate English word because of the way in which its 
sounds, p + i + n, have been linked. On the other hand, the form pfin is not 
recognizable as an English word because the sequence p + f + i + n violates 
English combinatory (syntagmatic) structure. So, too, the integers {1, 2, 3, 4, 
5,…} can be combined to form numerals larger than nine according to  specified 
rules of horizontal combination—for example, 12, 345, 9870; but they cannot 
be put one under the other vertically, because we do not form numerals in that 
way (at least commonly). Overall, paradigmatic structure involves differentia-
tion and selection, syntagmatic structure combination and arrangement.
The notion of structure is a crucial one. So, it is worth mulling it over with 
an analogy to solitaire. Solitaire is a card game played by one person. In all 
versions, the cards are dealt to the table according to a plan or pattern, known 
as a tableau. The game develops out of the undealt portion of the deck, known 
as the hand, which is turned up one card or more at a time. The object of most 
solitaire games is to build columns of cards in ascending or descending order. 
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The rules of play may require that these be built up in one suit or color, in 
alternating suits or colors, in some number-value arrangement, or in some 
other way. Playing solitaire, therefore, entails both the ability to recognize the 
distinctive features of cards (suit and number value) and knowledge of how to 
put the individual cards together in vertical columns. In other words, solitaire 
is a code in which the various cards (signs) are distinguishable paradigmati-
cally from each other by suit, color, and number, and placeable syntagmati-
cally into columns in certain specified ways.
The psychological importance of differential structure was noticed first by 
the psychologists Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) and Edward B.  Titchener 
(1867–1927). Saussure too saw it as the psychological basis of how we recog-
nize signs. He called it différence. A little later it came to be called opposition. 
Traditionally, the technique of opposition has been carried out in a binary 
fashion—that is, it is performed on two forms (for example, cat versus rat) at 
a time. Because binary opposition was used extensively and unreflectively 
both within semiotics and linguistics in the first part of the twentieth century, 
to the virtual exclusion of any other kind of analytical technique, it was bound 
to come under criticism. The late French semiotician Greimas (mentioned in 
the previous chapter) introduced the notion of the “semiotic square” that, he 
claimed, was more suitable as an opposition technique because it involved 
two sets of oppositions forming a square arrangement. Given a sign (for 
example, the word rich), we determine its overall meaning by opposing it to 
its contradictory (not rich), its contrary (poor), and its contradictory (not poor).
Whether oppositions are binary, four-part, or n-part, the fact remains that 
we seem to respond to them instinctually. They surface, in fact, in philosophi-
cal, religious, and narrative systems across the world. Some of these are:
Masculine versus Feminine
Light versus Dark
Good versus Evil
Self versus Other
Subject versus Object
Sacred versus Profane
Body versus Mind
Nature versus History/Nurture
Positive versus Negative
Heaven versus Hell
Beginning versus End
Love versus Hate
Pleasure versus Pain
Existence versus Nothingness
Left versus Right
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The oppositional view of human representational systems assumes that 
meaning is something that cannot be determined in the absolute, but only by 
opposing concepts to each other.
To conclude this rudimentary discussion on sign theory, it is relevant to 
emphasize that signs are both restrictive and liberating. They are restrictive in 
that they impose upon individuals born and reared in a specific culture an 
already-fixed system of meanings; that system will largely determine how they 
will come to understand and even perceive the world around them. 
Paradoxically, the very same perception-structuring system of signs in 
which we are reared is also liberating because it provides the means by which 
we can seek new meanings. The enduring artistic, religious, mathematical, 
scientific, and philosophical texts to which people are exposed in different 
cultural contexts open up the mind, stimulate creativity, and engender free-
dom of thought. As a result, human beings tend to become restless for new 
meanings, new messages. For this reason, sign systems and their meanings are 
constantly being modified by new generations of artists, scientists, philoso-
phers, thinkers, and others to meet new demands, new ideas, and new chal-
lenges. Therein lies the semiotic essence of the human condition.
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Makeup: Why Do We Put It On?
God hath given you one face, and you make yourselves another.
—William Shakespeare (1564–1616)
As the onerous job of introducing the more technical matters of semiotics is 
behind us, it is time to get back to other interesting parts of Martha’s recording. 
Incidentally, the smoking ritual, which was the focus of the first chapter, is just 
one of many examples of coded behaviors, known as nonverbal. Anthropological 
and psychological research has established that we transmit most of our messages, 
not through words, but through the body. We have the capacity to produce up 
to seven hundred thousand distinct physical (nonverbal) signs, of which one 
thousand are different bodily postures, five thousand are hand gestures, and two 
hundred and fifty thousand are facial expressions.1 Psychologist Paul Ekman has 
even linked particular emotions to specific facial signals and expressions—eye-
brow position, eye shape, mouth shape, nostril size, and so on.2 When someone 
is telling a lie, for instance, the pupils tend to contract, one eyebrow may lift, and 
the corner of the mouth may twitch. To cover up the lie, the person might use 
strategies such as smiling, nodding, and winking, which seem to be incongruent 
with the other facial patterns.3 Given such instinctive signaling, Ekman has 
claimed that it is possible to write a “grammar of the face” that shows less cross-
cultural variation than do the grammars of verbal languages.
Ekman has classified basic facial expressions into thousands of microexpres-
sions in what he calls the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). He claims 
that FACS can help people detect deception with up to 76 percent accuracy. 
FACS has been adopted as a screening tool in various airports and as a 
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d etection device in some police interrogations. However, the use of FACS 
raises ethical problems. Lie detection is not a precise science, for the simple 
reason that people can fool the lie detection technology with good old human 
cleverness. As Ken Adler has shown in his fascinating book, The Lie Detectors, 
throughout history people have employed all kinds of strategies to help them 
detect liars, from the ancient Chinese practice of making a suspect chew rice 
(a dry mouth supposedly exposing a liar) to the belief in India that lying 
makes the toes curl up.4 In effect, Adler argues, knowledge of detecting lying 
scientifically remains elusive.
Conveying emotional states through ear, mouth, lip and other bodily 
movements is a trait that cuts across species. Dogs prick up their ears during 
an alert mode; lynxes twitch them in conflicted or agitated states; cats flatten 
them when they are in a protective mode. Many animals constrict their 
mouths and bare their teeth to convey hostility. Following intense sexual sniff-
ing, various primates expose their upper teeth, making themselves appear to 
be overwhelmed by their sexual urges. Many of our own emotional states are 
conveyed in similar ways: when we bare our teeth, for instance, we invariably 
signal aggressiveness and hostility.
However, in the human species, the face is not only a source for the display 
of emotions, but also a source for defining and presenting the self in social 
situations. Making up the face with cosmetics, removing (or growing) facial 
hair, and wearing decorative trinkets such as earrings and nose rings is, in fact, 
designed to do something that is entirely alien to other species—to commu-
nicate who we are to others or what we want them to think we are. Facial 
decoration and specific kinds of clothing can announce social class or status, 
as is the case in India where a caste mark on a person’s face lets others know 
their place in society; it can mark the coming-of-age; it can function to 
enhance attractiveness in courtship; and the list could go on and on. Makeup 
is clear evidence that we have cut the link to our purely instinctive past, and 
transformed the face into something more than a carrier and conveyor of 
spontaneous emotional states.
Does Martha’s video reveal anything pertinent to the theme of makeup? It 
shows that Ted, our male protagonist, has shaved himself and has slicked 
down his hair with lotion for the occasion. It also shows that Cheryl, our 
female protagonist, has put on red lipstick, mascara, facial powder, and long 
pendant earrings. Martha has also made some interesting notes for us, which 
are relevant to the matter at hand. Her notes inform us that Ted had doused 
himself with musk cologne and Cheryl had done the same with sweet laven-
der perfume. Given our previous analysis of the restaurant scene as a court-
ship display, it should come as no surprise that the semiotician would see 
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cosmetics, lotions, and perfumes as elements of a grooming code, which, like 
the smoking code, is gender-specific and, thus, designed to enhance the sexual 
attractiveness of the actors in the performance. To the semiotician, the signs 
that comprise the grooming code provide further insights into human court-
ship, and more generally, into human meaning-making.
 Making Up the Face
Psychologists have found that, at puberty, an individual will respond sexually 
or amorously only to particular kinds of faces. The source of this response is 
hardly biologically programmed, but appears to be based on the kinds of 
experiences the individual had during childhood. At puberty, these generate 
an unconscious image of what the ideal love-mate’s appearance should be like, 
becoming quite specific as to details of physiognomy, facial shape, eye struc-
ture, and so on. This finding (if really true) only confirms what people have 
known intuitively since time immemorial. This is why tribal cultures have 
always marked the coming-of-age with elaborate rites involving cosmetic dec-
orations designed to highlight the face as the primary focus of romantic atten-
tion. For instance, the pubescent males of the Secoya people who live along 
the Río Santa Naría in Peru insert a sprig of grass through their nasal septum 
for the traditional coming-of-age rite. This allows them to keep their faces 
“poised” to exude confidence and masculinity. This “sexualizing” of the face 
has parallels in all cultures. Even in contemporary urban cultures, where for-
mal society-wide puberty rites are lacking, adolescent females, for example, 
sexualize their look, typically, by putting on lipstick, mascara, and earrings. 
Males sexualize it in analogous ways, by growing a mustache or beard, letting 
their hair grow long, and sometimes putting on earrings.
As the archaeological record confirms, cosmetics have a long and unbro-
ken connection with maturation and courtship customs that goes back con-
siderably in time. As anthropologist Helen Fisher has shown, even in the 
 prehistoric Cro-Magnon era, during the last glacial age, humans spent hours 
decorating themselves, plaiting their hair, donning garlands of flowers, wear-
ing bracelets and pendants, and decorating their tunics and leggings with 
multi-colored fur, feathers, and beads.5 Our contemporary cosmetic and 
fashion accouterments are really no more than modern versions of such 
ancient forms of bodily decorations intended for romance. The colors used 
in lipsticks and eye decorations, as well as the rings people put on their ears, 
nose, lips, eyebrows, and even tongue are signifiers in a grooming code that 
has ancient origins.
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Unguent jars, some of which were scented, have been found in Egyptian 
tombs of the First Dynasty (c. 3100–2907 BCE). These were probably used 
by both men and women to keep their skin supple and unwrinkled in the dry 
heat of Egypt. The women also developed the art of eye beautification by 
applying dark-green color to the under lid and by blackening the lashes and 
the upper lid with kohl, a preparation made from antimony and soot. In the 
first century CE, kohl came to be widely used by the Romans for darkening 
eyelashes and eyelids. They also employed rouge, depilatories, chalk for whit-
ening the complexion, and pumice for cleaning the teeth. Similar practices are 
found across the world and across time. In effect, there has never been a cul-
ture without cosmetics used in rituals of courtship and maturation.
The reason why Cheryl wore red lipstick can now be connected to some of 
the connotations of this color sign (previous chapter). Red has a long and 
fascinating cross-cultural history of symbolic meanings—for example, to the 
Pawnees of North America, painting one’s body red is the symbolic embodi-
ment of life associated with the color of blood; in languages of the Slavic fam-
ily red signifies “living, beautiful”; and so on.6 Red is also highly suggestive of 
female fertility across many cultures. This is the reason why in advertising 
(and in erotic pictures and movies) close-ups of female lips, painted red, 
slightly parted, have a powerful erotic effect on viewers.
 Hairstyle
Now, let’s consider another aspect of appearance caught on Martha’s video—
Cheryl’s long hair, which contrasts with Ted’s short-cut style. Hairstyle has 
always had social significance. Since prehistoric times, people have cut, 
braided, and dyed their hair and changed it in various ways as part of  grooming 
and fashion.7 Members of the Mesopotamian and Persian nobility, for 
instance, curled, dyed, and plaited their long hair and beards, sometimes add-
ing gold dust or gold and silver ornaments for embellishment. Egyptian men 
and women shaved their heads to combat the Egyptian heat. Therefore, bald-
ness became a fashion style in its own right. Hebrew men were prohibited by 
biblical law from cutting their hair or beard, but orthodox women, upon 
marriage, were expected to crop their hair and wear a wig.
The way people have worn their hair has, in a phrase, always been a sign of 
beauty, personality, membership in a certain social class, and even physical 
power. The biblical story of Samson who lost his superhuman strength after 
having his hair cut by Delilah is repeated in other ancient stories, in which 
strong heroic men wore long hair, while slaves were forced to shave their heads 
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to indicate submission and humiliation. A shaved head can also indicate sac-
rifice and submission of a spiritual nature—Buddhist monks shave their heads 
for this very reason. In addition, it can convey group allegiance, as exemplified 
by the shaved heads of punks and other subcultures today. In the late Middle 
Ages and early Renaissance, the Christian Church dictated that married 
women had to cover their heads in public for modesty. Only husbands were 
allowed to see their wives’ hair. Women who had natural red hair tried to color 
it because they would otherwise be seen as witches. Curling the hair was 
reserved for the aristocracy. Most noblemen had long, flowing curls. Such 
hairstyles became despised among the bourgeoisie and the lower classes and 
groups. The chief opponents of King Charles I during the civil war in England 
(1642–49) were the Puritans, who were called Roundheads because they cut 
their hair short, frowning upon the long hairstyles and cosmetic fashions of 
the aristocracy, which they saw as elements in a degenerate lifestyle.
In the 1920s hairstyle became a form of rebellion against staid puritanical 
lifestyles and a declaration of sexual independence. Young women wore short 
hair as part of the so-called Flapper look; young men slicked down their hair 
with oil in the manner of the movie star Rudolph Valentino. During the 
1950s, some teenagers wore a crew cut, a very short hairstyle combed upward 
to resemble a brush. Others wore their hair long on the sides, and swept back, 
so that it looked somewhat like a duck’s tail. During the 1960s young males 
copied the haircuts of the Beatles, a British rock music group, who wore long 
hair that covered the forehead. Long hair was also the style of adolescent 
females in that era. A number of unisex styles, which were fashionable for 
both sexes, appeared during the 1960s. The subsequent decades saw hairstyles 
vary according to emerging forms of fashion and lifestyle, ranging from the 
bizarre Mohawk hairstyles of punks to the cropped hairstyles of movie stars.
All this comes as no surprise to the semiotician, since hairstyles and cos-
metics are sign systems or codes and, thus, interpretable in specific ways 
according to culture and era. They are part of the material means through 
which the body is transformed into a language. This is why some people today 
adopt bizarre nonconformist grooming styles. Aware of their subversive value, 
they adopt them to make ideological statements, shock others, look tough, or 
mock the styles of others. Similar to the Puritans, some today condemn the 
use of cosmetics and the wearing of extravagant hairstyles as symptoms of a 
narcissistic disease spread by the beauty industry, pop culture, celebrities, and 
the media working in tandem. Others instead praise them. Kathy Peiss, for 
instance, has argued that cosmetics have actually been instrumental in liberat-
ing women to express themselves sexually on their own terms.8 The founders 
of modern-day cosmetic trends were simple women—Elizabeth Arden 
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(1884–1966), a Canadian, was the daughter of poor tenant farmers; Helena 
Rubinstein (1870–1965) was born of poor Jewish parents in Poland; and 
Madam C. J. Walker (1867–1919) was born to former slaves in Louisiana. 
Although it is true that our media culture often preys on social fears associated 
with “bad complexions,” “aging,” and the like, it has at the same time allowed 
us to assert our right to be openly attractive, not conceal it.
Given the long history of cosmetic makeup and hairstyles, it is now a 
straightforward matter to understand in semiotic terms why Cheryl wore her 
hair long (which was the “in” style for women at the time of Martha’s record-
ing), put on red lipstick, mascara, and facial powder, while Ted wore short 
hair (the “in” style for men), shaved himself cleanly, and put on styling lotion 
to keep his hair in place. Makeup and hairstyling allow prospective romantic 
partners to highlight their attractiveness through the deployment of the 
appropriate grooming signifiers. Perfume is part of the grooming code too. 
This is why Cheryl sprayed on a sweet lavender perfume and Ted a musk 
cologne. Although the sense of sight has largely replaced the sense of smell for 
sexual arousal—modern humans are more inclined to respond to erotic 
images than to bodily scents—the need for olfactory-based fantasizing has not 
disappeared completely from our evolution. Similar to other animals, humans 
continue to respond sexually to odors and scents that are emitted by  prospective 
mates. Artificial scents have always been used as effective surrogates for bio-
logical scents.
 Portraiture
The perception of the face as a signifier of selfhood is borne out by the art of 
portraiture. Portraits are probes of character and personality. The first ones 
date from Egypt around 3100 BCE. They were mainly funereal masks, etch-
ings, or sculptures of pharaohs and nobles. The subjects are portrayed in rigid, 
staring poses, communicating everlasting authority. The ancient Romans also 
made death masks of ancestors (worn by survivors in funeral processions) that 
were remarkable in how they captured the uniqueness of their subjects. Early 
Christian portrait artists had three subjects—Jesus, the Madonna, and the 
saints. Medieval gospel books included portraits of the gospel authors, shown 
writing at their desks. During the same era, the portraits of donors became a 
means of verifying patronage, power, and virtue. The Renaissance marked a 
turning point in the history of portraiture. In that era artists started to become 
fascinated by the face of the common person as a sign of human character in 
all its variable manifestations. Among the portraitists of that period were some 
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of the greatest visual artists of all time—Sandro Botticelli, Leonardo Da Vinci, 
Raphael, and Titian. Their portraits explored the “poetry” of the face, seeking 
to extract the meaning of individual human life from its expressions of sad-
ness, humor, joy, and tragedy.
The focus on individuality that the Renaissance spawned was not a unique 
historical development of Western culture. In China, murals depicting por-
traits of common people go back to the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). 
They convey the subject’s character not only through facial features, but also 
through clothing, pose, and gesture. The stone heads made by the Maya peo-
ples, the “laughing clay sculptures” of the Veracruz region in Mexico, the 
effigy vessels and funerary vases of the Mohican culture, and many other 
examples of Native American portraiture also display powerful images of 
individuality.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries photography 
entered the domain of portraiture. Among the first photographic portraitists, 
the names of Oscar Gustave Rejlander (1813–75), Henry Peach Robinson 
(1834–1901), Dorothea Lange (1895–1965) and Diane Arbus (1923–71) are 
often mentioned. Like canvas portraitists, these early photo artists used the 
camera to capture the poignancy of the faces of common people. Photography 
is one of the primary ways in which we now create memories. The  photographs 
that adorn our tables, walls, and our mobile phones are, in effect, visual 
mementos and testimonials of who we are. Photographs capture a fleeting and 
irretrievable moment in time, extracting it from the flux of change that char-
acterizes human life. Such captured moments have strong appeal because they 
provide eyewitness evidence, so to speak, that we do indeed exist in some 
enduring form, at least in the photographic space.
 The Selfie and the Simulacrum
The next section of Martha’s video reveals something that has become emblem-
atic of the contemporary world in which we all live. In it, we see Cheryl and 
Ted take a Selfie of themselves and then post it on their Instagram sites. They 
are engaging in a new self-styled form of portraiture made possible by new 
technologies—a form that also reveals how perceptions of selfhood, persona, 
representation, and other semiotic modalities are morphing in the age of the 
Internet.
Instagram is an online mobile photo- and video-sharing social network 
founded in 2010, which allows anyone to take pictures and videos and share 
them on other social media sites and platforms, ever since it was acquired by 
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Facebook in 2012. The popularity of Instagram is a symptom of living in the 
world of the “matrix,” where the constant barrage of images has taken prece-
dence over reflective words. French scholar Jean Baudrillard put forth the idea 
of the simulacrum in 1983 to describe the effects of modern media on the 
mind, whereby what is on the other side of a screen (TV or computer) seems 
more real than real to those who have become accustomed to viewing screens 
for information and delectation.9 The 1999 movie, The Matrix, treated this 
theme in an insightful way, before the advent of Web 2.0 technologies. The 
main protagonist of that movie, Neo, lives “on” and “through” the computer 
screen. The technical name of the screen is the matrix, describing the network 
of circuits on it. But the same word also meant “womb” in Latin. The movie’s 
transparent subtext is that, with the advent of the digital universe, new gen-
erations are now being born through two kinds of wombs—the biological and 
the technological. The difference between the two has become indistinguish-
able—it has become a simulacrum.
The Selfie is, in effect, a modern-day form of self-portraiture. Its impact on 
society has been acknowledged by various sources, including the British news-
paper, The Guardian, which produced a film series titled Thinkfluencer in 
2013 that explored the implications of Selfie culture. There was even a short- 
lived sitcom in 2014 on ABC, titled Selfie, which revolved around a woman 
who was obsessed with gaining fame through the Selfies she posted on 
Instagram. She ends up discovering, in true cautionary tale tradition, that this 
whole new trend is meaningless and alienating.
The self-construction of selfhood extends to all new media. Online sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter, among many others, are virtual locales where 
users share common interests and interact in a regular way. Entry to a site 
generally involves constructing a “public profile” of oneself (a summary of 
one’s autobiography and interests) and interacting with individuals, called 
“Friends,” using the online site. Ning has even launched a new kind of hosting 
service that encourages users to create their own networking sites. The socio- 
philosophical implications of social networking have been studied from many 
angles, since they are immense. Some of these will be discussed subsequently. 
Suffice it to say here that Web 2.0 technologies may have even rewired the 
brain. Living in a social media universe, we may indeed feel that it is the only 
option available to us for interacting with others. The triumph of social media 
lies in the promise to allow human needs to be expressed individualistically, 
yet connect them communally—hence the paradox. As social media commu-
nities become part of larger pathways of a global connected intelligence, a new 
form of consciousness has emerged, called by Peter Russell a “global brain” 
already in 1983 and thus long before the advent of social media.10
M. Danesi
 57
The Internet does indeed seem to function as if it were a nervous system 
connecting the entire planet. Intelligence in this system is collective, not cen-
tralized in any particular person or institution. This means that no one indi-
vidual can control it; the system organizes itself from the networks and 
processes of interaction among the components. In other words, we have cre-
ated the Internet to mirror our brain structure. The hyperlinks among web-
pages resemble synaptic connections, forming a huge associative network 
along which information is distributed. The Internet is one huge mirror meta-
phor, so to speak, connecting domains of all kinds, including social ones 
allowing for interpersonal information distribution much like the neural net-
works in the brain, which distribute information in a parallel fashion, along 
different pathways. There is a danger here, as will be discussed in more detail 
later on. We might become controlled by the whole system of bots, autono-
mous programs on a network that can interact with computer systems or 
users, which may dupe us, like Baudrillard feared, to believe that intelligence 
and consciousness are independent of the body. This is a warning sign or 
symptom, which we ignore at our own risk.
 Kissing
Another section of Martha’s video reveals something rather bizarre, at least as 
seen from the view of other cultures and children of any culture. In it we see 
Cheryl and Ted making oscular contact—a form of nonverbal communica-
tion we commonly call “kissing.” Kissing is one of those things that a semioti-
cian would find highly interesting and relevant to understanding human 
nature.11 The particular type of kissing that occurred on the video is called 
“French kissing”—an erotic form of osculation reserved for intimate amorous 
relationships. Osculation is not limited to courtship situations. It has other 
functions and meanings that  are found throughout the world, being more 
important in some cultures and less so in others. The German language has 
words for thirty kinds of kissing actions, including nachküssen, which means 
“making up for kisses that have not been given.” Some languages, on the other 
hand, have no words whatsoever for such actions.
According to some culture theorists, the erotic kiss may have crystallized in 
India in 1500 BCE, which is the period when Vedic writings start mentioning 
people “sniffing” with their mouths and lovers “setting mouth to mouth.” In 
early Christian times the lip kiss was regarded as something spiritual, rather 
than sexual, representing the exchange of breath between two people, which 
was thought to contain the soul of a person. This idea was extended to m arriage 
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ceremonies, with the nuptial kiss symbolizing the spiritual union of the bride 
and groom. In Celtic legend too, the kiss is seen as an exchange of the breath 
of life.
Archaeological findings suggest that erotic kissing is ancient and wide-
spread. Representations of kissing have been found, for instance, on two 
thousand-year-old Peruvian pots and vases. Some psychologists argue that the 
origin of such kissing lies in the need to transfer sebum, the substance that 
lubricates our skin and hair, so that mating partners can achieve a form of 
chemical bonding. Others believe that we kiss because the lips, tongue, and 
interior of the mouth are highly sensitive erogenous zones connected to the 
limbic system, the oldest part of the brain and the source of sexual pleasure. 
Whatever the case, it is clear that kissing, similar to smoking and grooming, 
is now part of a code that allows the partners in courtship performances to 
communicate romantic feelings. Romantic kissing is widespread, but it is not 
universal. It is not common in many parts of Asia, and is completely unknown 
in some African societies. In Inuit and Laplander cultures romantic partners 
are more inclined to rub noses than to kiss (probably to smell each oth-
er’s  skin). Obviously, what is normal osculation behavior in one system of 
everyday life is seen as bizarre in another.12
Humans kiss not just for romance, as mentioned. They do so for a variety 
of reasons: to greet each other, to show love and affection, and so on. Hand 
kissing, especially the man kissing the hand of a woman, was once thought to 
be chivalrous and important in greeting a woman. Athletes kiss trophies, 
pious people kiss religious books, artifacts and statues, a gambler kisses the 
dice for luck, and wanderers kiss the soil upon reaching safe ground. The 
point is that kissing is an important semiotic activity that invariably elicits 
reactions and interpretations of various kinds. Some kisses have become 
famous, ranging from Judas’ kiss of betrayal to Madonna’s provocative kiss of 
Britney Spears on television. The fabled kisses of star-crossed lovers are part of 
cultural lore—Sleeping Beauty and the Prince, Snow White, Paolo and 
Francesca, Tristan and Isolde, Romeo and Juliet, and so on. Many movies are 
memorable because of a particular kiss exchanged between two lovers—for 
example, Gone with the Wind (Clark Gable and Vivien Leigh), From Here to 
Eternity (Burt Lancaster and Deborah Kerr), Rear Window (James Stewart and 
Grace Kelly), An Officer and a Gentleman (Richard Gere and Debra Winger), 
and Titanic (Leonardo DiCaprio and Kate Winslet), to mention a few. Kissing 
is also a basic theme in pop love songs—for example, Kiss Me Big (Tennessee 
Ernie Ford), Kisses Sweeter than Wine (Jimmie Rodgers), It’s in His Kiss (Betty 
Everett). Kisses of Fire (ABBA), Suck My Kiss (The Red Hot Chili Peppers), 
and Kiss from a Rose (Seal), again among many others.
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In art, perhaps no other portrait of a kiss is as famous as the one painted by 
the Austrian nouveau style artist Gustav Klimt (1862–1918) in 1908 that 
seems to bring out the delicate romantic and passionate qualities of the kiss at 
once. As seen through the eyes of a great artist, the kiss becomes a symbol of 
humanity in all its idiosyncrasies. The kissers blend into each other, becoming 
a singular body. Kissing is more than sex; it is an expression of intimacy and a 
sign of how the body and the emotions form an unbroken harmony. Other 
famous paintings of the kiss are found among the works of Titian, Rubens, 
Canova, Munch, Schiele, Chagall, Matisse, Toulouse-Lautrec, Rodin, and 
Hayez. The kiss has become part and parcel of the language of love because it 
has behind it such a long history of meanings—a history in which it speaks 
volumes for itself as a sign—perhaps the sign—of romantic love.
 Eye Contact
In the next segment of her video, Martha has taken a close-up of the faces of 
our two protagonists, showing them gazing intently and steadily at each other, 
as if they were in a state of wonder or expectancy. Making eye contact is part 
of a vast repertoire of facial signals and signs that humans deploy to send out 
various messages: for example, staring suggests challenge, making eyes flirta-
tion, eyebrow constriction thoughtfulness, and eyebrow elevation surprise. 
The presence of numerous words to describe the ways we look at each other—
glower, gawk, glance, watch, gaze, scan, peep, wink, observe, peek, peer, inspect, 
scrutinize, ogle, gape, sneer, grimace, scowl, and so on—bears testimony to the 
fact that we perceive eye contact as extremely meaningful. Looking and being 
looked at are courtship strategies that depend not only on the directness of the 
eyeline, but also upon head tilting and facial expression, on the orientation of 
the body, and on the sex of the gazer.13 Traditionally, in many cultures it has 
been the expectation that men are the lookers and women the “looked at.” 
Changes in gender roles since the late 1960s have altered this pattern. Today, 
the lookers are equally males and females.
Across cultures the length of time involved in making eye contact along 
with the pattern of contact (looking into the eyes, looking down or up, and so 
on) convey what kinds of social relationship people have to each other, among 
other things. Some patterns appear to cut across cultures: for example, staring 
is typically interpreted as a challenge throughout the world; “making eyes” at 
someone is normally interpreted as flirtation; narrow eyelids communicate 
pensiveness, and making the eyebrows come nearer together communicates 
thoughtfulness; raising the eyebrows conveys surprise. However, even in these 
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there is culture-specific variation. Southern Europeans will tend to look more 
into each other’s eyes during conversation than will North Americans; in 
some cultures, males do not look into female eyes unless they are married or 
are members of the same family. In all cultures, eyes themselves are part of the 
symbolic order. In some traditions, including the Hindu and Taoist ones, the 
eyes are identified with the sun (the right eye) and the moon (the left eye). In 
ancient Greece the eye was perceived to be a symbol with magical powers. 
This is why the Greeks painted it on the prows of their warships, believing 
that it had the power to guide them to victory. In ancient Egypt the Eye of 
Horus was thought to have healing and protective powers. In many cultures 
there exists the concept of an “evil eye,” which is perceived to be a certain kind 
of stare that is purported to have the power to harm or bewitch someone. The 
list of symbolic connotations associated with the eye is an infinite one.
In the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey (directed by Stanley Kubrick) the com-
puter named Hal scrutinizes the environment around itself through a menac-
ing “eye lens”; and in Blade Runner (directed by Ridley Scott), the eye is 
presented as the symbol of humanity. The replicants (robots) in the movie are 
icons of the human form. However, there is one feature that differentiates 
human anatomy from artificially made anatomies—the eye. Replicants use 
their mechanical eyes exclusively to see; humans use them as well to show feel-
ing and to understand the world. Aware of the mysterious power of the human 
eye, the replicants kill their maker by poking out his eyes.
 Body Language
The details of skeletal structure distinguishing Homo sapiens from its nearest 
primate relatives—the gorilla, chimpanzee, and orangutan—stem largely 
from a very early adaptation to a completely erect posture and bipedal (two- 
legged) striding walk. The uniquely S-shaped spinal column places the center 
of gravity of the human body directly over the area of support provided by the 
feet, thus giving stability and balance in the upright position. This biological 
development is the physical source of signifying postures and poses, and of 
other bodily schemas of which human beings are capable, all of which come 
under the rubric of “body language.”
In human affairs, the body has always been an issue of high moral, social, 
and aesthetic significance. In ancient Greece it was glorified as a source of 
pleasure, while in Rome as the root of moral corruption. Since ancient times, 
philosophers have debated the nature of the relation of the body to the soul 
and the mind. The French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes 
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(1596–1650) even went so far as to suggest that God had created two classes 
of substance that make up the whole of reality: one was thinking substances, 
or minds, and the other was extended substances, or bodies.
Martha’s video is replete with instances and displays based on a strategic 
deployment of body language. Because these are coded culturally, they may 
appear comical to outsiders. To those who know the code, on the other hand, 
body language is sensed as crucial in courtship and romance. The study of 
body language is known technically as kinesics, the term used by American 
researcher Ray L. Birdwhistell (1918–94), who became interested in analyz-
ing the way people interacted by watching films (just like we have been doing 
in an imaginary way in this book). He noticed that people seemed to transmit 
information unconsciously through their eye movements, facial expressions, 
and postures. For this reason, he came to view body language as a critical 
component of human interaction. His first book on the topic, Introduction to 
Kinesics, was published in 1952.14 In it, he discussed the role of body schemas 
and gesture in human communication, claiming that it is possible to write a 
“kinesic grammar” in the same way that linguists write a verbal grammar. As 
he put it: “The first premise in developing a notational system for body lan-
guage is to assume that all movements of the body have meaning. None are 
accidental.”15 Messages made with body language can give a look and feel to a 
conversation remembered long after spoken words fade away.
A kinesic analysis of Martha’s video shows that the postures and poses that 
Ted and Cheryl assumed as they were smoking away and looking into each 
other’s eyes are clearly reminiscent of those used by performers and actors. 
Their body language was part of a courtship display. So, too, are the decora-
tions that are put on the body to enhance interest in it. Not surprisingly, we 
see a rose tattoo on Cheryl’s right shoulder.
Tattooing is one of the most ancient forms of creative body decoration. Cave 
paintings date it to at least approximately 8000 BCE, but it may go back even 
farther in time to the Upper Paleolithic era (38,000–10,000 BCE).16 Almost 
every culture has practiced tattooing. As early as 2000 BCE, the Egyptians used 
it to indicate social rank, affiliation, or allegiance. The ancient Greeks and 
Romans, on the other hand, used tattoos to brand slaves and criminals. Tattoos 
are a sign of honor in the Marquesas Islands, a group of islands in the South 
Pacific Ocean; the young women of eastern New Guinea (like Cheryl) see tat-
toos as signs of beauty; and the list could go on and on. Sailors introduced into 
Europe the practice of tattooing during the Age of Exploration; it remained a 
rarely used body art until the middle part of the twentieth century when it 
gained popularity among disparate groups, including fashion models, youth 
gangs, and prison inmates. It was propelled into mainstream American culture 
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in 1981 by the album Tattoo You by the Rolling Stones. In contemporary urban 
culture, tattooing has become mainly fashion statement, used by media icons 
and common folk alike, with no distinction as to age, gender, or social class. In 
reaction to its spread, some subcultures, such as goths and punks, have resorted 
to tattooing in a more extreme and, thus, exclusive form. Goth tattoos extol the 
occult and the macabre; those of the punks, the bizarre and the weird. They are 
the equivalents of the body decorations worn by the mockers in ancient carni-
vals—decorations designed to shock moralistic society.
 Objects
Decorating the body to present an appropriate persona involves putting on 
trinkets and jewelry. Rings, for instance, convey specific types of messages that 
can be interpreted only in cultural contexts. In some cultures, they are worn to 
convey things such as educational status (graduation ring), institutional affilia-
tion, marital status, athletic prowess, social status (diamond rings), group affili-
ation, personal interests, and so on. Some ornaments, such as cross chains, 
beads, and amulets are worn to convey meanings of a superstitious or occult 
nature. However, more often than not, the wearing of jewelry has a courtship 
objective. Traditionally, when a Zulu woman falls in love, she is expected to 
make a beaded necklace resembling a close-fitting collar with a flat panel 
attached, which she then gives to her suitor. Depending on the combination of 
colors and bead pattern, the necklace will convey a specific type of romantic 
message: a combination of pink and white beads in a certain pattern would 
convey the message “You are poor, but I love you just the same.”17
All cultures share the belief that certain objects possess mysterious powers. 
This belief is the basis of the ancient craft of alchemy, defined as the art of 
transmuting materials that lasted well into the medieval ages and continues to 
have some adherents to this day. The principal activity of the alchemists was 
the search for the “philosopher’s stone”—brought back into popularity by the 
Harry Potter movies of the 2000s—and the production of gold by artificial 
means. Gold meant (and continues to mean) power, deification, and immor-
tality. The belief in the mystique or “hidden life” of objects has not disap-
peared from the modern world. In the 1970s, for example, the pet rock craze 
beset American society. Many considered the fad a ploy foisted upon a gullible 
public spoiled by consumerism by a clever manufacturer, and thus simply a 
quick way to make money. However, that craze could not have been perpe-
trated in the first place, unless some latent (or unconscious) semiotic force was 
at work—and that force was animism or the intuitive belief that objects are 
imbued with spiritual energy. The same animistic tendencies can be seen in 
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the common view held by people that some objects are unexplainably magi-
cal. This is why, if some objects are lost, then impending danger is feared. If, 
however, they are found serendipitously—as for instance when one finds a 
“lucky penny”—then it is believed that the gods or Fortune will look auspi-
ciously upon the finder.
Objects are clearly signs. This is why many are preserved and kept in muse-
ums. Similar to works of art, they are felt to be reflections of human attempts to 
shape the world on their own terms and to, literally, “make” it conform to 
human expectations. As McLuhan (Chap. 1) suggested, objects extend human 
bodily structure. The automobile, for instance, is experienced by many of us as 
an extension of our bodily armor. In the public world of traffic, it creates a space 
around the physical body that is as inviolable as the body itself. Interestingly, 
but not unexpectedly, this perception is not confined to modern urban cultures. 
The anthropologist Basso found that the Western Apache of east-central Arizona 
also perceive the car as a body, even going so far as to use the names of body 
parts to refer to analogous automobile parts: for example, the hood is called a 
“nose,” the headlights “eyes,” the windshield “forehead,” the area from the top 
of the windshield to the front bumper a “face,” the front wheels “hands and 
arms,” the rear wheels “feet,” the items under the hood “innards,” the battery a 
“liver,” the electrical wiring “veins,” the gas tank a “stomach,” the distributor a 
“heart,” the radiator a “lung,” and the radiator hoses “intestines.”18
Animism is certainly obvious as a latent form of semiosis in childhood. 
Children have always played with objects as signs standing for suggestive refer-
ents—broom handles can be imagined to be enemies to be vanquished, rocks 
can be imagined to be animate things, and so on. However, a toy is different, 
semiotically speaking. It is an adult-made object given to children according to 
social traditions. Dolls are particularly interesting in this regard because they 
are icons of the human figure and associated with female childhood. As early 
as 600 BCE dolls were made with movable limbs and removable garments, to 
reinforce their resemblance to human anatomy. Dolls have been found in the 
tombs of ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman children. Evidently, the objec-
tive was to provide the children with a lifelike human form, so that they could 
play with someone in the afterlife. Analogous sacred meanings are found 
throughout the world. In the aboriginal Hopi culture of the United States, 
kachina dolls are given to female children as part of fertility rites. In many 
Christian traditions, dolls have been used since the Middle Ages to represent 
the Holy Family in the Nativity scene, as part of Christmas observations. In 
Mexico, dolls representing Our Lady of Guadeloupe are ceremonially paraded 
every year. In some cultures of the Caribbean, it is believed that one can cause 
physical or psychological damage to another person by doing something inju-
rious to a doll constructed in effigy to resemble that person.
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The modern-day perception of dolls as toys for female children can be 
traced to Germany in the early fifteenth century, when doll figures were made 
on purpose to show new clothing styles to German women. Shortly thereaf-
ter, manufacturers in England, France, Holland, and Italy began to manufac-
ture dolls dressed in fashions typical of their respective locales. The more 
ornate ones were often used by rulers and courtiers as gifts. By the seventeenth 
century, however, simpler dolls, made of cloth or leather, were manufactured 
mainly as toys for female children.
Twentieth century technology made it possible to make dolls look so life-
like that they were often used to illustrate clothing style trends and were sent 
from one country to another to display the latest fashions in miniature form. 
Noteworthy design innovations in dolls manufactured between 1925 and 
World War II included sleeping eyes with lashes, dimples, open mouths with 
tiny teeth, fingers with nails, and latex-rubber dolls that could drink water 
and wet themselves. Since the 1950s, the association of lifelike dolls with 
female childhood has been entrenched further by both the quantity of doll 
types produced and their promotion in the marketplace. Of particular semi-
otic interest in this regard is the Barbie doll, launched in 1959 and which 
evolved into an icon of female childhood for many years, adapting its identity 
to changing social views of femininity. Barbie has been portrayed as an astro-
naut, an athlete, a ballerina, a businesswoman, a dancer, a dentist, a doctor, a 
fire-fighter, a paleontologist, a police officer, a rock star, and so on. She has 
also been involved in a romantic relationship with the Ken doll, which 
appeared in 1961. The two dolls split up in 2006, a period when break-ups 
among celebrities were common. Barbie has also been friends with minority 
dolls, including African American and Hispanic dolls. Books, apparel, cos-
metics, and video games are now branded Barbie goods, and she has appeared 
in films such as Toy Story 2 and 3. Barbie has also been parodied on Saturday 
Night Live. Acknowledging her pop culture status, Andy Warhol made a 
painting of the doll in 1985. In a phrase, Barbie is an emblematic sign of 
American culture. Its spread to other countries is thus limited, because it is 
culturally meaningless. Some countries have even banned sales of the doll, 
claiming that it does not conform to the ideals and values of their societies.
 Dancing
There is another segment on Martha’s video that requires some semiotic com-
mentary in this chapter; namely, the segment in which Cheryl and Ted can be 
seen engaged in a bodily embrace called a dance, moving in rhythmic unity to 
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the musical beats made by the jazz band in the restaurant. Why do humans 
dance? Bodily locomotion has a biological source. This is probably why it is 
virtually impossible to remain motionless for any protracted period of time. 
Indeed, when we are forced to do so, our body reacts against it. During the 
performance of a lengthy, slow movement of a classical symphony, it is almost 
impossible to keep perfectly still or not to cough, even though one might be 
enraptured by the music. The need for almost constant movement during our 
waking hours is probably a remnant of an ancient survival mechanism 
designed to keep us moving, so as not to be easy prey for enemies. At some 
point in human history, however, our instinctual survival movements gave 
way to something vastly different—the dance, a set of organized rhythmic 
bodily movements that are designed to evoke some meaning or communicate 
some message.
Dancing involves spatial gesture (the shapes made by the moving body and 
the designs in space made by the limbs), tempo (patterned rhythm), and bodily 
schemas (heavy limp, tense, restrained, or bound movements). These may 
allow dancers to express emotions, moods, ideas, tell a story, or simply experi-
ence movement that is pleasurable or exciting in itself. In some situations, 
dancing may lead to trance or some other altered state of awareness. The latter 
is sometimes interpreted as possession by spirits. In tribal societies, for instance, 
shamans dance in trance in order to heal others physically or emotionally.
It is not known when people began to dance. Prehistoric cave paintings 
from more than twenty thousand years ago depict figures in animal costumes 
who seem to be dancing, possibly in hunting or fertility rituals, or perhaps 
merely for entertainment. Written as well as visual evidence of dance has sur-
vived from the ancient civilizations of the Mediterranean region and the 
Middle East. Egyptian tombs depict people who seem to be dancing, often in 
acrobatic positions. These figures probably represented professional slave 
entertainers. Dancing was an integral component of agricultural and religious 
festivals in Egypt, such as the one enacting the cyclic death and rebirth of the 
god Osiris (symbolizing the seasonal cycle of the Nile). Ritual dances, espe-
cially those honoring Dionysus, the god of wine, are believed to be the moti-
vation for including dancing in Greek drama, accompanying the spoken or 
sung verse. In ancient Rome, professional dancers, pantomimists, jugglers, 
and acrobats worked as traveling “sexual entertainers,” so to speak, similar to 
the erotic dancers of today. This is perhaps why the Christian Church, which 
at first allowed dancing as a part of worship and religious celebrations, 
denounced dancing as immoral during the Middle Ages. Dancing continued 
among the peasants, however, both in communal festivals and as a form of 
entertainment. Variations of medieval peasant dances continue today as folk 
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dances. Some peasant dances, taken over and adapted by the aristocracy, 
became courtly dances that, in turn, evolved into the classical ballet. The latter 
originated in the courts of Italy and France during the Renaissance, becoming 
a professional art form by the late seventeenth century. Since that time, ballet 
has remained a major category of the performing arts. Its style and subject 
matter continue to evolve as modern-day dance artists experiment with new 
ways of expression through dance. Some forms of dance have developed 
around work activities, as in the Japanese rice-planting dances or in the 
Swedish weaving dances, which make working more pleasant.
Throughout the world, the significant stages of an individual’s life, such as 
birth, puberty, marriage, and death, are marked and celebrated by rituals that 
often involve dancing. Weddings, for instance, provide one of the most common 
occasions for dancing. The bride and the groom may dance together to show 
bonding, or else they may perform separate dances—the bride’s reel of northern 
England, for example, is danced by the bride and her attendants. Dance is also 
perceived by many societies as part of their rites of passage. In some societies even 
today organized dances may be the only events at which young people of differ-
ent sexes can meet and socialize without sanction or reprobation.
 What Does It All Mean?
The semiotic study of nonverbal behavior is a study of how people experience 
and define themselves through their bodies and their objects. In most cul-
tures, self-image is expressed and conveyed primarily as body image. In many 
contemporary societies the slim and lean look is a strategic sign of attractive-
ness for both males and females. The margin of deviation from any idealized 
thinness model is larger for males than it is for females; but males must fre-
quently strive to develop a muscular look. This oversensitivity to idealized 
body prototypes is the reason why we tend to become discontented with our 
bodies.19 From this discontent, a whole subculture based on physical exercises 
has become part of everyday life in many modern societies.
What the topics discussed in this chapter ultimately bring out is the impor-
tance of form in human life. A form is a “sign-in-the-making,” so to speak, 
something that suggests something else, even though we cannot quite grasp 
what that something else is. The feminine form (as represented in paintings 
and other media) is a case-in-point of the inbuilt power of suggestion of 
forms. Whereas the masculine form has been represented throughout history 
(in sculpture and painting) to emphasize virility, the feminine form has been 
represented with a high degree of ambiguity to represent both motherhood 
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and sexuality in tandem.20 Pop culture has projected the feminine form out in 
the open like never before. The Charleston, a dance craze that was introduced 
in 1923 by the Broadway musical Runnin’ Wild, became one of the first vehi-
cles for emphasizing the feminine  form, becoming instantly emblematic of 
society’s shift to a sexier, more carefree mood. Condemned by society’s moral 
elders, it clearly signaled the advent and installation of a popular culture 
implanted in a sexual defiance of adult mores.
The representation of the body has always informed any meaningful reading 
of pop culture. The open sexuality of many modern performances has always 
challenged moralistic views of the body. Above all else, they bring questions of 
sex, sexuality, and gender to the forefront. Today, representations of the body 
and sexual persona are being altered by new technologies, as we have argued 
briefly here. From the Selfie to social media networks we are now living in a 
simulacrum that makes it difficult to distinguish between virtual bodies (bod-
ies represented on screens) and real bodies. This has concrete implications for 
the semiotic study of the body, as we have seen. But perhaps the most salient 
one is that the three-part interaction between the senses, the world, and the 
mind, which is the source of semiosis, is becoming more and more an interac-
tion that includes a fourth part—the virtual world. The implications of this 
development in human evolution will be broached in a later chapter.
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human ingenuity has been at its most productive, especially in the modern 
era, with all kinds of inventions, from lipstick dispensers to corsets and 
Wonderbras.
9. Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotexte, 1983).
10. Peter Russell, The global brain (New York: Tarcher, 1983).
11. See, for example, Marcel Danesi, The history of the kiss: The origins of pop cul-
ture (New York: Palgrave, 2013).
12. Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality, vol. 1 (London: Allen Lane. 1976).
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Routledge, 1993), 22.
14. Ray, L. Birdwhistell, Introduction to kinesics (Ann Arbor: University of Ann 
Arbor, 1952).
15. Ibid., p. 70.
16. Teresa Green, The tattoo encyclopedia (New York: Fireside, 2003), x–xi. In 
Spiritual tattoo: A cultural history of tattooing, piercing, scarification, branding, 
and implants (Berkeley: Frog, 2005), John A. Rush suggests that tattooing 
may go even further back in time to 200,000 BCE.
17. L. S. Dubin, The history of beads (New York: Abrams, 1987), 134.
18. Keith H.  Basso, Western Apache language and culture: Essays in linguistic 
anthropology (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1990), 15–24.
19. Marcel Danesi, My son is an alien: A cultural portrait of today’s youth (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 56–57.
20. In Striptease: The untold story of the girlie show (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), Rachel Shteir shows convincingly how the feminine form has 
always made performances such as stripteases central elements in pop cul-
ture’s history.
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Tell Me About Yourself: What Is Language?
Language is the mother of thought, not its handmaiden.
—Karl Kraus (1874–1936)
Martha’s video contains much more material that is of interest to semioticians. 
For example, in an early segment Ted can be heard asking his partner, “Tell me 
about yourself,” to which Cheryl replies, “There’s not much to say. I was born 
here, and I’ve lived here all my life. I majored in math at college. I now work for 
Google.” A semiotician never fails to be intrigued by such seemingly trivial 
forms of conversation because, in their essence, they reveal many interesting 
things about the vital functions that language plays in everyday life. In court-
ship, the function of conversation is clearly similar to that of theatrical dis-
course, complementing and reinforcing the nonverbal components of the 
ongoing performance. Similar to smoking, grooming, and gazing, speaking is 
part of a courtship ritual supplying the verbal resources for presenting an appro-
priate persona to a romantic partner. Whereas nonverbal communication and 
semiosis allow Cheryl and Ted to present an attractive face and body to each 
other, discourse allows them to present an “attractive intellect,” so to speak.
Since the dawn of civilization, human beings have had an abiding fascina-
tion with language—the ability to use the tongue and other organs of the vocal 
tract to represent the world through meaning-bearing sounds. Language has 
served humanity well. All the world’s cultures have myths and legends to 
explain their roots. Knowledge and skill are passed on through stories, oral 
explanations, and books. It is no exaggeration to say that the very survival of 
civilization depends on preserving language. If somehow all the knowledge 
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captured and stored in verbal texts were to be irretrievably destroyed overnight, 
the next morning people the world over would have to start anew, bringing 
together storytellers, writers, scientists, educators, law-makers, and others to 
literally “retell” and “rewrite” knowledge; otherwise civilization as we know it 
would soon disappear. Those texts constitute humanity’s collective memory.
No wonder, then, that across the world language is felt to constitute the 
faculty that, more than any other, sets humanity apart from all other species. 
There is a deeply embedded conviction within us that if we were ever able to 
solve the enigma of how language originated in our species, then we would 
possess a vital clue to the mystery of human existence itself. The ancient Greek 
philosophers defined it as logos, the faculty that they claimed had transformed 
the human being from an insentient brute into a rational animal. However, 
they also saw language as a potentially dangerous weapon for inflicting harm 
upon others. Even today, there is a widespread tendency to blame linguisti-
cally based misunderstandings for many of the world’s ills, from conflicts 
between individuals to wars between nations. If we all spoke the same lan-
guage, avoided insulting each other verbally, or employed speech construc-
tively, so the story goes, then we would avoid many of our problems. If we 
were to purify all languages of the favoritisms and biases that they have 
acquired throughout their histories, we would be able to set the world right.
 Learning to Speak
Language has endowed humans with the extraordinary ability to refer to 
events that have not yet occurred, to formulate questions about existence, to 
propose answers to them, to make up fictitious worlds, and to frame impor-
tant thoughts and actions. Just as remarkably, it comes naturally to humans in 
childhood. The only requirement for learning any language is adequate expo-
sure to samples of it from birth to approximately two years of age. Noam 
Chomsky, perhaps the most influential linguist of the modern era, has even 
gone so far as to claim that there is an organ in the human brain that is espe-
cially designed to detect and reproduce language.1 This would explain why 
humans acquire language without any training or effort during infancy, and 
why attempts to teach a human language to the higher primates, who do not 
have such an organ, have turned out to be unsuccessful.
Chomsky’s view is actually ancient. Intrigued by the spontaneity with 
which infants acquire language, the Greek philosopher Plato asked the follow-
ing question: How it is that children, whose contacts with the world are brief 
and limited, are able to know as much as they do about language and start to 
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speak spontaneously early in infancy? He concluded that this is so because 
much of what infants know is innate, coming from earlier existence and 
merely reawakened in childhood. But this explanation by itself does not cap-
ture the crucial importance and intricacy of the interplay between the envi-
ronment in which the child is reared and the apparently instinctive knack for 
language. If nurturing is not present, then language simply does not emerge, 
as the study of “feral children”—children who have survived without normal 
nurturing conditions—clearly shows. Even after a century of studying lan-
guage acquisition scientifically, linguists are still unsure as to how language is 
acquired. In the end, all arguments are based on specific inferences about the 
way humans learn.
To the semiotician, there is no reason to posit a special organ for language. 
Language is really no more than one of the many forms that semiosis (the 
ability to produce and understand signs) takes in the human species. The 
psychological record shows that verbal and nonverbal forms of semiosis 
emerge in tandem during childhood. So, Chomsky is partially correct. 
Language is undoubtedly a species-specific faculty; but so are the nonverbal 
abilities that set humanity apart from other species (art, music, and so on).
Before proceeding further with the discussion, it is essential to differentiate 
between speech and language. Speech is the ability to use the vocal organs 
(tongue, teeth, lungs) for producing phonic signs (oral speech) or other organs 
(such as the hands) for producing visual signs (gesture, writing). Language, on 
the other hand, is a mental faculty, guiding speech. Verbal messages can be 
conveyed as sound sequences (oral speech), but they can also be communi-
cated in other ways, through writing or gesture. One can have language with-
out speech (as do individuals with impaired vocal and hearing organs), but 
one cannot have speech without language because it is dependent on the cat-
egories of language.
The physiology of oral speech is made possible by the lowering of the larynx 
(the muscle and cartilage at the upper end of the throat containing the vocal 
cords). During their first few months of life, infants breathe, swallow, and 
vocalize in ways that are anatomically similar to gorillas and chimpanzees, 
because they are born with the larynx high in the neck. It is found in virtually 
the same position in the neck of other primates. Some time around the third 
month of life, the larynx starts to descend gradually, dramatically altering how 
the child will use the throat, the mouth, and the tongue from then on. The 
new low position means that the respiratory and digestive tracts will cross 
above the larynx. This entails a few risks: food can easily lodge in the entrance 
of the larynx; simultaneously drinking and breathing can lead to choking. In 
compensation, the lowered larynx permits speech by producing a chamber 
above the vocal folds that can modify sound.
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How do children learn to speak? When infants come into contact with an 
unknown object, their first reaction is to explore it with their senses, that is, 
to handle it, taste it, smell it, listen to any sounds it makes, and visually 
observe its features. This exploratory phase of knowing, or cognizing, an object 
produces sensory models that allow children to recognize the same object the 
second time around without having to examine it again probingly with their 
sensory system. As infants grow, recognizing more and more objects, they 
start to engage in semiotic behavior that transcends the early sensory phase: 
they start pointing to the object they recognize, imitating the words they have 
heard in context. At this point in the child’s development, the object starts to 
assume a new cognitive form of existence; it has, in effect, been transferred to 
the physical sign (manual gesture or word) used to refer to it. This is a quan-
tum leap in development. The American psychologist-semiotician Charles 
Morris (1901–79) remarked, in fact, that from that point onward the sign 
will replace the object, cognitively speaking.2 As rudimentary as they might 
seem, these early signs allow human infants to refer to virtually anything they 
notice or find interesting in their immediate world.
Soon after, children start using the words they have learned in context, 
repeating them as single syllables (mu, ma, da, di). These are not mindless 
imitations: they are early signifiers in search of complete structure, so to say. 
The Russian psychologist L.  S. Vygotsky (1896–1934) called them “small 
works of art” because, like poetic images, they are attempts to make sense of 
things through phonemes and tones.3 By the age of six months the child’s 
repertoire of one-syllable words increases at a rapid rate. At eight months the 
child starts reduplicating words (dada, mama) and using elementary meaning- 
bearing intonation patterns. By the end of the first year the first true words 
emerge, as the child realizes that these are powerful tools for naming and 
remembering things, for expressing actions or a desire for some action, and 
for conveying emotional states. At that point in development, the child seems 
to become mesmerized by the fact that words evoke thoughts. By simply say-
ing the right word, a thought appears “inside the head” as if by magic. The 
psychologist Julian Jaynes has suggested that this feeling of amazement is an 
ancient one, dating back to when the first sentient human beings must have 
become overwhelmed by the “magic” of articulated words to conjure up 
images in their minds.4 Words make children aware that there is a dimension 
to life beyond the purely sensory—a dimension that connects the body, the 
mind, and the world seamlessly.
At around eighteen months of age children start using language creatively, 
often talking to themselves as they play. My grandson was barely fifteen months 
of age when I observed him use language creatively. I knew at the time that he 
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could refer to many objects in the house with the appropriate words, but he had 
not learned the words for colors. Remarkably, one day he referred to the orange 
color of our household cat in a way that can only be called “a small work of art,” 
as Vygotsky put it. He pointed to the cat’s hair, hesitating for an instant as he 
searched his mind for an appropriate word. Not finding one, he came up with his 
own—juice—a word he had been using to refer to the orange juice he drank at 
breakfast. Examples such as this one, which we take for granted, reveal the pres-
ence of a “creative fantasy” in children, which provides them with the means to 
make images and to move them about inside their heads in new forms and 
arrangements. My grandson had inferred that the word juice referred to the same 
property of orangeness in drinks and cats alike. It showed an inherent ability to 
make sense of things by connecting them ontologically, seeing in the world rela-
tions and connections. This ontological-imaginative capacity  has allowed the 
human species to know from the inside, and thus beyond the instincts.
 Language and Thought
Language provides perhaps the most significant clues for understanding how 
the knowing animal actually comes to know the world. The words a society 
uses are the semiotic building blocks of its “edifice of knowledge.” One of the 
earliest efforts to link these blocks to knowledge can be traced back to approx-
imately 400 BCE when the Indian scholar Pāṇini showed how words in the 
Sanskrit language were constructed systematically and what meanings each of 
their parts carried. Another early attempt to study language systematically was 
that by the Greek scholar Dionysius Thrax (late second century BCE) whose 
work, the Art of Grammar, became the model for many Greek, Latin, and 
(later) modern European grammars. Not only did he deal with the structure 
of words, their arrangement in phrases and sentences, but also with the rules 
for correct speech. Throughout the centuries, interest in grammar (the study 
of structural patterns in language) never waned. With the spread of Christianity 
and the translation of the Scriptures into the languages of the Christians, 
medieval scholars began thinking about how to compare different languages. 
Their comparisons, however, were haphazard, and it took many centuries for 
scholars to develop more systematic methods for studying the world’s lan-
guages and for examining the nature of grammars scientifically. It was after 
the publication of Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale in 1916 and the 
work of the American anthropologist Franz Boas (1858–1942), who docu-
mented and studied the native languages of North America in the 1920s, that 
linguistics emerged as a “science of language.”
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Since the 1930s linguists have studied and documented many fascinating 
things about language, describing with precise detail its basic structural proper-
ties. Perhaps the most remarkable finding is the intrinsic link that exists between 
words and the concepts that inform a culture’s system of everyday life.5 Words 
are not just convenient labels for already-existing concepts. Rather, they make 
specific kinds of concepts available to the members of a culture. Consider a 
“device for keeping track of time.” Given that it is a human-made object, there 
really should be little or no variation in the ways different peoples refer to it. In 
English, for example, there are two basic words for this device, clock and watch. 
The difference lies in the fact that a watch is carried or worn (around a wrist, 
around the neck), whereas a clock is placeable in specific locations (on a table, 
on a wall) but is not normally carried. This double classification has a historical 
raison d’être. The word watch appeared in northern Europe several centuries 
ago when people started strapping timepieces around their wrists, so that they 
could literally “watch” time pass and thus maintain appointments with preci-
sion. The subsequent manufacturing of “watches” (portable timepieces) on a 
large scale in the nineteenth century signaled a radical change in the perception 
of time management. In Italy, on the other hand, the double classification was 
never introduced into the language. The single Italian word orologio still refers 
to any type of timepiece. This does not mean that, in Italian, there is no verbal 
way for signaling the distinction that English makes. After all, Italians also 
wear watches. It implies, rather, that Italian culture did not go through the 
same historical semiotic process that introduced the categorical distinction in 
English. The Italian  language can also refer to a clock’s location or portability, 
as does English, but it does so in a linguistically different way, namely, with the 
structure da: orologio da polso = wristwatch (watch for wrist), orologio da tavolo 
= table clock (clock for table), and so on. This allows Italian speakers to refer to 
a timepiece’s location if the need should arise. In English, on the other hand, it 
is built into the double classification and is therefore something that speakers 
of English perceive as somehow necessary.
Differences such as these reflect differences in cultural thinking and, ulti-
mately, in worldview. Indeed, Italians have a subtly different approach to time 
management than do North Americans, although differences between these 
two industrialized societies are becoming less marked as they assume more 
and more of a “global cultural structure” through media access, travel, and 
socioeconomic interaction. As the psychologist Robert Levine recently discov-
ered in his travels, a fixation with being “precisely on time” is typical of cul-
tures that distinguish between clocks and watches, but less so of others that do 
not.6 Burmese monks, for instance, know more or less that it is time to get up 
in the morning when there is enough light to see the veins in their hands. 
They are not as compulsive about time-keeping as we are, thus avoiding many 
of the stress-related syndromes that afflict us in the West.
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The intrinsic bond that exists between words and reality is fairly easy to 
discern, as the preceding example shows. It exists as well in a less obvious 
fashion at the level of sentence structure. Consider the difference between the 
active sentence, “Alexander ate the carrot,” and its passive equivalent, “The 
carrot was eaten by Alexander.” In traditional theories of grammar, the passive 
is considered to be a stylistic option of the active. Why, then, are there sen-
tences that seem conceivable only (or primarily) in the passive form, such as, 
“The Bible was written at the dawn of time;” and “My work is still unfin-
ished”? If we consider the sequence of the mental images that active and pas-
sive sentences elicit, we will soon realize that the two types are hardly just 
stylistic variants. Because the subject (Alexander) is first in an active sentence, 
it appears in the foreground of the mind’s eye, whereas the object (the carrot) 
comes into view in its background. A change from active to passive reverses 
this mental view, so that the object (carrot) now becomes visible in the fore-
ground of the mind’s eye, and the subject (Alexander) in the background. 
Both sentences say the same thing, but the way in which they portray perspec-
tive is significantly different. The passive sentence emphasizes the object at the 
expense of the subject. This emphasis on the object is the reason why the 
 passive form characterizes conventional scientific writing. The aim of science 
is objectivity. In language, this translates into an emphasis on the object, so as 
to deemphasize the subjectivity of the human scientist and all the undesirable 
connotations (error, unreliability, and so on) that this entails. This is why a 
passive sentence such as “The experiment was conducted in support of the 
theory,” sounds much more objective, and thus more credible in scientific 
culture, than an active sentence such as, “I conducted the experiment in sup-
port of the theory.”
Examples such as these suggest that language is a modeling system, that is, 
a system of representation that attempts to model the world through sense 
and perception. The active versus passive distinction demonstrates how syn-
tactic structure (the organization of words in a sentence) provides a perspec-
tival model of a specific type of scene.7 This was the view of the philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), who argued that words in sentences show 
how things are related to each other, in ways that parallel physical vision. 
Modeling is not restricted to providing visual perspective; it can also be based 
on perceptions of the meanings of phonemes. In a classic study conducted by 
the American psychologist Roger Brown, native English speakers were asked 
to listen to pairs of opposites from a language unrelated to English and then 
to try guessing which foreign word translated into which English word.8 The 
subjects were asked to guess the meaning of the foreign words by attending to 
their sounds. When Brown asked them, for example, to match the words 
ch’ing and chung to the English equivalents light and heavy, he found that 
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approximately 90 percent of English speakers correctly matched ch’ing to light 
and chung to heavy. He concluded that the degree of translation accuracy 
could only be explained as indicative of a primitive kind of sound symbolism, 
an instinctual tendency to link sounds and meanings. Sound symbolism is a 
perfect example of linguistic modeling based on sonority.
The view of language as a modeling system is not a contemporary one.9 It 
goes back to ancient Greece, when some philosophers claimed that words 
were constructed on the basis of the way their referents looked or sounded 
(although others maintained that words were arbitrarily related to their refer-
ents). This perspective was championed in the nineteenth century by F. Max 
Müller who proposed that humanity’s first words tended to be instinctive, 
expressive sounds uttered in response to an emotional state—anger, surprise, 
pain, pleasure, relief.10 Remnants of this tendency, he claimed, can be found 
in all the world’s languages. In English, interjections such as Huh?, Ouch!, 
Wow!, which are uttered in response to different emotionally charged situa-
tions, and words referring to sonorous referents, such as dip, rip, sip, crack, 
click, creak, rub, jab, blob, rustle, bustle, trickle, ooze, wheeze, squeeze, puff, huff, 
cough are obviously such remnants.
The German philologist Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) went fur-
ther than anyone before him in linking language to mental and emotional 
states. Indeed, von Humboldt claimed that the structure of a particular lan-
guage constrains the thought and behavior of the people using it. In the twen-
tieth century, von Humboldt’s outlook was pursued first by Edward Sapir 
(1884–1939) and then by Sapir’s pupil Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941). 
Sapir asserted that human ideas, concepts, feelings, and characteristic social 
behaviors were rooted (or at least mirrored) in the structures of language. 
Sapir never carried out an extensive research program to test his idea rigor-
ously and systematically. That fell on the shoulders of his brilliant student 
Whorf, whose work on the language of the Hopi society, a native people occu-
pying living abodes  on reservation land in northeast Arizona, led him to 
believe that the language individuals learn in cultural context constitutes a 
mental filter through which they come to perceive and understand the world.
The Whorfian hypothesis raises some fundamental questions about the 
connection between social inequalities and the language that encodes them. 
Did terms like chairman or spokesman predispose speakers of English to view 
social roles as gender-specific in the not-too-distant past? Feminist social crit-
ics maintained that English grammar was organized from the perspective of 
those at the center of the society—the men. This is why, not long ago, we said 
that a woman married into a man’s family; and why, at traditional wedding 
ceremonies expressions such as “I pronounce you man and wife” were common. 
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These defined women in relation to men. Others, such as lady atheist or 
lesbian doctor, are exclusionary of women, since they insinuate that atheists 
and doctors are not typically female or lesbian. In the Iroquois language the 
reverse is the norm—the language is structured from the female perspective.11 
This is because in Iroquois society the women are in charge: they hold the 
land, pass it on to their heirs in the female line, are responsible for agricultural 
production, control the wealth, arrange marriages, and so on.
The foregoing discussion in no way implies that language constrains or stifles 
the imagination. On the contrary, language is a malleable semiotic instrument 
that can be put to any use speakers desire. Should the need arise to create a new 
word category, all we have to do is be consistent with the structural require-
ments of our language’s sound and grammatical  systems. Imagine a concept 
roughly referring to “all preadolescent boys who have a missing front tooth.” 
You certainly have seen such boys, but you have not thought of them as a dis-
tinct or necessary conceptual category. This is because there is no word in the 
English language that calls attention to them as such. However, by simply mak-
ing up a word—say, forbs—we will ipso facto have created that category. If 
English-speaking people started using the word forb routinely, then after a while 
they would start “seeing” or “recognizing” forbs everywhere, eventually believing 
that the category must have some necessary purpose. This example shows exactly 
what Sapir meant when he said that language is both limiting and limitless.12
Nowhere is the intrinsic relation between language and thought more evi-
dent than in the area of color categorization. Color is a sensation produced 
through the excitation of the retina of the eye by rays of light. Physicists point 
out that, in theory, millions of color gradations can be discriminated by the 
human eye; but no more than twelve basic color terms have been found in any 
of the world’s languages. The colors of the spectrum are produced by viewing 
a light beam refracted by passage through a prism, which breaks the light into 
its wavelengths. If one were to put a finger at any point on the spectrum, there 
would be only a negligible difference in gradation in the colors immediately 
adjacent to the finger at either side. The organization of so many potential 
gradations into a limited number of categories has an obvious purpose: with-
out it, people would have to refer to all possible gradations by coining and 
memorizing millions of words. There is, however, a trade-off. Although a lim-
ited set of color terms makes it possible for people to refer to color gradations 
efficiently, those very terms also predispose them to recognize the categories 
that they entail as “normal.” To put it in semiotic terms, people recognize only 
those color signifieds that the signifiers of their native languages have encoded.
English has six basic color categories, known as the primary colors: purple, 
blue, green, yellow, orange, and red. In color theory, white and black are not 
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considered colors. Other color terms are considered to be secondary (brown, 
pink, gray, and so on). The sensation of black is that of a complete lack of 
stimulation of the retina; that of white is of complete stimulation. English 
speakers might disagree on exactly where on the spectrum one category ends 
and another begins, but, by and large, the disputed range would be minimal. 
This is because the above terms have established the color categories for speak-
ers of English; in effect, they have classified the content of the spectrum in 
specific ways. However, there is nothing inherently “natural” about this orga-
nizational scheme. The specific color categories that speakers of English have 
learned to recognize are part of the structure of English, not of nature.
By contrast, speakers of other languages are predisposed to see other or dif-
ferent color categories on the same spectrum. Speakers of the indigenous 
African language Shona, for instance, divide the spectrum into cipswuka, 
citema, cicena, and cipswuka (again), from left to right, and speakers of Bassa, 
a language of Liberia, dissect it into just two categories, hui and ziza, from left 
to right. When an English speaker refers to something as blue, a Shona speaker 
would refer to it as either cipswuka or citema, and a Bassa speaker as hui. The 
Bassa speaker would refer to green also with hui, while a Shona speaker would 
refer to it with citema or else with cicena.
In 1969, anthropologists Brent Berlin and Paul Kay conducted a study that 
has since become a point of reference in color semiotics. They found that dif-
ferences in color terms are merely superficial matters that conceal general 
underlying principles of color perception.13 Using the judgments of the native 
speakers of twenty widely divergent languages, Berlin and Kay concluded that 
there are “focal points” in basic (primary) color systems that cluster in certain 
predictable ways. They identified eleven universal focal points, which corre-
spond to the English words red, pink, orange, yellow, brown, green, blue, purple, 
black, white, and gray. Not all the languages they investigated have separate 
words for each of these colors, but a pattern in their data suggested the exis-
tence of a fixed way of categorizing color across cultures. If a language has two 
color terms, then the focal points are equivalents of English black and white. 
If it has three color terms, then the third one corresponds to red. A four-term 
system adds either green or yellow, while a five-term system has both of these. 
A six-term system includes blue; a seven-term system adds brown. Finally, 
purple, pink, orange, and gray, in some combination, are found in languages 
with more than seven color terms. Berlin and Kay found that no language has 
a four-term system consisting of, say, black, white, red, and brown.
Their study, however, raises some questions. For one thing, the fact that the 
eleven focal points discovered by Berlin and Kay correspond to the color 
terms of their own language (English) raises a red theoretical flag. The linguist 
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McNeill noticed, for instance, that the eleven-term Japanese system posited 
by Berlin and Kay dated only from the time of Japanese contact with the 
West, beginning in the 1860s.14 The traditional Japanese system had five focal 
points: black, white, orange, turquoise, and yellow, which does not fit in with 
Berlin and Kay’s theory.15
Whatever the truth about color perception, the semiotician would point 
out that color terms constitute a code consisting of specific signifiers that, like 
any code, will condition its users to perceive the world in specific ways. 
However, as mentioned earlier, this does not imply that color schemes close 
the mind. The specific color categories acquired in cultural context in no way 
preclude people from discerning those established in other cultures, if they so 
desire. This is, indeed, what students of another language must learn to do 
when they study the color system of the new language. Moreover, in all lan-
guages there exist verbal resources for referring to more specific gradations on 
the spectrum if the situation should require it. In English the words crimson, 
scarlet, vermilion, for instance, make it possible to refer to gradations within 
the category red. However, these are still felt by speakers to be subcategories of 
red, not distinct color categories in themselves.
There is one more point to be made here about color. Although the research 
would lead one to surmise that color categories are established arbitrarily, the 
historical record tells another story. Color vocabularies originate out of spe-
cific needs and experiences. In Hittite (the language of an ancient people of 
Asia Minor and Syria), for instance, words for colors initially designated plant 
and tree names such as poplar, elm, cherry, and oak. Many English terms, too, 
were coined to indicate color perceptions  metaphorically: green originally 
meant “to grow,” yellow “to gleam,” purple “a type of shellfish,” and so on. 
Indeed, to this day, color terms are used in so many symbolic ways that one 
hardly ever thinks of them as denotative signifiers—that is, as actually refer-
ring to hues. In fact, one could make a fairly in-depth comparison of different 
cultural symbol systems by focusing on the differential meanings that these 
have: For example: What meanings do white and red have in China and 
America? In what ways are these similar or different? Why?
 Writing
As mentioned earlier, language is expressed not only as vocal speech but also 
through writing, that is, through the use of visual signs, known as characters, 
transferred to some surface. The characters that we use to write English words 
have a more or less fixed correspondence to the sounds of the language. These 
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comprise a type of writing code known as an alphabet. Alphabets allow their 
users to write (represent visually) any concept that can be expressed in vocal 
speech. This is why in an alphabet-using culture a distinction between speech 
and writing is rarely made. History shows, however, that writing systems did 
not start out as a visual means of recording spoken language. Rather, they 
originated as systems of pictorial representation that were largely independent 
of vocal language.
Systems in which images represent word concepts are called pictographic. The 
combinations that result when several pictographs are used to represent ideas are 
called ideographic. In Chinese, for instance, the pictographs for sun and tree are 
combined to form the ideograph for east. The earliest systems of writing were 
pictographic. Among those of which we have preserved a record are the cunei-
form system of the ancient Sumerians, Akkadians, Assyrians, Babylonians, and 
Persians, the hieroglyphic systems of the Egyptians and the Mayans, and the 
pictographic systems still used by the Chinese and Japanese. The idea of using 
pictographs (or parts of pictographs) to represent consonant sounds probably 
originated with the Phoenicians in approximately 1000 BCE. Thus, a picto-
graph representing a house, for which the spoken word was beth, eventually 
came to symbolize the initial b sound of beth. This symbol, standing originally 
for the entire word beth and later for the sound of b, ultimately became the b of 
our alphabet. McLuhan often argued that the invention of the alphabet brought 
about the first cognitive revolution in the human species. In pre-alphabetic soci-
eties, words elicited sound images. Knowledge was processed and remembered 
in an auditory form. With the invention and spread of the alphabet, this gave 
way to a visual form of processing and remembering knowledge.
Societies tend to perceive some forms of writing as sacrosanct and inviola-
ble. This is why attempts to reform spelling or eliminate inconsistencies in 
writing conventions meet with strong resistance. In early cultures, writing 
systems were often attributed to divine sources. In many societies religious 
principles and laws are preserved in the form of sacred written texts. The Ten 
Commandments were inscribed on two stone tablets directly by God. The 
principles of Hinduism were written down in four collections of hymns, 
detached poetic portions, and ceremonial formulas.
In effect, writing is considered to have a sacred (authoritative or official) 
status. Correct spelling, like correct speaking, is more than a sign of educa-
tion. So, when spelling is altered it transmits social or cultural connotations. 
For example, a number of 1970s and 1980s rock groups spelled their names 
phonetically rather than traditionally: Guns N’ Roses, Led Zeppelin, The 
Monkees, and so on, standing out from mainstream society. The same pr actice 
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was adopted by rap artists as part of a social discourse that exudes resistance 
to inequalities, as symbolized by standard spelling. Names such as Snoop 
Dogg, Sister Souljah, and Jay Z, among many others, bespeak of empower-
ment. In a way, such trends are not particularly subversive (or innovative). All 
one has to do is look at the writings of authors such as Chaucer and even 
Shakespeare to realize the extent to which spelling has changed over the years. 
It was Noah Webster who proposed in 1828 the elimination of u in words 
such as colour, harbour, favour, and odour. His proposal was accepted, becom-
ing one of the features that distinguishes American from British English and 
thus, by implication, America from its British past. Changes of this kind have 
always come about to symbolize a break with tradition. American English is, 
itself, a language that was once considered to be subversive by the British (“not 
the King’s or Queen’s English”). So, although hip-hop style implies a break 
with white culture, it is, paradoxically, also a contemporary symptom of a 
larger tendency in America to constantly break from the past.
Spelling changes are also characteristic of the writing trends in online com-
munications. The term netlingo was coined by the linguist David Crystal to 
describe the spelling peculiarities in such communications.16 The main char-
acteristic of netlingo is its compactness, allowing interlocutors to increase the 
speed at which their messages can be inputted and received. So, a series of 
common abbreviations, acronyms, and other compressed structures have 
emerged to characterize netlingo.
b4 = before
bf/gf = boyfriend/girlfriend
f2f = face-to-face
gr8 = great
h2cus = hope to see you soon
idk = I don’t know
j4f = just for fun
lol = laughing out loud
cm = call me
2dA = today
wan2 = want to
ruok = Are you OK?
2moro = tomorrow
g2g = gotta go
Abbreviated writing was used by the Greeks as early as the fourth century 
BCE. Scholars and scientists have always used abbreviations of various kinds 
to facilitate technical communications among themselves, making them pre-
cise (etc., et al., op. cit. N.B.). In this case, abbreviation implies a high level of 
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literacy. Also, we abbreviate the names of friends and family members (Alex 
for Alexander), common phrases (TGIF for Thank God it’s Friday), and any-
thing else that refers to something common or familiar.
But what sets the abbreviation tendencies in netlingo apart from all econo-
mizing tendencies of the past is the speed and extent to which compressed 
forms are spreading and becoming part of communicative behavior through-
out the Internet and also migrating to the offline world. Arguably, the ratio-
nale has a social basis. Writing takes time and effort. But there is an expectation 
in the Internet universe that responses to e-mails, text messages, and the like 
must be rapid. Logically, the compression of forms helps people meet this 
expectation by making it possible to “get back” to the sender more quickly 
and rapidly. In effect, the Internet is changing not only language, but also the 
rate of communication and our expectations of response patterns to commu-
nication. This is creating ever-emerging and ever-changing literacies and com-
municative practices that have become central to the articulation of shifting 
social beliefs and ritual practices through individual and collective engage-
ment with digital technologies.
 Emoji
An amazing event occurred in 2015 that bore rather profound implications 
for the future of writing, literacy, and even human communication itself. That 
was the year when the Oxford Dictionary chose, as its “Word of the Year,” an 
emoji—the “Face with Tears of Joy” emoji.
Not only was it not a “word” in the traditional sense—it was a pictogram—
but it also turned on its head the very definition that the dictionary itself had 
always adopted for the meaning of a written “word”—a representation of the 
individual sounds of the spoken word. It was not the only event in 2015 that 
brought out the growing communicative and social significance of emoji. 
Musicians, artists, politicians, and advertisers, among many others, started 
using them in their tweets, on their Facebook pages, on Instagram, on web-
sites, and in other digital venues. Even a distinguished musical artist like Sir 
Paul McCartney was enlisted by Skype to create ten animated emoji, called 
“Love Mojis,” for its new app. Since then, emoji writing has certainly entered 
the realm of pop culture, with emoji translations of popular songs, entire 
books, and even an emoji movie.
What is going on? With an ever-increasing repertory of emoji symbols cur-
rently available (including smileys with more skin tones), it has become obvi-
ous that the emoji phenomenon is not just a “cute” means of visually sprucing 
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up a written text, but rather a veritable “sign of the times.” On its website, the 
Oxford Dictionary explained that it chose an emoji over a traditional pho-
netic word because it “captures the ethos, mood, and preoccupations” of the 
contemporary world. Is traditional writing on the wane since the arrival of 
Web 2.0 technologies? Is the kind of literacy that has served us so well since at 
least the sixteenth century lost its social value and prestige, as the Oxford 
Dictionary choice indirectly suggested? Unlike the Print Age, which encour-
aged, and even imposed, the exclusive use of alphabetic writing in most 
message- making media and domains of literacy, the current Internet Age 
encourages different modes (including visual and audio) to be utilized in tan-
dem with alphabetic (and non-alphabetic) scripts in the composition of mes-
sages. This new kind of multimodal writing system harbors a broad range of 
implications within it, from the possible demise of the Print Age to an evolu-
tionary shift in human communication systems and practices.17
Emoji are iconic signs, by and large, although there are also indexical (such 
as pointing arrows) and symbolic signs in the mix. They do not substitute 
traditional forms of writing in science, academia, journalism, and so on; 
rather, they reinforce, expand, and annotate the meaning of an informal writ-
ten communication. It is relevant to note here that, although emoji surfaced 
as a means to enhance a broader comprehension of written texts in an age of 
instant communications across the globe, culturally stylized emoji have none-
theless emerged for various reasons. Even facial emoji (or smileys) have under-
gone modification based on culture-specific needs. The creators of smileys 
attempted to make them as culturally neutral as possible. The use of yellow to 
color the smiley was an obvious stylistic ploy to remove recognizable facial 
features associated with race or ethnicity. Roundness also seems to attenuate 
specific details of facial structure that would otherwise suggest personality or 
identity. But, almost right after their spread into common usage, new emoji 
were constructed that embedded culturally based meanings, either explicitly 
or unwittingly. So, different colors to represent the face have now become 
common. As emphasized throughout this book, connotation is a principle of 
human semiosis—it simply cannot be eradicated from sign systems. The smi-
ley and face with tears emoji are found on virtually all mobile device key-
boards, no matter what language is involved. They are stylized, almost 
comic-book-like, pictograms that can (and do) replace words and phrases. 
They are meaning-enhancing devices that are amalgamated with alphabetic 
writing in a hybrid fashion, although there are now texts that are composed 
entirely of emoji. It is not certain, however, that this “emoji-only” mode of 
writing is spreading broadly. The hybrid system continues to be the most 
prominent one in informal settings.
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An analysis of common text messages shows that three speech functions are 
now part of systematic emoji usage18:
 1. Utterance opener. The smiley is used in place of, or in tandem with, opening 
salutations such as “Hi!” allowing the sender to strengthen or maintain 
friendly bonds with the interlocutor even when a message may have some 
negativity in its contents.
 2. Utterance ending. The smiley and similar sentiment emoji (such as hearts in 
the case of intimate messages) are used typically as the good-bye function 
in a message.
 3. Silence avoidance. In written messages, silence gaps occur when the reader 
expects more information about something, whereas the writer wishes to 
avoid it. By putting emoji in such gaps, the intent is to counteract the 
uncomfortableness that may result from such gaps.
In addition to such common speech functions, emoji usage entails a con-
siderable level of emotivity, portraying one’s state of mind. In face-to-face 
communication, people use interjections, intonation, and other prosodic 
strategies, alongside specific keywords and phrases, to convey their feelings, 
explicitly or implicitly. In hybrid messages these are typically replaced by 
emoji forms. There are also other utterance functions with respect to emoji 
usage that need not concern us here. The main point is that emoji are hardly 
randomly used visual devices to embellish a written text. They now form a 
pictographic  language  that complements other ways in which language is 
written and expressed. The widespread use of emoji became practicable in 
2010 when hundreds of characters were standardized by Unicode. The stan-
dardized emoji lexicon consisted of smileys, heart emoji, and a few other pic-
tographic forms still found across keyboards and apps (with minor variations 
in detail), implying that people likely use these forms in similar ways. 
Additional characters are created on a daily basis, and these are accessed pri-
marily on online dictionaries and inventories that allow for selection and, in 
some cases, even modification of emoji for personalized or specialized use.
In sum, emoji in themselves are not revolutionary—the technology behind 
them is. So, they will likely morph or disappear as the technology changes. In 
the meanwhile, there appears to be a very important subtext in them. They 
invariably seem to add a “sunny” cheerful tone to common everyday commu-
nications, standing out against the dark realities and conflicts of the contempo-
rary world. They seem to say, implicitly, “Smile, life is short.” It is no coincidence, 
in my view, that the most popular emoji bear the color of the sun.
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 Ritual and Language
Language and ritual are two sides of the same semiotic coin. The speakers in 
any dialogue must know how to start and end the conversation, how to make 
themselves understood, how to respond to statements, how to be sensitive, 
how to take turns, and how to listen. All this implies knowledge of the speech 
rituals connected with the appropriate discourse code. This informs people 
about what to say and how to say it in specific situations. There are several 
factors that will shape how discourse will unfold. First and foremost, there is 
the social situation itself. The utterance “Good-bye” is formalistic; “See ya” is, 
instead, much more casual. Discourse spans the whole range of formality, 
from highly formulaic to highly intimate, depending on situation. Second, 
there is the setting (time and place) in which discourse occurs. Greeting some-
one in the morning entails a “Good morning,” while in the evening it requires 
a “Good evening.” Third, there is the function or purpose of the discourse—
making contact, greeting, gossiping, informing, praising, blaming, persuad-
ing, advising, congratulating, and so on. This entails not only level of formality, 
but also mode of delivery (voice tone, rate of speech). In a situation such as 
our imaginary restaurant scene, the appropriate tone of voice of the partici-
pants would be low and their rate of speech drawn out and deliberate. Fourth, 
there is the mood of the participants. This makes the discourse event constru-
able as serious, jovial, ironic, and so on. Fifth, there is the relationship of the 
participants to each other (intimate, distant, and so on). Greeting a stranger 
entails a “Hello,” while greeting a friend requires a “Hi” instead. Societies are 
held together because of these discourse rituals.
The link between language and ritual was forged at the origin of human 
culture when certain words were felt to have awesome magical powers. That 
same feeling of awe is still manifest in children’s eyes when they listen to a 
magician’s abracadabra, or when they read about the power of a magical spell 
or formula, such as the Open Sesame formula used by Ali Baba in Arabian 
Nights to open the door of the robbers’ cave. Incidentally, the word abraca-
dabra derives from the letters arranged in the inverted pyramid design of an 
amulet worn around the neck in centuries gone by. In each line of the pyra-
mid there was a letter. Each letter was supposed to vanish magically until only 
the A remained to form the vertex of the triangle. As the letters disappeared, 
so purportedly did the disease or problem of its wearer.
In tribal societies, shamans are thought to possess knowledge of magical 
words that allow them to control objects, people, spirits, and natural events, 
and thus cure disease, ward off evil, bring good or harm to another person. In 
some cultures, knowing the name of God is thought to give the knower great 
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power. Such knowledge is often a closely guarded secret, if indeed it is allowed 
to be known by anyone but a select few. In ancient Egypt, the sorceress Isis 
tricked the sun god Ra into revealing his name, allowing her to gain power 
over him and all other gods. In Native American cultures, the given name is 
thought to bring with it all the spiritual qualities of the individuals who have 
shared that name. These are thought to cast a magical, protective spell on the 
child given the name. This is why many Inuit will refuse to say their name out 
loud, fearing that this “senseless” act could break the magical spell. The Inuit 
also believe that a newborn baby cries because it wants its name, and will not 
be complete until it gets it.
The feeling that certain words are sacred or magical has become largely 
unconscious in modern societies, but the residues of word magic, as it is called, 
can be found in everyday discourse. We take oaths to fulfill a pledge, calling 
on God as witness. Expressions such as “Oh, God” and “Thank Heaven” have 
become so common that we scarcely think of them any more as sacred formu-
las. We tell our children “Just say the magic word, and what you want will 
appear.” When someone sneezes, we utter “Bless you,” no longer realizing that 
the words are meant to ward off sickness.
The other side of sacredness is profanity. Most societies look down upon 
profane or vulgar language, viewing it in the same way that they would an 
immoral or criminal act; most societies have taboos against its use. The word 
taboo comes from the tribal Polynesian language, Tongan, in which it means 
“holy, untouchable.” Verbal taboos exist in all cultures. For example, among 
the Zuñi of New Mexico, the word takka (frogs) is prohibited during religious 
ceremonies because of its vulgar connotations. In our own culture, so-called 
four-letter words are generally deemed to be obscene, and considered taboo in 
sacred places such as churches and sanctuaries. In common law it is a misde-
meanor to speak or publish words that vilify or ridicule God or the Bible. The 
manner, rather than the content, of the utterance or publication renders it 
blasphemous. Thus, a statement of opinion, no matter how heretical it may 
be, is not punishable as blasphemy. Language that offends or provokes a pub-
lic disturbance is also held to be in violation of the law.
 Slang
The language spoken in a society is never homogeneous, especially in large 
societies. Certain people or groups within the society may use, frequently, a 
version of the language called slang, which implies the use of nonstandard 
words and phrases, generally shorter lived than the expressions of ordinary 
colloquial speech. However, slang is hardly an inconsequential form of 
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“v ulgar” speech (note that originally vulgar meant “of the common people”); 
rather, it constitutes a powerful form of discourse because it bestows a recog-
nizable identity on group members, embodying their attitudes and values as a 
group. Slang suggests that language is like make-up, smoking, and other 
codes; it is a code that provides the props (verbal in this case) for defining and 
presenting a persona to a specific social audience.
Although the larger society may find slang undesirable, it is not immune 
from it. If the slang-using group has enough contact with the mainstream 
culture, some of its figures of speech might become forms known to the whole 
society, usually because they may provide a name needed for an object or 
action (chill out). Sometimes, slang terms become accepted as standard speech 
with an altered, tamed meaning (jazz, as you might recall from Chap. 1, origi-
nally had sexual connotations). Slang also finds its way into the cultural main-
stream through the work of writers who use it to convey character and 
ambiance. Shakespeare brought into acceptable usage such slang terms as hub-
bub, to bump, and to dwindle. Television and cinema have been instrumental 
in spreading slang usage. The words pot and marijuana, which were part of a 
secret criminal jargon in the 1940s, became, through the media, common 
words in the 1960s when they were adopted by counterculture youths. Today, 
new slang items come and go quickly; they are memes in cyberspace that have 
a truly short lifespan.
Slang plays (and has always played) an important semiotic role in the expe-
rience of youth, no matter what era of time or society are involved. It provides 
the signs (slang forms) that young people equate with specific kinds of social 
meanings that have resonance among peers. Take the word duh, which sur-
faced in late 1990s youth slang, even though it is now a colloquialism in the 
speech of everyone. With its perfectly paired linguistic partner, yeah-right, it 
is, above all else, a means for conveying savvy and sarcasm. It is the equivalent 
of “Tell me something I don’t know.” Duh is assertive, a perfect tool for under-
cutting mindless chatter or insulting repetition. It is an example of how slang 
is used to cut directly to the chase.
The reason why a slang item becomes a common word or colloquialism is 
fairly straightforward. If many people start using it, it enters the common 
lexicon, becoming indistinguishable from other forms of speech. The slang 
that is transmitted by and through the media is actually much more than 
slang. It is what journalist Leslie Savan labeled pop language in 2005.19 Pop 
phrases such as “That is so last year,” “I hate it when that happens,” “It’s so 
yesterday,” “Don’t go there,” and “I don’t think so” constitute the lexicon of 
pop language, which has a “sitcomish” flavor to it. Pop language is light, self- 
conscious, and replete with put-downs and exaggerated inflections. Savan 
compares the 1953 Disney cartoon Peter Pan with the 2002 sequel Return to 
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Never Land showing how remarkably free the former one was of packaged 
phrases and slang. The sequel on the other hand speaks in pop language, 
including such phrases as “In your dreams, Hook,” “Put a cork in it,” “Tell me 
about it,” “You’ve got that right,” and “Don’t even think about it.”
Pop language is hip language for a mass audience, having precedents in 
previous eras of pop culture. In the 1920s, jazz introduced a whole series of 
slang expressions, including hip, stylin’, cool, and groovy into pop language, 
which have since migrated to standard vocabulary. Savan describes the abuse 
of slang phrases in common conversations. Her point seems to be that in the 
past, the primary conduits of new vocabulary were writers. However, not 
before the second half of the twentieth century did it become routine for the 
conduit to be popular media recycling, essentially, teen-created words. As 
mentioned, the words pot and marijuana became common words in the 1960s 
after they were adopted by the counterculture youth of the era. These were 
spread by TV sitcoms and other programs of the era to society at large. The 
number of such words that have entered the communal lexicon since the 
1960s is truly mind-boggling, constituting strong evidence that the media 
have become a major social force, as Savan suggests. The way actors speak on 
screen seems to constitute a model of how to speak on the streets. Animal 
House (1978) introduced slang terms still used today, such as wimp, which is 
now a common term for someone who is scared or has no courage, and brew, 
which means a beer. Clueless introduced pop language mannerisms such as as 
if, an exclamation of disbelief, and whatever to convey that one does not care 
what another person is saying. In 2004, the film Mean Girls introduced plas-
tic, meaning fake girls who look like Barbie dolls, and fetch, which is an abbre-
viation of fetching to describe something cool and trendy. Movies, TV, and the 
Internet inform people how to say things. The reason why pop language has 
become so dominant is because people gain insights into the events of their 
everyday worlds through the media and the Internet. Where once it took 
decades for a change to penetrate the language, now it seems to take only 
days. And the reason for this is that electronic media are accessible to one and 
all. The greatest influence on the development of language today does come 
not from the pen, but from the screen.
 Gesture
As we saw in the opening chapter, the smoking performance put on by Cheryl 
and Ted was grounded on the strategic deployment of gesture. However, gesture 
has many more functions than courtship-based communication. It is nonverbal 
communication involving hand, arm, and head movements that can be used 
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independently of, or in tandem with, oral speech. Gesture languages include the 
sign languages used by hearing-impaired individuals, the alternate sign lan-
guages used by religious groups during periods of imposed silence or during 
ritualistic practices, the hand signals used by police officers to control traffic, 
and the hand and arm movements used by conductors to lead an orchestra.
The ability to use the hands—the dominant limbs in the human species, 
given their physiological structure that make grasping and pointing simple—
was achieved by the first hominids who had the capacity to walk upright. The 
liberation of the hands from the requirements of locomotion not only allowed 
these early humans to make tools and to use fire deliberately, but also to use 
their hands for signaling. The capacity to point out and locate beings, objects, 
and events in the immediate environment, and to convey their existence and 
location to others, conferred upon the human species a new and powerful 
control over the environment. Manual communication  coincides with the 
emergence of self-awareness and consciousness. As already discussed, the first 
inscriptions and cave etchings were, no doubt, realized through hand gestures, 
which were probably transferred to a wall or some other surface with some 
tool. These “gesture-to-drawing” portrayals were humanity’s first visual repre-
sentations. Children, too, pass through an initial stage of gesture before they 
develop vocal language, constantly pointing to things they recognize. Although 
oral speech eventually becomes the dominant form of communication around 
the age of two years, gesture does not vanish. It remains a functional subsys-
tem of communication that can always be enlisted as an alternate and more 
understandable form of message transmission.
When people do not speak the language of the country they are visiting, 
they resort instinctively to gesture to get a message across or to negotiate a 
meaning. For example, to describe an automobile, a person might use the 
hands to portray a steering wheel and the motion used to steer a car, accom-
panying this gesture perhaps with an imitative sound of a motor. The iconic 
nature of gesture is what makes it a more universal, and less culture- dependent, 
mode of communication, even though studies show that the type and form of 
gesture used will vary from culture to culture, suggesting that while there are 
more common elements in gesture than there are in vocal languages, it is 
likely that the two—a specific language and the gestures that accompany it—
form a structural partnership. As Adam Kendon aptly writes, “grammatical 
and lexical differences between languages may play a role in structuring the 
way a speaker organizes associated gestures.”20
The intriguing work of linguist David McNeill (as we saw in Chap. 2) has 
revealed, in fact, that oral discourse is typically accompanied by gestures that 
depict the imagery implicit in the content of a message.21 For example, when 
someone says, “Where did you get that idea?” they tend to use an a ccompanying 
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gesture of the hand curved, up high in front of the face, with the fingers and 
thumb forward and apart, giving the appearance of holding onto something. 
With sentences such as “I gave him that idea,” and “It’s hard to get that idea 
across,” the accompanying gesture is both hands extended, moving downward, 
making the speaker appear to be presenting an object to the other person along 
a conduit. With utterances such as “Your words are full of meaning” and “I 
can’t get these ideas into words,” the accompanying gesture is both hands form-
ing a cup, with the fingers curled and palms up, to show two containers. Such 
gestures suggest a semiotic link between hand movements and vocal speech.
In the case of hearing-impaired individuals, needless to say, the primary 
means of communication is through sign language, that is, language based on 
hand signs. These signs are word-like units with both concrete and abstract 
meanings, made by either one or both hands, which assume distinctive shapes 
and movements. Spatial relations, directions, and orientation of the hand 
movements, as well as facial expressions and bodily movements, make up the 
grammar of sign languages. As Goldin-Meadow aptly puts it, “sign languages 
assume the structural properties characteristic of spoken languages.”22
The Plains peoples of North America employ sign language as a means of 
communication between tribes that do not share the same oral language. The 
gesture signs represent things in nature, ideas, emotions, and sensations. The 
sign for a white person, for instance, is made by drawing the fingers across the 
forehead, indicating a hat. The sensation of cold is indicated by a shivering 
motion of the hands in front of the body. The same sign is used for winter and 
for year, because Native Americans traditionally count years in terms of win-
ters. Slowly turning the hand, relaxed at the wrist, means indecision, doubt, 
or possibility; a modification of this sign, with quicker movement, is the ques-
tion sign. Special signs also exist for each tribe to represent the rivers, moun-
tains, and other natural features within their particular habitats.
The possibility that gesture is a kind of “prelude” to oral speech, and thus 
full language, led some twentieth-century animal psychologists to teach ges-
ture to primates, who lack the requisite anatomical organs for vocal speech, to 
determine whether they are capable of human language. When the female 
chimpanzee named Washoe was almost one year of age, she was taught 
American Sign Language by the Gardner husband-and-wife team in 1966.23 
Remarkably, Washoe learned to use 132 signs in just over four years. What 
appeared to be even more remarkable was that she began to put signs together 
to express a small set of concepts resembling the early sentences of chil-
dren. Actually, the Premack husband-and-wife team, whose work began back 
in 1954, went further than the Gardners, teaching a five-year-old  chimpanzee, 
who they called Sarah, a form of written language.24 They instructed Sarah to 
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arrange and respond to vertical sequences of plastic tokens that represented 
individual words: a small pink square = banana; a small blue triangle = apple; 
and so on. Sarah eventually developed the ability to respond to combinations 
of such symbols that included references to abstract notions.
In another highly publicized primate experiment, yet another husband- and- 
wife team, Duane and Sue Rumbaugh, taught common chimpanzees and 
bonobos to associate symbols with a variety of things, people, and places in and 
around a laboratory. In one study, they had taught two chimps to engage in a 
conversation. One was allowed to observe a trainer hide an item of food in a 
container. The chimp knew through previous training how to press a key on a 
computer keyboard with the symbol for the food item in question, which 
could be seen by a second chimp. The second chimp was then able, on the basis 
of the first chimp’s keyboard signal, to locate the food item. This result might 
seem to be truly remarkable. However, Epstein, Lanza, and Skinner were able 
to get the same kind of behavior from two pigeons, named Jack and Jill.25 The 
pigeons were put in adjoining cages with a transparent wall between them. Jack 
was in a position to peck a key labeled “What color?” as a cue for Jill to look 
behind a curtain with three lights—red, green, and yellow—that were not vis-
ible to Jack. After ascertaining which light was illuminated, Jill pecked one of 
three keys—R, G, or Y—which Jack could see. Jack then responded by peck-
ing a key labeled “Thank you,” whereupon Jill was given a food reward.
Amazingly, Keith and Cathy Hayes were apparently successful in teaching 
a chimp named Viki how to utter a few words.26 They treated Viki like a child 
with a human upbringing. Viki was able to actually articulate the words 
“Mama,” “Papa,” “cut,” and “up.” Other experimenters, such as Mary Lee 
Jensvold and Allan Gardner, have tried to find out if chimpanzees can apply 
what they learn from humans to new situations.27 A researcher would bring 
up a specific topic, and then ask a chimpanzee a relevant question on the 
topic. Jensvold and Gardner claim that the chimps were able to understand 
and expand upon simple questions, in ways that are similar to how children 
respond to such questions.
Despite all the enthusiasm and all the truly extraordinary claims, what 
seems to be happening in most cases is not unlike classical conditioning, 
which cannot be ruled out as a factor in the primate language experiments. 
This in no way implies that animals do not possess sophisticated communica-
tion systems or intelligence. They do, but they are different from language, 
which is based on connotation structure and nuances that delve into human 
history. The primate trainers may have read much more in the linguistic 
behaviors of their primates than was really there. The Gardners had hired a 
hearing-impaired ASL user to help train Washoe. Later on, he made the fol-
lowing revealing comment28:
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Every time the chimp made a sign, we were supposed to write it down in the log. 
They [the Gardners] were always complaining because my log didn’t show 
enough signs. I watched really carefully. The chimp’s hands were moving con-
stantly. Maybe I missed something, but I don’t think so. The hearing people 
were logging every movement the chimp made as a sign. Every time the chimp 
put his hand in his mouth, they’d say “Oh, he’s making the sign for drink,” and 
they’d give him some milk. When the chimp scratched himself, they’d record it 
as the sign for scratch. Sometimes the trainers would say, “Oh, amazing, look at 
that, it’s exactly like the ASL sign for give!” It wasn’t.
There really has emerged no impartial evidence to suggest that chimpanzees 
and gorillas are capable of language in the same way that humans are, or of 
having the ability or desire to pass on to their offspring what they have learned 
from their human mentors, despite claims to the contrary.
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1. See, for example, Noam Chomsky, On nature and language (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
2. Charles W.  Morris, Foundations of the theory of signs (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1938).
3. See, Lev S. Vygotsky, Thought and language (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1962).
4. Julian Jaynes, The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
5. An in-depth synthesis of this line of work in linguistics, known more techni-
cally as cognitive linguistics, can be found in Gary B. Palmer, Toward a theory 
of cultural linguistics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996).
6. Robert Levine, A geography of time: The temporal misadventures of a social psy-
chologist or how every culture keeps time just a little bit differently (New York: 
Basic, 1997).
7. Ronald W. Langacker has studied this aspect of language rather profoundly in 
Concept, image, and symbol: The cognitive basis of grammar (Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter, 1990) and Grammar and conceptualization (Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter, 1999).
8. Roger W. Brown, Psycholinguistics (New York: Free Press, 1970), 258–73.
9. The most in-depth theory of modeling systems in semiotics is the one by 
Thomas A. Sebeok, Signs: An introduction to semiotics (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1994).
10. F. M. Müller, Lectures on the science of language (London: Longmans, Green, 
1861).
 M. Danesi
 95
11. B. Alpher, “Feminine as the unmarked grammatical gender: Buffalo girls are 
no fools,” Australian Journal of Linguistics 7 (1987): 169–87.
12. Edward Sapir, Language (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1921).
13. Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, Basic color terms (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1969).
14. N. McNeill, “Colour and colour terminology,” Journal of Linguistics 8 (1972): 
21–33.
15. A detailed treatment of color categories, as well as an up-to-date debate on the 
relation between color categories and perception, can be found in C.  L. 
Hardin and Luisa Maffi, eds., Color categories in thought and language 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
16. David Crystal, Language and the Internet, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).
17. Marcel Danesi, The semiotics of emoji: The rise of visual language in the age of 
the Internet (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).
18. Danesi, op. cit.
19. Leslie Savan, Slam dunks and no-brainers: Language in your life, the media, 
business, politics, and, like, whatever (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2005). In 
Conversation: A history of a declining art (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2006),  Stephen Miller also decries the loss of true conversation, which he 
similarly claims is due to media influence. But I have a slightly different take 
on this, namely that conversation is a code that changes over time and it does 
so because the channels we use to converse are changing. Talk online is bound 
to be different from talk face-to-face. But the content of conversations have 
always remained the same from time immemorial. Conversation is about pre-
senting the Self in daily life with the strategies that are consistent with trends 
within that very life.
20. Adam Kendon, Gesture: Visible action as utterance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 348.
21. David McNeill, Hand and mind: What gestures reveal about thought (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), and Gesture & thought (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005).
22. Susan Goldin-Meadow, Hearing gesture: How our hands help us think 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2003), 194.
23. R. A. Gardner and B. T. Gardner, “Teaching sign language to a chimpanzee,” 
Science 165 (1969): 664–72.
24. D.  Premack and A.  J. Premack, The mind of an ape (New York: Norton, 
1983).
25. R. Epstein, R. P. Lanza, and B. F. Skinner, “Symbolic communication between 
two pigeons,” Science 207 (1980): 543–545.
26. G.  Urban, “Metasignaling and language origins,” American Anthropologist 
104 (2002): 233–246.
 Tell Me About Yourself: What Is Language? 
96
27. M. L. Jensvold and R. A. Gardner, “Interactive use of sign language by cross-
fostered chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes),” Journal of Comparative Psychology 114 
(2000): 335–346.
28. Cited in Stephen Pinker, The language instinct: How the mind creates language 
(New York: William Morrow, 1994), 37.
Bibliography
Alpher, B. 1987. Feminine as the unmarked grammatical gender: Buffalo girls are no 
fools. Australian Journal of Linguistics 7: 169–187.
Berlin, Brent, and Paul Kay. 1969. Basic color terms. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
Brown, Roger W. 1970. Psycholinguistics. New York: Free Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2002. On nature and language. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Crystal, David. 2006. Language and the Internet. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Danesi, Marcel. 2016. The semiotics of emoji: The rise of visual language in the age of the 
Internet. London: Bloomsbury.
Epstein, R., R.P. Lanza, and B.F. Skinner. 1980. Symbolic communication between 
two pigeons. Science 207: 543–545.
Gardner, R.A., and B.T. Gardner. 1969. Teaching sign language to a chimpanzee. 
Science 165: 664–672.
Goldin-Meadow, Susan. 2003. Hearing gesture: How our hands help us think. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press.
Hardin, C.L., and Luisa Maffi, eds. 1997. Color categories in thought and language. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jaynes, Julian. 1975. The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Jensvold, M.L., and R.A. Gardner. 2000. Interactive use of sign language by cross- 
fostered chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology 114: 
335–346.
Kendon, Adam. 2004. Gesture: Visible action as utterance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Langacker, Ronald W. 1990. Concept, image, and symbol: The cognitive basis of gram-
mar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
———. 1999. Grammar and conceptualization. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Levine, Robert. 1997. A geography of time: The temporal misadventures of a social psy-
chologist or how every culture keeps time just a little bit differently. New York: Basic.
McNeill, N. 1972. Colour and colour terminology. Journal of Linguistics 8: 21–33.
 M. Danesi
 97
McNeill, David. 1992. Hand and mind: What gestures reveal about thought. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
———. 2005. Gesture & thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Miller, Stephen. 2006. Conversation: A history of a declining art. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
Morris, Charles W. 1938. Foundations of the theory of signs. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press.
Müller, Friedrich M. 1861. Lectures on the science of language. London: Longmans, 
Green.
Palmer, Gary B. 1996. Toward a theory of cultural linguistics. Austin: University of 
Texas Press.
Pinker, Stephen. 1994. The language instinct: How the mind creates language. New York: 
William Morrow.
Premack, D., and A.J. Premack. 1983. The mind of an ape. New York: Norton.
Sapir, Edward. 1921. Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
Savan, Leslie. 2005. Slam dunks and no-brainers: Language in your life, the media, 
business, politics, and, like, whatever. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Sebeok, Thomas A. 1994. Signs: An introduction to semiotics. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press.
Urban, G. 2002. Metasignaling and language origins. American Anthropologist 104: 
233–246.
Vygotsky, Lev S. 1962. Thought and language. Cambridge: MIT Press.
 Tell Me About Yourself: What Is Language? 
99© The Author(s) 2018
M. Danesi, Of Cigarettes, High Heels, and Other Interesting Things, 
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95348-6_5
5
Kisses Sweeter Than Wine: Metaphor 
and the Making of Meaning
Midway between the unintelligible and the commonplace, it is metaphor which 
most produces knowledge.
—Aristotle (384–322 BCE)
Let’s go back to the kissing scene on Martha’s video described previously. There 
is something else in that scene that is semiotically interesting. During the small 
talk that followed the kissing action, Ted can be heard saying, “Your kisses are 
sweeter than wine, Cheryl.” As you might surmise by now, a semiotician would 
not construe Ted’s statement as merely a figure of speech chosen to embellish 
his compliment. Unlike most people, who hardly notice such expressions, hav-
ing become so accustomed to hearing and using them, the semiotician would 
see Ted’s metaphor as revealing something much more fundamental about 
human meaning-making than meets the eye (to use a metaphor). To the semio-
tician, metaphor is the conceptual glue that binds all the meaning systems and 
codes in the system of everyday life together. Language is the code that most 
reveals how it works, although it is found in all other codes.
Metaphor brings us into an in-depth study of iconicity. Recall from Chap. 
2 that icons are signs that stand for things by resemblance or simulation of 
some type. Metaphor does as well, but it does so in an imaginary abstract way. 
To say that a kiss is sweet involves a mental simulation of a sensory e xperience—
sweetness—that is projected onto the experience of an emotion—love. In a 
nutshell, that is how metaphor works. It is an icon of an imagined experi-
ence—an attempt to make the abstract, imaginary world of mind understand-
able in concrete terms. Metaphorical expressions are so common and pervasive 
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that people hardly ever notice them. Although interest in metaphor is ancient, 
the study of its relation to cognition and culture is a relatively recent phenom-
enon. And the interest has soared. Since about the mid-1950s the amount of 
research on metaphor has been mind-boggling. There is currently so much 
information on metaphor scattered in journals and books that it would take a 
gargantuan effort just to organize and classify it. For this reason, I have had to 
be highly selective in this chapter.
 Aristotle and the Discovery of Metaphor
If a very young child were to ask a parent “What is love?” one thing the parent 
would not do is give the child an encyclopedic definition of love. Rather, the 
parent would relate it to an experience that is familiar to the child: “Well, you 
know, love is like…when mummy or daddy kisses or hugs you…and that 
makes you feel warm and cozy inside, right?” Adults say things such as this all 
the time because they intuitively know that children can relate an abstract 
concept such as love to an emotional event or feeling connected with it. This 
is exactly what metaphor allows people to do—to link an abstraction to some-
thing concrete, familiar, or experienced. People the world over use similar 
“metaphorical elucidations” to explain morals, ideas, values, and other abstrac-
tions to children. Metaphor is the faculty that makes Homo sapiens sapient, yet 
it is still largely the popular view that it is a device of poets—a matter of 
extraordinary rather than ordinary language.
The term metaphor, itself a metaphor (meta “beyond” and pherein “to 
carry”), was coined by the Greek philosopher Aristotle, who saw it as much 
more than poetic license. Take the notion of life. How would one answer the 
question “What is life?” As Aristotle knew, there really is no literal way to 
answer this question satisfactorily. Aware of this, the poet would probably 
write a poem about it, the dramatist a play. The common person, too, would 
come up with something just as inventive (albeit on a much smaller scale). 
Someone might say that “life is a stage.” Incredibly, that would be the end of 
the matter, for such an answer invariably seems to satisfy the questioner. The 
word life refers to something that we know exists, but when asked to describe 
it, there is virtually no way of conveying its meaning sufficiently in literal 
words. This is because the notion of life is something abstract, and thus pro-
duces no concrete images to which we can put literal words. A stage, on the 
other hand, is something we can visualize, and thus describe easily in such 
words—it is a raised platform on which theatrical performances are presented, 
in which actors perform actions according to their roles, and so on. Now, the 
use of stage to describe life makes this notion intelligible. No further explana-
tions are needed.
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Remarkably, in having described life as a stage, we now have a different 
understanding or view of what life means. Indeed, if one were asked “How 
would you change your life?” the metaphor itself would suggest the vocabu-
lary required to formulate a viable answer. For example, one could say that a 
change in role or setting (whatever the case may be) would be appropriate to 
change one’s life. In other words, the original metaphor, by its very nature, 
teaches and guides us by the new information it produces, as if by magic. 
Metaphor is, in fact, word magic in its most common, albeit largely unrecog-
nized, form. Aristotle suggested that people use metaphor not only to render 
intelligible what is abstract, but also to create new meanings, to seek new 
insights, to discover new concepts, and, remarkably, no special intellectual 
powers are required. The ability to coin and use metaphors is an innate skill of 
all humans, no matter how much intelligence or erudition they may have.
Given its apparent open-endedness—one could have related life to many 
other visualizable things (to a river, to the seasons, and so on)—the question 
that comes to mind is how do we go about gleaning the meaning of a given 
metaphor? Aristotle answered this question rather cleverly. He suggested that 
a metaphor is like a logical proportion that people must figure out in terms of 
the formula A is to B as C is to D. For example, consider the meaning of “Old 
age is the evening of life.” If old age is the A in the proportion, life the B, and 
evening the C, then a successful interpretation of the metaphor lies in figuring 
out the D in this formula: old age (A) is to life (B) as evening (C) is to (= D)? 
The answer to this logical puzzle is twilight: old age is to life as evening is to 
twilight. This proportion, incidentally, pervades mythical and literary tradi-
tions throughout the world. It is found in the legend of Oedipus the King and 
the Sphinx—the mythical creature with the head and breasts of a woman, the 
body of a lion, a serpent tail, and the wings of a bird who guarded entrance to 
the ancient city of Thebes. When Oedipus approached the city, so the legend 
goes, the Sphinx confronted him, posing the following riddle to him: “What 
is it that has four feet in the morning, two at noon, and three at twilight?” 
Failure to answer it correctly meant instant death—a fate that had befallen all 
who had ventured to Thebes before Oedipus. The fearless Oedipus answered: 
“Humans, who crawl on all fours as infants, then on two legs, and finally with 
a cane in old age.” Upon hearing the correct answer, the Sphinx killed itself, 
and Oedipus entered Thebes as a hero for having gotten rid of the terrible 
monster that had kept the city enslaved for a long period of time.
Various versions of the Sphinx’s riddle exist. The one paraphrased above is 
adapted from the play Oedipus Rex by the Greek dramatist Sophocles  
(c. 496–406 BCE). Whatever its version, it is evidence that since the dawn of 
history people come to an understanding of life through metaphor. As human-
ity’s first recorded riddle, the Riddle of the Sphinx provides us, in fact, with an 
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early model of how metaphor manifests itself in human affairs. Often, Aristotle 
emphasized, metaphorical reasoning provides the only way to understand or 
describe something. In English, we use an agrarian term in the sentence “The 
ship plowed through the ocean,” not as a mere idiomatic choice, but because 
it is the only way we can talk about that action. So, too, with many other 
concepts. The notion of “mental depth,” for instance, is a product of meta-
phorical reasoning. That is why in English we talk about thoughts as being 
deep, profound (a word that contains the Latin fundus “bottom”), or shallow, 
even though we do not consciously experience actual physical depth when 
using such words.
 Giambattista Vico
Aristotle himself claimed that, as knowledge-productive as it was, metaphor is 
essentially a poetic device. The basis of language is thus literal meaning and 
figurative language is essentially rhetorical embellishment. Two  millennia 
went by before someone was perceptive enough to grasp fully the relevance of 
metaphor to human cognition—the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher 
Giambattista Vico (1668–1744).
Like Aristotle, Vico saw metaphor as the strategy by which people come to 
grips with abstract knowledge. However, he went further than Aristotle, 
attributing the ability to use metaphor to the workings of the human imagina-
tion, the fantasia, as he called it. The first symbols of humanity, Vico claimed, 
were sensory metaphors revealing a strategy of knowing that he called poetic1 
because, like poets, people reflect on what they have sensed by inventing 
words that are designed to resemble their sensory responses. These words are 
metaphors and upon them human cultures are constructed. In the earliest 
stage of culture-making—which he called the age of the gods—human groups 
created religion, marriage rites, burial rites, and other basic institutions and 
rituals. These are based on common sense, which Vico defined as “judgment 
without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire nation, or the entire 
human race.”2 Since these institutions originated “among entire peoples 
unknown to each other” they must have a “common ground of truth.”3 Vico 
called this primordial phase of culture the age of the gods, because it was a 
reaction to an intense fear of gods, to whom early people ascribed frightful 
events such as thunder and lightning. In the succeeding age of heroes, a domi-
nant class of humans—the heroes of the evolving culture—emerged typically 
to subjugate the common people. These were men with great physical prowess 
who inspired fear and admiration in people, shaping cultural institutions to 
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satisfy their goals and aspirations. After a period of domination, a third 
stage—the age of equals—is brought about by the common people rising up 
and winning equality. However, in the process, society gradually starts to dis-
integrate by force of “the misbegotten subtleties of malicious wits” that turn 
ordinary people “into beasts made inhuman by the barbarism of reflection.”4 
At this point, Vico claimed, a culture has run its course, expiring “under soft 
words and embraces.”5
The third age is an age of decline, of subtle irony and wit. Language is shal-
low, dispassionate, devoid of the poetic. However, all is not lost. On the con-
trary, because of the fantasia, we start once again to seek new meanings to life, 
becoming once more “religious, truthful, and faithful.”6 In this renewal, or 
ricorso as Vico called it, new metaphors are invented fostering new thoughts, 
new forms of expression. The lesson of history, Vico concludes, is that human 
beings are constantly reinventing themselves, but in so doing are unwittingly 
following a larger goal: “It is true that men themselves made this world of 
nations, but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, 
at times quite contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men 
had proposed to themselves.”7
 I. A. Richards
More than a century after Vico, another philosopher, the German Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844–1900), became both intrigued and disconcerted by the power 
of metaphor, identifying it as humanity’s greatest flaw because it allowed peo-
ple to create an illusory reality in their minds and then to believe it as being 
true. The growing interest in metaphor shifted away from  philosophy toward 
the scientific domain with the founding of experimental psychology in Leipzig, 
Germany in 1879 by the German physicist Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–87) 
and the German linguist and physiologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920). The 
early psychologists were the first to conduct experiments with subjects on how 
they processed figurative language. They found, for instance, that recall of a 
given metaphor was excellent if it was linked to a second one; otherwise it was 
easily forgotten. The early experiments thus suggested that metaphorical-asso-
ciative thinking produced an effective retrieval form of memory and was, 
therefore, something to be investigated further by the fledgling science.
However, the scholar who kindled serious interest in metaphor as some-
thing much more than a rhetorical technique was a British literary critic—
I. A. Richards (1893–1979). In his ground-breaking 1936 book, The Philosophy 
of Rhetoric, Richards expanded upon Aristotle’s basic idea that the function of 
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metaphor was related to the acquisition of knowledge, by proposing a viable 
explanation of how this function unfolded.8 The meaning that a metaphor 
produces, Richards suggested, was due to an ontological interaction that is 
perceived to exist between the abstract topic of the metaphor (the life in “life 
is a stage”) and its concrete vehicle (the stage in “life is a stage”). Explaining an 
abstract notion (life) in terms of something concrete (a stage) is hardly a mere 
figurative (decorative) ploy. Rather, it implies that we feel that the two share 
similar properties in our experience of them. Richards called this perceived 
commonality of properties the ground of the metaphor—the common area of 
meaning shared by the topic and the vehicle in the mind of the speaker. 
Therefore, the metaphor “life is a stage,” was forged in the first place, not 
through a pure flight of poetic fancy, but because the maker of the metaphor 
saw life and stages as existing on the same ground in the mind. The mental 
perspective provided by metaphor is, in effect, a counterpart to physical per-
ception; in English we say that ideas (an abstract topic) can be approached, 
looked at, touched, taken apart, seen from different angles, as if ideas had loca-
tion in space and thus visible properties.
Richards’ theory provides insight into the uncanny power of metaphor to 
generate “feeling forms” of thought within the mind. Consider a common 
metaphor such as “John is a gorilla.” The topic in this case is a person named 
John and the vehicle the animal known as a gorilla. Describing John in terms 
of a gorilla implies that a conceptual interaction of physical and personality 
properties is perceived to exist between John and a gorilla. Now, even if we do 
not know the John alluded to in the metaphor, the metaphor forces us to 
think of John in terms of gorilla-like, simian traits. In our mind, we cannot 
help but see John looking and acting like a gorilla. Changing the vehicle shows 
this imaginary synesthetic effect even more sharply. If one were to call John a 
snake, a pig, or a puppy, then our image of John changes in kind—the person 
named John becomes serpentine, swine-like, and puppy-like in our mental 
view. John is, in short, what our metaphors say he is.
Following Richards’ ground-breaking work, in the 1950s the psychologist 
Solomon Asch investigated metaphors based on words for sensations (hot, 
cold, heavy, and so on) in several unrelated languages.9 Asch discovered some-
thing truly interesting, namely, that the same sense-projecting pattern was 
used in all the languages, even though the end results were different. For exam-
ple, he found that hot stood for rage in Hebrew, enthusiasm in Chinese, sexual 
arousal in Thai, and energy in Hausa (the language of a people living in north-
ern Nigeria, Niger, and adjacent areas). Intrigued by Asch’s findings, psycholo-
gists in the late 1950s and 1960s undertook similar studies, signaling a turning 
point in the study of metaphor. Indeed, since then, the amount of research on 
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this phenomenon has been truly astronomical. In 1979, the literary scholar 
W. Booth calculated that, given the number of books and articles on metaphor 
published in the year 1977 alone, by the year 2039 there would be “more stu-
dents of metaphor on Earth than people!”10 The prediction was not itself sim-
ply a figure of speech—today, branches of linguistics, called cognitive linguistics 
or cognitive semantics—have arisen because of the study of metaphor.
 Lakoff and Johnson
By the end of the 1970s scholars from different disciplines were convinced 
that metaphor was more than a metaphor (in the traditional sense). In one 
classic 1977 study, a series of verbal metaphors was presented to brain- 
damaged subjects who were asked to select one of four response pictures that 
best portrayed the meaning of each one.11 For the sentence “A heavy heart 
can really make a difference” the subjects were shown four pictures from 
which to choose: a person crying (= metaphorical meaning); a person stag-
gering under the weight of a huge red heart (= literal meaning); a 500-pound 
weight (= a representation emphasizing the adjective heavy); a red heart (= a 
representation emphasizing the noun phrase red heart). The subjects were 
divided into those with damage to their left hemisphere (LH), those with 
lesions in the right hemisphere (RH), and a normal control group. Normal 
and LH subjects gave up to five times as many metaphorical responses, but 
the RH group showed great difficulty in coming up with the appropriate 
metaphorical answers. The researchers, Ellen Winner and Howard Gardner, 
thus established a link between the meaning of a metaphor and the RH of 
the brain, since damage to that hemisphere obviously impeded comprehen-
sion of metaphor. This was not an inconsequential finding, because the RH 
is the cerebral area responsible for producing most of our mental images. 
Therefore, the idea that metaphor and mental imagery are intertwined turned 
out to be more than just speculation. In the same year, 1977, the psycholo-
gist Howard Pollio and his associates found that metaphor was a statistically 
pervasive force in everyday discourse.12 They determined that speakers of 
English uttered, on average, 3000 novel metaphors and 7000 idiomatic 
expressions per week—a finding that laid the groundwork for the study that 
finally established metaphor as a fundamental area of concern for psychology 
and linguistics—George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s 1980 book, Metaphors 
We Live By.13 The innovative claim of that book was that metaphor is the 
cornerstone of language.
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First, Lakoff and Johnson assert what Aristotle claimed two millennia 
before, namely, that there are two types of concepts—concrete and abstract. 
The two scholars add a notable twist to this Aristotelian dichotomy—namely, 
that abstract concepts are built up systematically from concrete ones through 
metaphorical reasoning. They thus renamed abstract concepts conceptual met-
aphors. These are generalized metaphorical formulas that define specific 
abstractions. Recall the earlier example of John and the animals to which he 
was associated metaphorically (gorilla, snake, pig, puppy). Each specific meta-
phor (“John is a gorilla,” “John is a snake,” and so on) is not an isolated 
example of poetic fancy. Moreover, since John can be replaced by any other 
person (Mary, Edward, and so on), each conceivable metaphorical combina-
tion (“John is a gorilla,” “Mary is a snake,” and so on) is really an example of 
a more general metaphorical formula: people are animals. Such formulas are 
what Lakoff and Johnson call conceptual metaphors. Each of the two parts is 
called a domain: people is the target domain because it is the abstract topic (the 
“target” of the conceptual metaphor); animals is the source domain because it 
is the class of vehicles that deliver the metaphor (the “source” of the meta-
phorical concept). An abstract concept can now be defined simply as a “map-
ping” of one domain onto the other. This model suggests that abstract concepts 
are formed systematically through such mappings and that specific metaphors 
(called linguistic metaphors in contrast to conceptual metaphors) are traces to 
the target and source domains. So, when we hear people talking, for instance, 
of ideas in terms of geometrical figures and relations—“Those ideas are circular,” 
“I don’t see the point of your idea,” “Her ideas are central to the discussion,” 
“Their ideas are diametrically opposite,” and so on—we can now easily identify 
the two domains as ideas (target domain) and geometrical figures/relations 
(source domain) and, therefore, the conceptual metaphor as: ideas are geo-
metrical figures and relations.
Conceptual metaphors pervade common discourse. A few examples will 
suffice to make this evident.
Happiness is up/Sadness is down
I’m feeling up.
She’s feeling down.
That comment boosted my spirits.
My mood sank after I heard him speak.
Your joke gave me a lift.
Health and life are up/Sickness and death are down
I’m at the peak of my health.
He fell ill.
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Life is an uphill struggle.
Lazarus rose from the dead.
He’s sinking fast.
Light is knowledge/Dark is ignorance
I was illuminated by that professor.
I was left in the dark about what happened.
That idea is very clear.
Their theory is obscure.
His example shed light on several matters.
Theories are buildings
That is a well-constructed theory.
His theory is on solid ground.
That theory needs support.
Their theory collapsed under criticism.
She put together the framework of a very interesting theory.
Ideas and theories are plants
Her ideas have come to fruition.
That’s a budding theory.
Aristotle’s ideas have contemporary offshoots.
That idea has become a branch of mathematics.
Ideas are commodities
He certainly knows how to package his ideas.
That idea just won’t sell.
There’s no market for that idea.
That’s a worthless idea.
As Lakoff and Johnson emphasize, we do not detect the presence of concep-
tual metaphors in such common expressions because of repeated usage. We no 
longer interpret the word see metaphorically in utterances such as “I don’t see 
what you mean,” “Do you see what I’m saying?” because its metaphorical uses 
have become so familiar to us. However, the association between the biological 
act of seeing outside the body with the imaginary act of seeing within the mind 
was originally the source of the conceptual metaphor, seeing is understanding/
believing/thinking, which now permeates common discourse:
There is more to this than meets the eye.
I have a different point of view.
It all depends on how you look at it.
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I take a dim view of the whole matter.
I never see eye to eye on things with you.
You have a different worldview than I do.
Your ideas have given me great insight into life.
In the inner world of abstractions, ideas, like objects, can be seen, looked 
into, scanned, moved, arranged. This is why we have expressions such as 
broad-minded, far-sighted, far-reaching, far-fetched, narrow-minded, short- 
sighted, worldview, insight, foresight, and hindsight. As Walter Ong has pointed 
out, the universality of such words suggests that “we would be incapacitated 
for dealing with knowledge and intellection without massive visualist concep-
tualization, that is, without conceiving of intelligence through models apply-
ing initially to vision.”14
The next important point made by Lakoff and Johnson is that there are 
several general kinds of cognitive processes involved in metaphor. The first 
one involves orientation. This produces concepts that are derived from our 
physical experiences of orientation—up versus down, back versus front, near 
versus far, and so on. For example, the experience of up versus down underlies 
conceptual metaphors such as:
Happiness is up = I’m feeling up.
Sadness is down = She’s feeling down today.
More is up = My income rose (went up) last year.
Less is down = Her salary went down after her change of job.
This up versus down schema derives from the accumulated experiences of 
standing upright, climbing stairs, and looking up or down. Let us assume, as 
a hypothetical scenario, that this image spontaneously appeared in the mind 
of an individual during a conversation in association with a topic that involved 
the notion of quantity (for example, prices). That individual might have said 
something like “Prices keep going up.” Caught by the force of this metaphori-
cal image, a listener might have imitated the model, answering with some-
thing like “Yes, and my earnings have fallen.” Continued associations between 
up and more and down and less—that is, between orientation and quantity—
in routine communicative exchanges are what led over time to the establish-
ment of the abstract concept: more is up/less is down. Lakoff and Johnson claim 
that the experiential forces at work in conceptualization constantly produce 
such image schemas.15 These are defined as largely unconscious mental outlines 
of recurrent shapes, actions, dimensions, and so on that derive from percep-
tion and sensation. Image schemas are so deeply rooted that we are hardly ever 
aware of their control over conceptualization, but they can always be conjured 
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up easily.16 If someone were to ask you to explain an idiom such as spill the 
beans, you would not likely have a conscious image schema involving beans 
and the action of spilling them. However, if that same person were to ask you 
the following questions—“Where were the beans before they were spilled?” 
“How big was the container?” “Was the spilling on purpose or accidental?”—
then you would no doubt start to visualize the appropriate schema. You would 
see the beans as kept in a container and the container as being about the size 
of the human head.
An interesting type of image schema is, in fact, that of the container. This 
produces conceptual metaphors in which activities, emotions, and ideas are 
associated with entities and substances contained in something:
The mind is a container = I’m full of memories.
Anger is fluid in a 
container
= You make my blood boil.
There are other types of image schemas underlying conceptualization, of 
course. Suffice it to say here that, in all cases, the source domain is something 
that has either experiential force or, by cultural conditioning, particular 
salience in the mind of people. This can be seen in the following examples:
Argument is war = I demolished his argument.
Labor is a resource = He was consumed by his job.
Time is a resource = Time is money.
To get a firmer sense of how such concepts shape discourse, consider the 
argument is war metaphor. The target domain of argument is conceptualized 
in terms of warlike activities (the source domain), and thus in terms of battles 
that can be won or lost, of positions that can be attacked or guarded, of 
ground that can be gained or lost, of lines of attack that can be abandoned or 
defended, and so on. These warlike images are so embedded in our mind that 
we do not normally realize that they guide our perception of, and emotional 
reactions to, arguments. Nonetheless, they are there, surfacing regularly in 
such common expressions as the following:
Your claims are indefensible.
You attacked all my weak points.
Your criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I’ve never won an argument.
She shot down all my points.
If you use that strategy, I’ll wipe you out.
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The last relevant point made by Lakoff and Johnson in their truly fascinat-
ing book is that culture is built on conceptual metaphors, since these coalesce 
into of a system of meanings. This is accomplished by a kind of “higher-order” 
metaphorizing—that is, as target domains are associated with many kinds of 
source domains, the concepts they underlie become increasingly more abstract 
and interconnected, leading to what Lakoff and Johnson call idealized cultural 
or cognitive models (ICMs). To understand what this means, consider the tar-
get domain of ideas again. The following three conceptual metaphors, among 
many others, deliver the meaning of this concept in three separate ways, con-
stituting a slice of the ICM for this concept:
Ideas are food
Those ideas left a sour taste in my mouth.
It’s hard to digest all those ideas at once.
Even though he is a voracious reader; he can’t chew all those ideas.
That teacher is always spoon-feeding her students.
Ideas are people
Darwin is the father of modern biology.
Those medieval ideas continue to live on even today.
Cognitive linguistics is still in its infancy.
Maybe we should resurrect that ancient idea.
She breathed new life into that idea.
Ideas are fashion
That idea went out of style several years ago.
Those scientists are the avant-garde of their field.
Those revolutionary ideas are no longer in vogue.
Semiotics has become truly chic.
That idea is an old hat.
Recall from other examples, cited earlier, that there are other ways of con-
ceptualizing ideas—for example, in terms of buildings (“That is a well- 
constructed theory”), plants (“That theory has deep roots”), commodities 
(“That theory will not sell”), geometry (“Those are parallel theories”), and see-
ing (“That is a clearly articulated theory”). The constant juxtaposition of such 
conceptual formulas in common everyday thinking produces, cumulatively, 
an idealized cognitive model (ICM) of ideas.
ICMs allow us to get a glimpse into cultural groupthink.17 Everything that 
I have written in this book, too, has been structured by ICMs. This applies to 
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any verbal text. Listen to a news broadcast, a sermon, a political speech, or 
read any textbook, newspaper article, blog, Facebook page, tweet, and you 
will soon realize how each text has been woven together with the handiwork 
of metaphor. When a preacher talks about the need for being “cleansed” or 
“purified” he or she is utilizing the concrete force of the sex is dirty conceptual 
metaphor to impart a moral feeling of “uncleanness” to believers.
Metaphor is also the source of innovation. As Vico argued, the metaphori-
cal capacity is tied to the fantasia, which predisposes human beings to search 
out or forge new meanings. This is why novel metaphors are being created all 
the time. If someone were to say “Life is a cup of coffee,” it is unlikely that you 
would have heard this expression before, because it is not (as far as I can tell) 
a routine option within English conversation. However, its novelty forces you 
to reflect upon its meaning. The vehicle used, a cup of coffee, is a common 
object and therefore easily perceivable as a source for thinking about everyday 
life. The metaphor compels us to start thinking of life in terms of the kinds of 
physical, gustatory, social, and other attributes that are associated with a cup 
of coffee. For this metaphor to gain currency, however, it must capture the 
fancy of many other people for a period of time. Then and only then will its 
novelty have become worn out and will it become the basis for a new concep-
tual metaphor: life is a drinking substance in its appropriate container. After 
that, expressions such as “life is a cup of tea,” “life is a bottle of beer,” “life is a 
glass of milk,” and the like, all become similarly functional as offering differ-
ent perspectives on life.
The ability to coin metaphors allows people not only to produce new con-
cepts, but also to fill-in “knowledge gaps” in a creative way. Recall from the 
previous chapter how my grandson at fifteen months of age referred to our 
orange-haired household cat, Pumpkin, as juice, in obvious reference to the 
color of the orange juice that he drank on a regular basis. The child had obvi-
ously extracted the quality of “orangeness” from the liquid (the source domain) 
and applied it to a new referent—the cat’s hair (the target domain). As this 
example shows, metaphor is a “conceptual gap-filler.”
There are other figures of speech that occur in everyday discourse, but fol-
lowing Lakoff and Johnson’s discovery of conceptual metaphors, these are 
now considered subcategories of the general process of metaphor. Nevertheless, 
there are two that are regularly studied separately—metonymy and irony—
because of their particular semantic characteristics:
Metonymy is the use of an entity to refer to another that is related to it; in 
other words, it exemplifies part-for-the-whole reasoning18:
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She likes to read Emily Dickinson (= the writings of Emily Dickinson).
He’s in dance (= the dancing profession).
My mom frowns on blue jeans (= the wearing of blue jeans).
New windshield wipers will satisfy him (= the state of having new wipers).
The automobile is destroying our health (= the collection of automobiles).
We need a couple of strong bodies for our teams (= strong people).
I’ve got a new set of wheels (= car).
We need new blood in this organization (= new people).
A conceptual formula of this type that requires special mention is the face is 
the person.
He’s just another pretty face.
There are an awful lot of faces in the audience.
We need some new faces around here.
As we saw in Chap. 3, this concept also crystallizes in the nonverbal domain, 
especially in the art of portraiture. Expressions such as saving face, face the 
music, putting on a happy/sad face reveal our fascination with the face as a sign 
of character and personality. Unlike metaphor, metonymy does not function 
to create knowledge through associative-connective reasoning; rather, it allows 
people to cast specific mental light on certain situations, so as to make some 
social or personal comment on them. For instance, the use of butt, in expres-
sions such as “Get your butt over here!” to stand for a person, forces us to focus 
on a part of human anatomy, the buttocks, that elicits images of laziness and 
indolence, given that the butt is the anatomical part used for sitting. In the 
choice of buses to stand for those who drive them as in “The buses are on 
strike” we are forced to evaluate the consequences of the strike. Metonymy is 
not productive of new knowledge. It is designed to allow people to provide 
perspective, opinion, point of view, or criticism.
Irony is, generally speaking, the use of words to convey a meaning contrary 
to their literal sense—“I love being tortured”; “That stupid plan is clever.” 
This is a remarkable form of discourse, based on exploiting the incongruities 
and complexities of an experience or a situation. As such, it is both a protec-
tive strategy, deflecting attention away from the self towards others, by which 
one can make value judgments without commitment, and a verbal weapon 
that can be used against others.19 In irony, the context is critical since without 
it a statement such as “I love being tortured” could be interpreted literally. If 
the person was a masochist, then this statement would hardly be construed as 
ironic. For irony to work, the person must be in real torment and dislike it.
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Irony has various cognitive and social functions. Suppose, for example, that 
a ballet dancer trips several times and her choreographer says, “You were very 
graceful!” The choreographer is using irony so that the dancer will become 
aware that she knows of the trips and that something has to be done about 
them. Another function is to relay to an interlocutor something that others do 
not know. In Oedipus Rex, for instance, Oedipus kills a man. He does not 
know that the man is Laius, his father. Oedipus puts a curse on the slayer of 
Laius. The irony is that Oedipus has unknowingly cursed himself, since Laius 
turns out to be his unknown father. Irony is also used to highlight events that 
work out contrary to expectations. Suppose that a home town is preparing a 
party for a returning soldier. However, the soldier is killed in an accident on 
his way home. The irony comes from the contrast between the expectations of 
the people and the actual situation.
These examples show that metonymy and irony can be subsumed under the 
same cognitive process as metaphor. So, the part-for-the-whole structure of 
metonymy could be considered to be a mapping of a part of something (source) 
onto the whole (target). For instance, the White House is mapped by implica-
tion onto the President in an expression such as “The White House made its 
announcement yesterday.” Thus, the part of some concept is extracted from it, 
and then mapped back onto it. Irony can also be viewed as a mapping—in this 
case, a source domain consisting of an “opposite” notion is mapped onto a 
target so that the latter can be understood through the opposition. In “I love 
being tortured,” uttered by someone in pain, the concept of pain is highlighted 
through its opposite—pleasure. Again, pleasure is mapped onto pain, which 
requires an advanced form of interactive cognition, so to speak.
 Blending Theory
Conceptual metaphor theory has received a lot of attention from cognitive 
scientists and semioticians ever since the publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s 
book in 1980. From the relevant research the concept of blending has emerged. 
In this model, metaphor is not simply the result of a mapping from one 
domain to another, as was originally posited, but rather the result of a cogni-
tive mechanism that blends domains together and then maps them onto other 
domains. The vehicle and topic, when blended together, produce new under-
standing, which is the intended meaning of the blend.
Blending theory was introduced formally in 2002 by Fauconnier and 
Turner20 who argued that the process of linking source and target domains 
occurs when someone recognizes that the two domains in a metaphor might 
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be mutually suggestive. A blend, once completed, is available for use in subse-
quent or additional blends. If this is so, then blending theory can also be used 
to explain any semiotic process, including the construction and interpretation 
of signs. Every signifier immediately suggests a signified and, by extension, 
various connotations. These are not separable cognitively; they co-occur. In 
effect, semiosis is evidence that blending may well be the way in which the 
brain creates and interprets information.
 Love Is Indeed Sweet, Metaphorically Speaking
We are now in a better position to provide an appropriate semiotic explana-
tion to Ted’s metaphorical statement: “Your kisses are sweeter than wine.” 
First, let’s consider a few of the ways in which we conceptualize love in English- 
speaking culture.21
Love is a physical force
There were sparks between us.
We are attracted to each other.
My life revolves around her.
I am magnetically drawn toward her.
Love is a medical-health force
Theirs is a sick relationship.
Their romance is dead; it can’t be revived.
Their relationship is in good shape.
Love is madness
I’m crazy about her.
I’m constantly raving about him.
He’s gone mad over her.
I’ve lost my head over him.
Love is a magical force
She cast a spell over me.
The magic is gone.
She has bewitched me.
I’m in a trance over him.
Love is a sweet taste
You’re so sweet.
She’s my sweetheart.
He’s my honey.
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As these examples illustrate, love is indeed a multifaceted experience, as our 
stack of metaphors attest, and as the poets have always known. Ted’s state-
ment is really no more than a particular use of the conceptual metaphor love 
is a sweet taste, which commonly surfaces in courtship and romance situations. 
This formula is a special manifestation of a broader one: love is a taste in one’s 
mouth. This is why we say that love that is no longer sweet can leave a bad, sour, 
rotten taste in one’s mouth. Like wine, love can both please and displease. 
Therefore, as poetic as Ted might have appeared to his partner, he really was 
using a time-tested and time-worn formula to give a romantic verbal touch to 
his courtship performance.
As Alice Deignan has argued, the use of such metaphorical strategies is not 
restricted to the language of love; they are general strategies that allow people 
to encode subjective judgments in a way that conceals their subjectivity: 
“Speakers use a metaphorical expression to encode their approval, or—far 
more frequently—their disapproval, of a manifestation of desire. The evalua-
tion, thereby, takes on the appearance of objectivity.”22 Nor are such strategies 
peculiar to speakers of English. There are, in fact, many cross-cultural simi-
larities in the ways in which sexual attractiveness and desire are modeled met-
aphorically. In the Chagga tribe of Tanzania, for example, the perception of 
sex and love as abstractions that can be “tasted” metaphorically manifests itself 
constantly in discourse about courtship and romance. In that society, the man 
is perceived to be the “eater” and the woman his “sweet food,” as can be 
inferred from everyday expressions that mean, in translated form, “Does she 
taste sweet?” “She tastes sweet as sugar honey.” Such a remarkable correspon-
dence to the love is a sweet taste formula deployed by Ted suggests that this 
particular conceptual metaphor probably cuts across cultures.
 Metaphor in Everyday Life
Conceptual metaphors surface not only in common discourse, but in nonver-
bal codes, rituals, and group behaviors as well. The metaphor justice is blind, 
for instance, crops up not only in conversations, but also in pictorial represen-
tations. This is why there are statues of blindfolded women inside or outside 
courtrooms to symbolize justice. The metaphorical expression the scales of jus-
tice is evident in the sculptures of scales near or inside justice buildings. 
Similarly, Ted’s love is a sweet taste concept finds expression not only in dis-
course, but also in rituals of love-making. This is why sweets are given to a 
loved one at Valentine’s Day, why matrimonial love is symbolized at a wed-
ding ceremony by the eating of a cake, why lovers sweeten their breath with 
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candy before kissing, and so on. Any ritualistic display of love will depend on 
what concept people infer to be more representative of a specific situation. For 
example, at weddings the concept of sweetness would probably be seen to fit 
the situation, whereas that of physical attraction would most likely be consid-
ered pertinent during other kinds of courtship situations.
More often than not, conceptual metaphors are also traces to a culture’s 
historical past. A common expression such as “He has fallen from grace” 
would have been recognized instantly in a previous era as referring to the 
Adam and Eve story in the Bible. Today we continue to use it with only a dim 
awareness (if any) of its Biblical origins. Expressions that portray life as a 
journey—“I’m still a long way from my goal,” “There is no end in sight”—are 
similarly rooted in Biblical narrative where journeys are allusive to self- 
discovery. As the Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye aptly pointed out, 
one cannot penetrate such expressions, and indeed most of Western literature 
or art, without having been exposed, directly or indirectly, to the original 
Biblical stories.23 These are the source domains for many of the conceptual 
metaphors we use today for talking about and judging human actions, which 
bestow a kind of implicit metaphysical meaning and value to everyday life.
All mythical (from the Greek mythos “word,” “speech,” “tale of the gods”) sto-
ries are, in effect, extended conceptual metaphors. These allow people to depict 
divine entities in terms of human images, with human bodily forms and emo-
tions. It is extremely difficult to think of a divinity in any other way. In the Bible, 
for example, God is described as having physical characteristics and human emo-
tions, but at the same time is understood to be a transcendent being.
The link to the past is also evident in proverbial language. Proverbs, like 
myths, are extended metaphors that provide sound practical advice.
You’ve got too many fires burning
(= advice to not do so many things at once)
Rome wasn’t built in a day
(= advice to have patience)
Don’t count your chickens before they’re hatched
(= advice to be cautious)
An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth
(= equal treatment is required in love and war)
Early to bed and early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise
(= this was Benjamin Franklin’s adaptation of Aesop’s proverb “The gods help 
them that help themselves”)
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Every culture has its proverbs, aphorisms, and sayings. These constitute a 
remarkable code of ethics and practical knowledge that anthropologists call 
“folk wisdom.” Indeed, the very concept of wisdom implies the ability to 
apply proverbial language insightfully to a situation. As the American writer 
Maya Angelou has put it, proverbs have “couched the collective wisdom of 
generations.” It is interesting to note that one of the most popular publica-
tions of the eighteenth century in America was an almanac, called Poor 
Richard’s Almanac, written and published by Benjamin Franklin (1706–90). 
Apparently, it became popular, in part, because it contained alluring prov-
erbs that have since become household sayings in America. Franklin came to 
the idea of the almanac early in his career, when he was a printer and pub-
lisher in Philadelphia. He issued the almanac for every year from 1733 to 
1758, writing under the name of Richard Saunders, an imaginary astrono-
mer. Similar to other almanacs of its time, Poor Richard’s included such fea-
tures as a horoscope, practical advice, jokes, poems, and weather predictions. 
At first, Richard had little wit or humor. However, as his character developed, 
he became a clever spokesman for Franklin’s ideas on thrift, duty, hard work, 
and simplicity. Poor Richard’s Almanac grew into one of the most popular and 
influential works printed in colonial America. Many of its sayings have 
become famous. Here are two of them:
A penny saved is a penny earned.
God helps those who help themselves.
The almanac greatly influenced American thought before and after the 
Revolutionary War of 1775–83. Franklin enlarged the almanac for the 1748 
edition and called it Poor Richard Improved. In the preface to the final edition, 
he collected many of Richard’s proverbs on how to succeed in business and 
public affairs. The preface, called “The Way to Wealth,” was reprinted sepa-
rately and was widely read in England and France, as well as in America.
The constant use of a proverb, a saying, or an aphorism leads to the forma-
tion of clichés—expressions that have become trite through over-usage. Phrases 
such as handwriting on the wall, many are called, few are chosen, and an eye for 
an eye are all proverbs that have become clichés. From Shakespeare we get the 
following clichés: a pound of flesh, method to my madness, and witching hour. 
Despite their apparent triteness, we continue to use them because we still 
sense that they provide wisdom. They enable common people to quote the 
Bible or Shakespeare, whether they mean to or not, and thus to give implicit 
authority to their statements. Orations and sermons, too, dispense their own 
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kind of advice and wisdom through metaphor. Rarely does a charismatic 
preacher not use metaphorical discourse in a persuasive way. The art of preach-
ing lies in the ability to apply metaphorical concepts effectively to a topic—sex 
is dirty, sin is punishable by fire, and so on.
The use of metaphor extends to scientific reasoning. Science often involves 
things that cannot be seen, such as atoms, waves, gravitational forces, and 
magnetic fields. Therefore, scientists use their metaphorical know-how to get 
a look, so to speak, at this hidden matter. That is why waves are said to undu-
late through empty space as water waves ripple through a still pond; atoms to 
leap from one quantum state to another; electrons to travel in circles around 
an atomic nucleus; and so on. The physicist K. C. Cole has put it into per-
spective as follows:24
The words we use are metaphors; they are models fashioned from familiar ingre-
dients and nurtured with the help of fertile imaginations. “When a physicist 
says an electron is like a particle,” writes physics professor Douglas Giancoli, “he 
is making a metaphorical comparison like the poet who says love is like a rose.” 
In both images a concrete object, a rose or a particle, is used to illuminate an 
abstract idea, love or electron.
Poet and scientist alike use metaphor to extrapolate a suspected inner con-
nection among things. Metaphors are slices of truth; they are evidence of the 
human ability to see the universe as a coherent organism. When a metaphor is 
accepted as fact, it enters human life, taking on an independent conceptual 
existence in the real world, and thus it can suggest ways in which to bring 
about changes in and to the world. Euclidean geometry, for instance, gave the 
world a certain kind of visual metaphorical structure for millennia—a world of 
relations among points, lines, circles, and so on. The structure was, however, 
changed to suit new ideas. This is precisely what happened when the mathema-
tician Nicholai Lobachevski (1793–1856) imagined that Euclid’s parallel lines 
would “meet” in some context, such as at the poles of a globe, thus giving the 
visual world a different structure. We are new reaping the benefits of his meta-
phorical thought, since the geometries that have derived from it are the basis 
for a host of modern-day inventions and physical theories of the world.
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Now, You Tell Me About Yourself: Why Do 
We Tell Stories?
Myth is an attempt to narrate a whole human experience, of which the purpose 
is too deep, going too deep in the blood and soul, for mental  
explanation or description.
—D. H. Lawrence (1885–1930)
Let’s go back to the scene discussed in Chap. 4 on Martha’s video, namely, the 
scene in which Ted asks Cheryl to tell him something about herself. After 
reciting her brief autobiography, Cheryl turns to her partner and says, “Now, 
you tell me something about yourself,” obviously wanting to know a little 
about his life story.
To the semiotician, the telling of life stories is not simply a way to make idle 
conversation. On the contrary, in such courtship situations the semiotician 
would see it as yet another way of presenting an attractive persona to a roman-
tic partner. However, that is not the only, or primary, reason why people tell 
their life stories to each other. They do so to make sense of who they are by 
weaving the various episodes and events of their lives into a story with a plot, 
with characters, and with settings. This imparts structure, purpose, and mean-
ing (or lack thereof ) to one’s life in the overall scheme of things.
Stories of all kinds give coherence and continuity to the thoughts and expe-
riences that people find important by connecting them narratively. It would 
be no exaggeration to claim that narrative structure might mirror human con-
sciousness itself. This would explain why, early in life, children learn abstract 
concepts through the stories they are told. It might also explain why, through-
out history, humans have produced narrative accounts—factual and  fictional—
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to explain who they are, why they are here, and to make sense of otherwise 
random and chaotic events.
Interest in the origin and nature of storytelling is as old as history. In ancient 
Greece, the philosophers Xenophanes, Plato, and Aristotle criticized stories, 
especially myths, as artful and deceitful, exalting reason and logic instead as the 
only trustworthy ways to gain access to the nature of reality. However, the exal-
tation of reason and its use in various disciplines has not eliminated the need for 
stories. On the contrary, people everywhere are constantly seeking engagement 
in stories (through movies, television programs, novels) not only to be enter-
tained, but also to gain insights into life through the eyes of the storyteller.
 Narrative
The term narrative refers to anything that has a recognizable story structure, 
which is essentially a sequence of events involving specific characters that 
unfold in time and that move towards some resolution. It is anything told, 
written, related, or exposed that shares that structure. The narrative may be 
construed as factual, as in a newspaper report or a psychoanalytic session, or 
fictional, as in a novel, a comic strip, or a film. It is often difficult to determine 
the boundary line between fact and fiction, given the interplay of many psy-
chological and social factors that coalesce in the production and interpreta-
tion of narratives.1 Some narratives have had a great impact on how people 
come to view human nature and the cosmos, including the earliest ones, 
known as myths. Storytellers have always enjoyed an important status in all 
cultures across time, be they soothsayers or writers of fiction. Even today, fic-
tional works are felt by people as somehow revealing something intrinsic 
about the human condition. As the writer David Lodge has phrased it, creat-
ing narratives “is one of the fundamental sense-making operations of the 
mind, and would appear to be both peculiar to and universal throughout 
humanity.”2
Narrative gives structure and logical coherence to a series of what would 
o therwise be perceived to be random actions. Animal programs on television 
sometimes exemplify how this mode works even in areas of scientific under-
standing. Unedited, the actions of the animals caught on film—eating, hunt-
ing, mating—would hardly make up a meaningful story line. However, with 
the intervention of editors, scriptwriters, and ethological consultants, such pro-
grams always produce an intriguing account of the actions connecting them 
t hematically and chronologically. The result is a scientific narrative of animal 
behavior that has been put together on the basis of ideas from scientific sources. 
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The narrative is compelling to the viewer because it explains the animals’ actions 
in a cohesive way that imbues them with an inherent sense and meaning. There 
may be no meaning in these actions; but by narrating them it somehow crystal-
lizes by itself.
Narratives are texts that function as composite, but unitary, meaning- 
making forms. This is why we understand a novel or a movie, for example, not 
in terms of its parts but in terms of what it means overall. Narrative texts are 
constructed according to what some semioticians call a narrative grammar, 
which has universal properties. The Russian scholar Vladimir Propp was among 
the first semioticians to put forward this view with his analysis of Russian folk-
tales in 1928.3 Moreover, Propp argued that ordinary discourse was built on 
the same units that make up the narrative grammar. So, fictional texts and 
conversations are equally narrative in form because they tap into the same nar-
rative grammar. This idea was pursued further by Algirdas J. Greimas, who 
labeled the narrative units or signs in the grammar as actants, including “hero,” 
“opponent,” “journey,” “battle,” and so on. These surface not only in novels, 
but also in a wide range of texts and, as Propp maintained, in ordinary dis-
course.4 Indeed, life without heroes, opponents, journeys, and battles would be 
inconceivable, regardless of culture or era of human history. These are narrative 
signs standing for people, events, things, and places in the real world. Greimas 
claimed that differences in detail, and especially in how the final resolution or 
clarification of a narrative unfolds, are due to the specific ways in which these 
categories are “textualized” linguistically into actual narratives or discourses. In 
a mystery novel, for instance, the hero may have several opponents, all of 
whom are the “opponent”; in a love story, a lover may be both a “hero” and an 
“opponent”; the dénouement of a love plot may end in a “battle”; and so on.
The concept of narrative grammar would explain why the plots, characters, 
and settings that are found in stories across the world are remarkably similar. 
Although one may lose some of the semantic nuances in translating stories from 
one language to another, one can easily transfer the basic narrative  categories 
across languages with little or no loss of meaning. A story told in India is as 
understandable as a story told in Arkansas because their actants are the same, 
Greimas would claim, even though their linguistic forms are different.
In biographies, too, there are heroes, opponents, journeys, battles, just as 
there are in novels and movies. Biography is as old as recorded history. The 
rulers and nobles of ancient Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon had their deeds 
incised in stone and clay. The Old Testament tells of the lives of many patri-
archs and prophets, and the four Gospels of the New Testament are essentially 
parallel biographies of Christ. Until about the middle of the seventeenth cen-
tury, biography was generally commemorative, dealing with the exemplary 
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lives of heroes and heroines, especially saints and martyrs, as well as with the 
lives of malefactors and tyrants—all of whom were depicted less as individuals 
than as actors in a narrative drama of salvation. The publication in 1791 of 
The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. by James Boswell (1740–95) is generally 
thought to be the first biography that moves away from this tradition, consti-
tuting a biography about someone other than a hero, leader, nobleman, or 
saint. During the nineteenth century, biographical writings of this kind pro-
liferated. In the subsequent twentieth century, the Austrian psychiatrist 
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) provided a further impetus for the exploration 
of personality through oral autobiographical narrative with the invention of a 
clinical technique known as psychoanalysis, which consists, essentially, in 
patients retelling their life stories. We can know ourselves only if we construct 
and recount our biography. Like a story, it is something we put together con-
sciously to make sense of who we are on the basis of our life events.
 Myth
The desire to know the life stories of people who stand out (artists, scientists, 
actors, politicians, and so on) goes back considerably in time. However, in 
early cultures, people sought to know about the gods, the supernatural beings 
who they imagined ran the world and to whom they looked for knowledge 
and wisdom. The stories they told about these supernatural beings are called 
myths, which are essentially early folk stories. Myths were created to provide 
reassuring metaphysical explanations for the reason of things in the world—
how the world came into being, who or what is responsible for it, how humans 
and animals were created, and how cultures originated. The language of myth 
is metaphorical, which, as we saw, allows the human mind to make connec-
tions based on sense. Myths were thus the first “theories” of the world, which, 
to this day, are somehow felt to bear intrinsic meaning, even if we may no 
longer believe them as true. Each character in ancient myth is a sign standing 
for some idealized human character or some actant. Take, for example, the 
Greek gods. Each one represented something in nature or human society. 
Zeus was, essentially, a sky and weather god associated with rain, thunder, and 
lightning; Poseidon (brother of Zeus) represented the sea and earthquakes; 
Hades stood for the underworld, the dispenser of earthly riches, and the god 
associated with death; Apollo was the god of archery, prophecy, music, heal-
ing, and youth; Artemis was the goddess of wild animals and hunting (twin 
sister of Apollo); Hermes was the messenger of the gods, the god of business, 
of thieves, and the guide of the dead to the underworld; and Aphrodite (to 
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mention one more) represented love, sexual desire, and beauty. The gods were 
thus metaphorical names used to stand for human and natural referents.
An insightful discussion of myth, from the perspective of semiotic theory, is 
the one put forward by anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. For Lévi- Strauss, 
all the oppositional clusters we find meaningful—life versus death, good versus 
evil, mother versus father, god versus the devil, day versus night, existence ver-
sus nothingness, and so on—are first articulated in mythic stories. If we were 
asked what evil is, we would tend to explain it in terms of its opposite (good), 
and vice versa. Similarly, if we wanted to explain the concept of right to some-
one, we would invariably tend to bring up the opposite concept of wrong at 
some point. Crucial to Lévi-Strauss’ conception of myth is the Saussurean 
notion of value (valeur). Rather than carrying intrinsic meaning, Saussure 
argued that signs had value only in differential relation to each other.
In ancient Greece, myth (mythos) was seen to be in opposition with reason 
(logos), although Aristotle concluded that in some of the creation myths, logos 
and mythos often overlapped. Plato saw myths simply as allegories, as literary 
devices for persuasively developing an argument. In the Judeo-Christian tra-
dition the notion of history has frequently been opposed to myth. Complicating 
this opposition was the concept that God, although existing outside of ordi-
nary time and space, was revealed to humanity within human history. Mythos, 
logos, and history overlap in the prologue to the Gospel of John in the New 
Testament; there, Christ is portrayed as the Logos, who came from eternity 
into historical time.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, myth caught the interest of the 
emerging academic disciplines of anthropology and the history of religions. 
Scholars tried to make sense of the world’s mythic stories as products of imagi-
nary thinking and as attempts to construct models of ethical, moral, and spiri-
tual behavior. The hypothesis that gained a foothold in these new  disciplines 
was that the earliest myths were genuine nonscientific attempts to explain 
nature and human behavior, in the same fashion that we impart knowledge of 
the world to children. The mythic tales we tell children are universally under-
standable as theories about the metaphysical world and of human character 
and destiny. The mythic imagination, these scholars claimed, ascribed light-
ning, thunder, and other natural phenomena to awesome and frightful gods. 
Only in succeeding stages did people look for more scientific ways to explain 
such phenomena—that is, only later did mythos give way to logos.
In his New Science, Giambattista Vico saw the birth of culture in the mythic 
imagination (or fantasia as he called it). Recall that Vico viewed the “life cycle” 
of cultures as unfolding according to three stages—the age of the gods, the age 
of heroes, and the age of equals. During the first age, the mythic fantasia created 
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“poetic images” of the world that ascribed to it a metaphysical structure. If there 
was thunder in the sky, then the mythic fantasia would hear it as the angry voice 
of a god; if there was rain, then it would see it as the weeping of a sorrowful god. 
During the second age (of heroes), the mythic fantasia gave way to a more 
heroic form of imagination. The tales that it impelled were no longer of gods 
and their supernatural exploits, but of human heroes and their feats. This is an 
age of legends—stories that document the deeds and accomplishments of 
heroes, of their lives, of their journeys. The mythic fantasia is still operative dur-
ing this age, Vico affirmed, but less so than previously. For this reason, legends 
are still highly imaginative, but at the same time also refer to actual events in 
history. Among the most famous legendary tales are the Iliad and the Odyssey of 
ancient Greece and the Aeneid of ancient Rome. It is during the third age (of 
equals) that the fantasia becomes dim, and the stories that people tell are no 
longer about gods or legendary heroes, but about ordinary human exploits and 
frailties. It is an age of rational history, of objective facts and knowledge (dates, 
treaties, social movements, political ideologies, and so on) behind which the 
tellers of history can hide their personal perspectives. Indeed, the reason why 
histories are constantly being revised is not only because they are by their nature 
incomplete, but also because they can never be totally free of the historian’s 
perspective. On the other hand, myths and legends, like all works of the fanta-
sia, are perceived to enfold eternal truths about the human condition. For this 
reason, they are handed down and preserved unrevised for posterity.
The primary function of the early myths is to explain how the world came 
into being in imaginary terms. In some cultures, the creation is said to pro-
ceed from a state of nothingness. The deity who created the world is portrayed 
as all-powerful and may come to the forefront so as to become the center of 
social life, or else may withdraw and become a distant or peripheral being. In 
other cultures, the deity is seen as giving order to a universe that finds itself in 
a state of chaos, separating light from darkness, and assigning the sun, moon, 
stars, plants, animals, and human beings to their proper roles in existence.
Among the Navajo and Hopi societies of North America, creation is 
thought to unfold as a progression upward from the underground. The emer-
gence of the human world is said to be the final stage in this progression. A 
Polynesian myth places the various phases of human emergence in a coconut 
shell, equating these to a form of metamorphosis in other creatures. In many 
African and oriental mythic traditions, creation is imagined as breaking forth 
from a fertile egg. The egg is the potential for all life and, sometimes, as in the 
myth of the Dogon people of West Africa, it is referred to as the “placenta” of 
the world.
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A common theme of mythical traditions is that of the first parents. In the 
Babylonian creation story, for instance, the first parents, Apsu and Tiamat, 
bore offspring who later defeated their parents in a battle. From the immo-
lated body of Tiamat the earth emerged. In other world-parent myths, such as 
those of the Egyptians and Polynesians, the parents beget offspring but remain 
in close embrace; the offspring live in darkness, and in their desire for light 
they shove the parents apart, creating a space for the deities to create the 
human world. In several Romanian and Indian myths, creation comes about 
not through parents, but through the agency of a bird, which dives into the 
primordial waters to bring up a small piece of earth, which later expands into 
the world.
Related to such cosmogonic myths, but at the other extreme, are myths 
describing the end of the world (so-called eschatological myths). These pre-
suppose the creation of the world by a powerful deity who in the end destroys 
the world, having become angry at the very creatures that he made. Meanwhile 
human beings are supposed to prepare for an afterlife existence of happiness 
or of eternal anguish, according to how they have lived their lives on earth. 
A universal conflagration and a final battle of the gods are envisioned. In an 
Aztec myth, several worlds are created and destroyed by the gods before the 
creation of the actual human world, which is also destined to end. In other 
myths, death is not present in the world for a long period of time, but enters 
it through an accident or because human beings have overstepped the proper 
limits of their knowledge.
Myths that describe the actions and characters of beings who are responsi-
ble for the discovery of a particular cultural artifact or technological process 
are called myths of the culture hero. Prometheus (in Greek mythology) is a 
classic example of this kind of hero. Prometheus was one of the Titans and 
worshiped by craftsmen. When Zeus hid fire from humanity, Prometheus 
stole it by trickery and returned it to earth. As punishment, Zeus chained him 
to a rock where an eagle fed each day on his liver, which grew again each 
night. Prometheus was eventually rescued by Hercules, and the world has 
never been the same since. In the Dogon culture of West Africa, the myth of 
the blacksmith who steals seeds from the granary of the gods is similar to the 
Prometheus story. In Ceram (Indonesia), Hainuwele is yet another Promethean 
figure—female this time; from the orifices of her body she provides the com-
munity with essential and indulgent goods.
Usually related to initiation rituals, myths of birth and rebirth tell how life 
can be renewed, time reversed, or humans transmuted into new beings. Such 
myths are found in the cultures of Europe, Africa, South America, and 
Melanesia. They typically describe the coming of an ideal society or of a savior 
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who will bestow new life among the people. Since the beginnings of cities, in 
the fourth and third millennia BCE, some myths were designed to describe 
the founding of cities. Foundation myths, as they are called, tell of how cities 
developed out of ceremonial centers that were seen to possess sacred power 
that could be summoned in a specific sacred place; or else they tell of particu-
lar personages (real or mythical) who were the founders of the cities. The 
myth of Gilgamesh in Babylon and that of Romulus and Remus in Rome are 
typical foundation myths. Gilgamesh was the legendary king of Uruk who 
was supposed to have ruled during the first half of the third millennium 
BCE.  His exploits in quest for immortality ended up being unsuccessful. 
Romulus is the mythic founder of Rome, one of the twin sons of Mars. He 
and his brother Remus were abandoned at birth in a basket on the Tiber 
River, but were found and suckled by a she-wolf and later brought up by a 
shepherd family.
A German scholar who spent most of his life in England in the nineteenth 
century, Friedrich Maximilian Müller (1823–1900), claimed that the catego-
ries of myth were, in fact, primordial linguistic categories, constituting the 
blueprint from which language evolved. Following an in-depth study of the 
religions and myths of India, Müller posited, for example, that the gods and 
their actions did not represent beings or events, but rather incipient nouns 
and verbs standing for natural referents (such as thunder or the sea).5 Lévi- 
Strauss pursued this line of reasoning further, pointing out that there are cer-
tain clusters of relationships in myth that, although expressed in the content 
of the story, conform to the structure of the language in which they are framed. 
Later, he contended that the same mythic structural blueprint is at work in all 
languages and cultures.6 As Csapo puts it: “Myth relates to language in two 
ways: it is like language; it is also part of language.”7
If such scholars are correct, then myth, language, and culture came into 
being at the same time. This would explain why ancient mythic rituals con-
tinue to be performed to this day (in contemporary versions, of course). 
Indeed, there seems to be a high level of isomorphism between social ideolo-
gies and mythic themes. Male gods who come forth to dominate the world are 
found in myths told in patriarchal cultures, by and large, and those that put 
the focus on goddesses are found mainly in matriarchal cultures.8 Whereas 
Superman and Batman are paragons of patriarchal mythic thinking, their 
female equivalents, from Wonder Woman and Batgirl to Superwoman, are 
modern-day equivalents of the ancient goddesses, rebranded to fit in with the 
changing times and the ever-adaptive views of the role of women in society.
In pop culture, the culture hero myths and legends abound, especially those 
revolving around the father-son theme. Spider-Man’s father died when he was 
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young, and it was the death of his surrogate father that prompted him to take 
up the task of fighting crime. As a young boy, Batman saw his parents mur-
dered, resolving to defeat injustices and evil as he grew older. Superman’s 
father and mother perished on his home planet and he was saved by being 
sent away; when Superman became older he discovered a recording of his 
father urging him to fight for truth and justice. The Hulk’s father is not 
deceased but is at odds with his son, and the Hulk carries much angst against 
him. Hellboy was rescued from the bowels of hell and he now fights against 
the forces of evil. He was adopted by a professor with whom he has a shaky 
relationship; the professor serves as Hellboy’s “supervisor” in the fight against 
evil, a relationship that nonetheless works well. Hellboy does not know who 
his biological father is, but later comes to know that he was fathered by the 
devil himself; Hellboy has no compunction in killing his devil father at the 
behest of his adoptive one in order to end the reign of evil upon Earth.
Perhaps the best-known myth of this type is the one of Oedipus (discussed 
briefly earlier on). In one version of the story, the child Oedipus was left to die 
on a mountain by Laius, his father, who had been told by an oracle that he 
would be killed by his own son. Oedipus was saved by a shepherd. Returning 
eventually to Thebes, he encounters a man on his way to the city. They get 
into an argument and this leads to Oedipus killing the man. That man was 
Laius, his father. Oedipus then solved the Riddle of the Sphinx. As a result, he 
was made king of the city and he married the widowed Jocasta, who was his 
mother. On discovering what he had done, he put out his own eyes in a fit of 
madness, and Jocasta hanged herself.
Freud termed this mythic father-son theme the “Oedipus complex.” He 
defined it as an emotional complex that afflicts boys as young as four years 
old who may want unconsciously to eliminate the father in order to have a 
closer relationship with the mother. Boys typically feel guilty about the com-
plex of emotions aroused by an unconscious sexual desire for the parent of 
the opposite sex and a wish to exclude the parent of the same sex. The equiva-
lent in girls was called the Electra complex. Freud saw in myths veritable 
theories of the human psyche in narrative form. Carl Jung (1875–1961), 
too, developed his theory of archetypes from the observation that people liv-
ing all over the world possess remarkably similar mythic rituals and symbols. 
He saw the unconscious part of the mind as a “receptacle” of primordial 
images, memories, fantasies, wishes, fears, and feelings that are too weak to 
become conscious. Therefore, Jung claimed that they manifest themselves by 
their influence on conscious processes and, most strikingly, by the symbolic 
forms they take in dreams, art works, and rituals. For instance, the phallic 
coming- of- age symbols and themes that cultures incorporate into their rites 
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of p assage, that they represent in their works of art, and that find their way 
into the stories that are communicated in cultural context, are understand-
able in approximately the same ways by all humans because they derive from 
the same archetype in the collective unconscious.
As an illustration of the Jungian notion of archetype, consider his example 
of the “trickster.” In every person there lies a certain instinct for childlike mis-
chief. On one hand, this may be expressed as a playful desire for capricious-
ness or by the need to play devil’s advocate in a conversation. On the other 
hand, it may manifest itself as a malicious urge to mock or ridicule someone 
else’s achievements. It might cause us to contemplate stealing something for 
the sheer thrill of it or to torment someone by hiding their belongings. At 
such times, the “trickster archetype” is directing our behavior. Jung looked at 
the ways archetypes gain expression not only through everyday behaviors, but 
also through images and symbols contained in dreams, fairy tales, myths, 
legends, poetry, and painting. The trickster archetype surfaces, for instance, as 
Dickens’ Artful Dodger, as the fabled character known as Rumpelstiltskin, as 
Shakespeare’s Puck in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and in the art of many 
contemporary comedians. Archetypes can take any form according to Jung; 
they can be an object or an animal in stories and in art.
The gist of the psychoanalytic work on myth is that the characters, themes, 
and events of mythic tales are part of a pre-scientific psychology of the human 
mind. They are attempts to harmonize the human mind and its emotional 
nature with the patterns of nature by connecting human experience to such 
fundamental phenomena as the daily rising and setting of the sun, the alterna-
tion of the seasons, the changing phases of the moon, and the annual planting 
and harvesting of crops. Ritual, as found in primitive religions, is a perfor-
mance of mythical themes, expressing and celebrating humanity’s meaningful 
participation in the affairs of the universe.
 Fairy Tales
Folktales, fairy tales, and fables are descendants of myth. Like myth, these do 
not mirror what happens: they explore reality and predict what can happen 
in an imaginary way. They not only recount states and events; they also inter-
pret them.
Take, for example, the kind of story told commonly to children known as the 
fairy tale. Taking place in a wonderland filled with magic and unusual charac-
ters, fairy tales (which rarely have to do with fairies) have a powerful emotional 
appeal over every child, no matter what culture in which the child is reared. The 
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persistence of stories such as Cinderella, Snow White, or Little Red Riding Hood, 
and their different versions, attest to this enduring fascination. These tell of an 
underdog hero or heroine who is put through great trials or must perform seem-
ingly impossible tasks, and who, with magical assistance, secures their birthright 
or a suitable marriage partner. Frequently, such stories begin with “Once upon 
a time” and end with “And they lived happily ever after,” formulas that imbue 
them with a sense of eternity and transcendental meaning.
A fairy, in folklore, is a diminutive supernatural creature who typically has 
a human form and lives in an imaginary region called a fairyland. Stories 
abound of the magical interventions of fairies in mortal affairs, from ancient 
legendary tales to modern-day cinematic portrayals. The childhood imagina-
tion not only conceives of fairyland as a distinct extra-worldly place, but one 
that nonetheless has everyday surroundings such as hills, trees, and streams. 
The sirens in Homer’s Odyssey are fairies, and a number of the heroes in the 
Iliad have fairy lovers in the form of nymphs. The Gandharvas (celestial sing-
ers and musicians), who figure prominently in Sanskrit poetry, were fairies, as 
were the Hathors, or female genies, of ancient Egypt, who appeared at the 
birth of a child and predicted the child’s future. In European literature, fairies 
appear in works such as Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream and Romeo 
and Juliet (in Mercutio’s “Queen Mab” speech), The Faerie Queene by Edmund 
Spenser, L’Allegro and Comus by John Milton, Tales of Mother Goose by Charles 
Perrault, Grimm’s Fairy Tales by the brothers Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, and 
Irish Fairy Tales by William Butler Yeats. In these stories, fairies are generally 
considered beneficent towards humans—like the “tooth fairy” that we teach 
about to our children today. They are sensitive and capricious, however, and 
often inclined to play pranks; so, if their resentment is not to be aroused, they 
must be spoken well of and always treated with obedience. Bad fairies are 
portrayed as being responsible for misfortunes such as the bewitching of chil-
dren, the substitution of ugly fairy babies, known as changelings, for human 
infants, and the sudden death of animals.
Today, fairy tales continue to be invented and told through different media 
(such as the movies). The Shrek movies, for example, are really modern-day 
fairy tales. The quintessential movie fairy is, of course, Disney’s Tinkerbell. 
However, she is not your average fairy—she did after all try to kill Peter Pan’s 
pal Wendy in a jealous rage in the original movie. People today like her 
because of her sassy attitude and looks. She is a fairy for the times.
Fairy tales were once passed on by word of mouth. It was a Frenchman 
named Charles Perrault (1628–1703) who wrote them down, publishing 
them in a book called Tales and Stories of the Past with Morals: or  Tales of 
Mother Goose in 1697. The collection included Sleeping Beauty, Cinderella, 
 Now, You Tell Me About Yourself: Why Do We Tell Stories? 
132 
Red Riding Hood, and Puss in Boots. Jacob (1785–1863) and Wilhelm 
(1786–1859) Grimm also wrote and published fairy tales, starting in 1812. 
The story of Cinderella has been told and refashioned to meet the require-
ments of modernity, starting with Disney’s 1950 animated version and mor-
phing into contemporary versions with titles such as Ella Enchanted, The 
Prince and Me, and The Cinderella Story. In the latter, it is a lost cellphone that 
leads Prince Charming to the girl, not a misplaced glass slipper. The former 
(Ella Enchanted) is a spoof of the tamer Cinderella characters of the past. The 
title character wants to free herself of the curse of obedience, to become inde-
pendent and free of the enslaving past. It is a powerful declaration of women’s 
liberation. In fact, in virtually all contemporary versions of the Cinderella 
tale, the girl strives to control her own destiny; the prince good-naturedly 
accepts this and abides by it; and from this liberation is achieved. The Internet 
Movie Database lists around 40 movies with the title Cinderella (at the time 
of the writing of this book). In some ways, the movies have become our 
 modern storytellers. As Segal observes, “Cinema-going combines myth with 
ritual and brings gods, hence myths, back to the world.”9
 The Persistence of Myth
Even if we live in a modern world that does not accept myth, by and large, as 
true, the mythic form of thinking has not disappeared. Its remnants are every-
where: we give cards with poetic, mythic messages on them; we tell nursery 
rhymes and fairy tales to our children; we read the horoscope daily; and so on. 
From our mythic heritage, we have inherited the names of the days of the week 
and months of the year. Tuesday is the day dedicated to the Germanic war god 
Tir, Wednesday to the Germanic chief god Wotan, Thursday to Thor, Friday to 
the goddess of beauty Frigga, Saturday to the Roman god Saturn, January to 
another Roman god Janus, and so on. Our planets bear a nomenclature similarly 
derived from myth: for example, Mars is named after the Roman god of war, 
Venus after the Greek goddess of beauty. Mythic themes, like that of the earth as 
a mother, of life as a journey, of an eternal battle between the forces of good and 
evil, reverberate in our spectacles, our modern narratives, and our discourses.
As the semiotician Roland Barthes argued, the presence of myth can be 
detected everywhere in contemporary pop culture and advertising.10 In early 
Hollywood westerns, for instance, the mythic good versus evil theme was 
often symbolized by having heroes wear white hats, and villains black ones. In 
sports events, the “big game” is typically portrayed by announcers as a mythic 
battle between the forces of good (the home side) and those of evil (the 
M. Danesi
 133
intruder or visiting team). The fanfare associated with preparing for the big 
game, like the World Series of baseball or the Super Bowl of football, has a 
ritualistic quality to it similar to the pomp and circumstance that ancient 
armies engaged in before going out to battle. The symbolism of the home 
team’s (army’s) uniform, the valor and strength of star players (the heroic war-
riors), and the tactical leadership abilities of the coach (the army general) all 
have a profound emotional effect on the home fans (one of the two warring 
nations). The game (the battle) is perceived to unfold in moral terms—as a 
struggle of righteousness and good against the forces of ugliness and evil. The 
players are exalted as heroes or condemned as villains. Victory is interpreted 
in moral terms as a victory of good over evil, or as a crushing defeat from a 
conquering army. The game is, as television and radio announcers were wont 
to say a few years back, “real life, real drama!”11
Myth is also recycled in modern media such as the comic book. Consider 
the figure of Superman—introduced in 1938 by Action Comics, and published 
separately a little later in Superman Comic Books. What or who does Superman 
represent? Why is he so popular (from time to time)? As a hero in the tradi-
tion of mythic heroes, Superman is a modern-day figment of the mythic 
imagination in which heroic figures, as we have seen, are archetypes of good-
ness and rightness. As a heroic figure, Superman has, of course, been updated 
and adapted culturally—he is an American hero who stands for “truth,” “jus-
tice,” and “the American way,” as the 1950s TV series used to put it. Like the 
ancient heroes, Superman is indestructible, morally upright, and devoted to 
saving humanity from itself. But, like Achilles, he has a tragic flaw—exposure 
to kryptonite a substance that is found on the planet where he was born, ren-
ders him devoid of his awesome powers.
In mythology and legend, a hero is an individual, often of divine ancestry, 
who is endowed with great courage and strength, celebrated for bold exploits, 
and sent by the gods to Earth to play a crucial role in human affairs. Heroes 
are, thus, character signs embodying lofty human ideals for all to admire—
truth, honesty, justice, fairness, moral strength, and so on. Rather than being 
sent by the gods from the afterworld to help humanity, Superman came to 
Earth instead from a planet in another galaxy; he leads a “double life,” as hero 
and as Clark Kent, a “mild-mannered” reporter for a daily newspaper; he is 
adored by Lois Lane, a reporter for the same newspaper who suspects (from 
time to time) that Clark Kent may be Superman; and he wears a distinctive 
costume when he becomes Superman. This “Superman code” was (and con-
tinues to be) an adaptation of the ancient hero code. It changes in newer ver-
sions of Superman, because the times dictate it. For example, Superman has 
always been apolitical. Today that is no longer possible. America is no longer 
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perceived (by itself ) as espousing the only version of truth and justice. So, the 
Superman code is adapting, incorporating social justice themes within it and 
relating these to the world of globalization.
Many of the ancient hero myths had several recurring themes that are 
worth mentioning here, since these are recycled in modern-day versions. First, 
like the Babylonian king Gilgamesh, heroes were sent typically away from 
their birthplace to avoid death, just as Superman had to leave the dying planet 
Krypton where he would have perished. Second, ancient heroes led an obscure 
early life, as does Superman. Third, many heroes lose their parents. Batman, 
Captain Marvel, Black Panther, and Cyclops have suffered this fate; Superman, 
actually, was given away by his parents, so that he could be saved, recalling the 
Oedipus legend. Fourth, heroes have superhuman powers. This is probably 
what we admire most in Superman, Spider-Man, and all the other action 
heroes of today. The tragic flaw is a fifth element in the code. Achilles had a 
weak heel; Superman had a fatal aversion to kryptonite; and Daredevil is 
weakened by blindness. Sixth, some heroes were protected by a magic weapon. 
The Norse god Thor possessed a hammer that could obliterate anything in the 
world. Spider-Man has web shooters, spider-tracers, and a versatile belt that 
creates an image of his mask, among other accoutrements and gadgets. Finally, 
the hero is unusually dedicated to help people and set things right in the 
world, since humanity is flawed by nature and needs guidance and help from 
a moral superior.
Although the foregoing discussion is a simplification of the hero code, not 
to mention that there is more than one hero code in mythological traditions, 
the main point is that myth has not disappeared from modernity. It is recycled 
in figures such as Superman. Movie adventurers and detectives too are cast like 
ancient heroes. Even in a modern urban world, we seemingly need myths to 
“make things right” in human affairs, at least in the realm of the imagination.
A classic remake of ancient hero mythology is the Hollywood western. In its 
prototypical form, the plot of the western revolved around a lonesome cowboy 
hero who wins a “high noon” gun duel and then rides off into the sunset, after 
making things right or righting wrongs. The cowboy hero is strong, handsome, 
honest, but also vulnerable. The cowboy villain has all the opposite traits—cow-
ardice, physical ugliness, dishonesty, and cunning. The hero is beaten up at 
some critical stage, but against all odds he prevails through a test of superhuman 
strength and valor, becoming a champion of justice. Movie cowboy heroes such 
as Roy Rogers, John Wayne, Hopalong Cassidy, and the Lone Ranger have 
become part of cultural lore and nostalgia. The western myth is America’s ersatz 
founding myth, extolling individualism and deriding weakness. The same 
mythological theme  is present in movie and television heroes and h eroines, 
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from Wonder Woman to James Bond. The details of the stories might change 
and might be updated in narrative detail, but the mythic code is the same.
As a final example of how myth continues to have emotional power con-
sider the case of the Star Wars set of movies, which started under the director-
ship of American motion-picture director and producer George Lucas (b. 
1944) and now are produced by the Walt Disney Company. Echoes of Greek 
dramatic style as well as classical mythical referents permeate this series of 
blockbuster movies. In a Greek tragedy, the story began typically with a pro-
logue or monologue, explaining the topic of the tragedy. Episodes of Star Wars 
begin in the same manner through the use of rising text against the back-
ground of space: “A long time ago in a galaxy far away….” The Star Wars saga 
is also divided into individual episodes, released in a sequence that starts in 
medias res with the fourth episode being the first one released. Homer’s Iliad 
is structured narratively in this manner. Significantly, the unifying theme of 
the series is the universal struggle between evil (the tyrannical Empire) and 
good (the Rebel Alliance). The villains appeared originally in futuristic white 
armor, covering the entire body from head to toe. Their leader, Darth Vader, 
stands in marked opposition semiotically, being entirely clothed in black and 
speaking with a low menacing tone of voice. White and black are not por-
trayed as opposing sides, but as forming a mythic code.
The hero of the movies cannot be identified as one particular figure, since 
a group of characters must work together for good to prevail. Luke Skywalker 
was one of them. As the story unfolds, Luke discovers that his father was a Jedi 
Knight, protecting the Old Republic. A Jedi Knight is one who has the ability 
to fight advantageously by using “the Force.” Since Luke’s father was once a 
person who possessed the Force, he is a descendent of the “other world.” 
Luke’s tragic flaw is, in effect, his yearning for a father. In line with the Greek 
tradition of tragic irony, Darth Vader turns out to be Luke’s father—a fact 
suggestive of the Oedipus myth.
As a modern-day mythic tale based on the good versus evil opposition, Star 
Wars simply renames it as a battle between the Jedi and Sith. Members of the 
Jedi Order have dedicated themselves for thousands of generations to master-
ing the knowledge and tranquility found in the benevolent light side of the 
Force. They have pledged their lives to fight against evil, training physically 
and emotionally to live an austere life. By using the Force, they can manipu-
late the minds of the weak-willed, move objects telekinetically, peer into the 
future, move around at enormous speeds, and survive death with their con-
sciousness intact. Recalling the biblical story of Lucifer, a renegade Jedi who 
succumbed to the dark side recruited other disenfranchised Jedi to his cause, 
declaring war on the Jedi Order. After a devastating battle, the fallen Jedi are 
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banished, settling in a far-flung planet (Korriban), becoming known as the 
Sith. Fueled by hatred and a never-ending thirst for power, the Sith and Jedi 
clash constantly. The collateral damage from these battles has devastated entire 
star systems. The Sith believe in conquering others, drawing their strength 
from the dark side of the Force, but are ultimately enslaved by it. As the 
 popularity of Star Wars saga brings out, myths—ancient or recycled—con-
tinue to play an important role in human life, whether it is realized or not.
 Urban Legends
The Internet has now entered the mythological realm, producing its own 
mythic stories and legends, known broadly as urban legends. Like the ancient 
myths, these are stories that are often portrayed as factual by those who circu-
late them, through the Internet, but that turn out typically to be not exactly 
as recounted. An urban legend may be untrue or true in part, recalling the 
ancient legends. Often, the events it describes are explainable in different 
ways. For example, a story about missing hitchhikers may be initiated by 
someone on Facebook, based on events that the originator had actually wit-
nessed or experienced. When the narrative starts to circulate and is retold by 
different people, the story gathers momentum and an expanding narrative life 
of its own, becoming an urban legend. It may turn out to be totally untrue, or 
else explained as a series of disappearances with rational explanations (such as 
the possibility that the hitchhikers were homeless people who could not be 
located easily). But it often persists and continues to be told and retold, much 
like the ancient legends.
An example of an Internet-based urban legend is Slenderman, a fictional 
scary character, portrayed as a slim and very tall man with a featureless face. 
Slenderman was created on the Internet in 2009 and quickly became a 
Creepypasta Internet meme copied and pasted an enormous number of times 
throughout the Internet. Like the traditional stories of the bogeyman and 
other sinister characters of children’s fable literature, Slenderman is in fact a 
scary and menacing figure who stalks and abducts children. There are variant 
narratives, depictions, and videos online that relate to the Slenderman legend. 
But as the legends of the past, Slenderman is believed by some children to be 
true. The near-fatal stabbing of a twelve-year-old girl in Waukesha, Wisconsin 
is attributed to the Slenderman meme. As this case showed, the world of the 
hyperreal, as Baudrillard claimed, is more real and perhaps more meaningful 
to people today than is the real world.12 Two twelve-year-old classmates of the 
Wisconsin girl stabbed her nineteen times claiming under interrogation that 
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they had become proxies for the Slenderman, fearing that he would kill their 
families if they did not obey his behest to murder their classmate. The victim 
fortunately survived, and the two perpetrators were deemed to suffer from 
mental illness. One wonders, though, whether the illness was not induced by 
the Slenderman meme. As Richard Dawkins, the originator of the term meme 
long before the Internet, claimed, memes are just as transferable to others as 
are genes.13 It could well be that nasty memes such as the Slenderman one are 
particularly transferable to susceptible individuals, like pubescent children 
whose emotions may be out of whack and needing balance.
This possibility is corroborated by the fact that the same meme “infected” 
other young people. On September 4, 2014, a fourteen-year-old girl in Florida 
allegedly set her own house on fire while her mother and little brother were 
inside. The teenager had been apparently inspired to do so by the Slenderman 
stories online. Alarmingly, a 2015 epidemic of suicide attempts by young 
people aged twelve to twenty-four years took place on the Pine Ridge Valley 
Indian Reservation. Slenderman was identified as a direct influence. It was 
not coincidental, according to tribal elders, that the Slenderman myth was 
consistent with the Native American belief in a suicide spirit similar to the 
online meme. Clearly, cyberspace and its memetic structure might be chang-
ing—or mutating—human mentality, taking it back to its primordial mythic 
form of consciousness where anything that appears in cyberspace is believable, 
whether or not it is real or true.
 Food and Culture Myths
In many of the ancient mythic stories, food plays a prominent role as a sym-
bolic artifact. This mythological association persists to this day. In American 
society, we tend not to eat rabbits, keeping them instead as pets. The reason is 
that rabbits have a mythic or archetypal status in our groupthink—think of 
all the stories we tell our children with rabbits in them (for example, the 
Easter Bunny and Bugs Bunny). Similarly, we do not eat cat and dog meat 
because such animals resonate with narrative-mythic meanings. Movies with 
cats and dogs in them as principal characters, in effect, show how deeply 
rooted our mythic connection to such animals is.
Claude Lévi-Strauss referred to the meanings associated with food as falling 
into two domains—“the raw” and “the cooked.”14 Raw food is just that—raw 
uncooked food. Cooked food is food that has been “humanized,” so to speak; 
it is evidence of the human ability to transform nature into culture. According 
to Lévi-Strauss, this transformation was accomplished by two processes, 
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 roasting and boiling, both of which were a result of the first technological 
advances made by humanity. Roasting implies a direct contact between the 
food and a fire and, thus, is technologically primitive. It is also associated 
initially with “the raw.” Boiling reveals an advanced form of food treatment, 
since the cooking process is mediated by a pot and a sophisticated cooking 
process. Boiling is thus associated with “the cooked.”
To get a firmer sense of the interconnection between culture and food, 
imagine being in a “Robinson Crusoe” situation. Robinson Crusoe, the hero 
of Daniel Defoe’s 1719 novel of the same name, was a shipwrecked English 
sailor who survives for years on a small tropical island. Let’s suppose that you 
have somehow been abandoned alone on an isolated island in the middle of 
nowhere, cut off from the rest of the world, to fend for yourself. Without the 
support and protection of society, your instincts will urge you on to survive in 
any way that you can. Clearly, your need for food and water will take prece-
dence over everything else. In a basic sense, your state of living will be depen-
dent on a purely biological level of existence. When your hunger becomes 
extreme, your tastes in food will hardly be guided by “good taste,” notions of 
cuisine, or by any desire to have the food cooked. You will consume any raw 
flora or hunt any fauna that will satisfy your hunger. Eating food in such a 
drastic situation has only one function—survival.
Now, let’s suppose that you discover other similarly abandoned people on 
another part of the same island. Since there is strength in numbers, you all 
decide to stay together as a group. To reduce the risk of not finding food and 
of not eating, the group decides to assign specific roles to each person for 
hunting food and for its preparation. After a period of time, what will emerge 
from these agreements is a proto-culture. As time passes, other social contracts 
and arrangements will undoubtedly be made, and the cooking of food will 
become more and more routine and subject to communal taste preferences.
The purpose of this vignette has been to argue that the cooking of food in 
prehistoric groups was the likely basis for the foundation of early culture. No 
wonder then that in early tribes, food—the source of survival—was offered to 
the gods. Food continues to be imbued with mythic and sacred meanings. 
Virtually all of the world’s religious and folk traditions are centered on food, 
such as turkey meat at Thanksgiving, lamb at Easter, and so on. Food is a sym-
bolic constituent of communal rituals and feasts such as weddings. The story 
of Adam and Eve in the Bible revolves around the eating of a forbidden fruit—
subsequently portrayed in narratives and paintings as an apple, which is not 
coincidental. The discovery and cultivation of the apple date back to 6500 BCE 
in Asia Minor. Ramses II of Egypt cultivated apples in orchards along the Nile 
in the thirteenth century BCE. The ancient Greeks also  cultivated apple trees 
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from the seventh century BCE onwards. They designated the apple “the golden 
fruit,” since Greek mythology, like Christian doctrine, assigned a primordial 
significance to the apple. An apple from the Garden of the Hesperides was 
given to Hera as a wedding present when she married Zeus. The point of this 
excursus into the symbolic history of the apple is to underscore the point that 
some foods are imbued with mythic meaning across all cultures. Bread and 
lamb, for instance, invariably evoke latent mythic symbolism. This is why we 
talk of the bread of life, of earning your bread, of sacrificial lambs. Indeed, in 
some languages the same word is used for bread and life, such as the Egyptian 
Arabic word aish, which means in fact both “bread” and “life.”
The origin of human culture is, arguably, the result of efforts to secure a 
stable source of food for a group and then to acknowledge its communal 
importance in rituals, rites, customs, and early myths. The critical importance 
of food as a sign system within a communal system of meaning-making was 
noted by the Greek historian Herodotus, who spent a large part of his life 
traveling through Asia, Babylon, Egypt, and Greece, recording the differences 
he perceived (with respect to Athenian culture) in the language, dress, food, 
etiquette, legends, and rituals of the different people he came across. As 
Herodotus discovered, food is an index of a culture’s origins and a symbol of 
its mythic beliefs. These are carried unconsciously forward to present times. In 
American society, by and large, beef has value as food and is therefore part of 
cuisine; rabbit does not and is thus excluded from it, although it is as edible 
as beef. The reason is, as mentioned, that rabbits are defined as pets and thus 
as inedible as other companionship animals (dogs and cats, for example).
As prehistoric people began to interact with one another, they learned to 
behave in ways that made life easier and more pleasant. As they learned to 
plant crops and farm, the ability to store food led to communal eating events, 
acknowledging the value of food as a bond within the tribe. Early civilizations 
subsequently developed rules for proper conduct at meals and for including 
or excluding certain animals (or plants) from the rules. So, animal meats such 
as pork, beef, and lamb were defined in social terms, not as alternative sources 
of nourishment. Such rules became more formal during the Middle Ages, 
when young men training to become knights learned a code of conduct called 
chivalry. According to this code, a knight was devoted to the Christian church 
and his country and expected to treat women with great respect. He also was 
obligated to eat only certain “noble foods.” Some aspects of this code became 
a traditional part of table manners throughout Europe, spreading to the 
emerging bourgeois middle classes. Much of today’s formal etiquette origi-
nated in this way. The word “etiquette”, incidentally, is traced to the French 
royal courts during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. King Louis 
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XIV drew up a daily list of events, organized around a specific time frame, 
place, and proper dress. It was posted in his palace at Versailles as an etiquette, 
French for “ticket,” to assist the nobles in what to do. In time, upper classes 
throughout Europe adopted the code.
Cuisine is a style of cooking that defines food preparation and consumption 
in a specific region or country. It informs us not only as to what certain people 
eat, but also how they make it, and ultimately what it reveals about them. So, 
when one thinks of “Italian cuisine,” for example, images of pasta, antipasti, 
and the like come to mind. Italian cuisine is, thus, indistinguishable from 
Italian ethnic identity and culture. To use the earlier example of the rabbit, 
many Italians perceive rabbits as a delicacy (in some regions). This shows that 
a specific food is part of a semiotic code. American society does not eat rabbits 
(outside of some rural areas), but it eats the meat of other animals such as cows 
and pigs. It also does not perceive foxes or dogs as edible food items; but the 
former is reckoned a delicacy in Russia, and the latter a delicacy in China.
It is interesting to note, parenthetically, that the ancient Romans were the 
ones who had domesticated the rabbit, which flourished throughout their 
empire as a source of food. In sixteenth-century England, rabbits were prized 
instead for their fur. For this reason, they were bred selectively in order to 
enhance their rich coats. In the nineteenth century, England passed strict game 
laws prohibiting rabbit hunting. In the remainder of the previous Roman 
Empire, however, rabbits continued to be perceived as food sources. By the 
turn of the twentieth century, rabbits were redefined in Anglo-American cul-
ture as household animals. The reinforcement of the anthropomorphic con-
notations that the rabbit has since taken on can be seen in the popularity of 
fictional rabbit characters (Bugs Bunny, the Easter Bunny, Benjamin Bunny) 
that have become a part of American childhood. Clearly, all this has nothing to 
do with the edibility of rabbits, but with their cultural value. Outside of those 
that have a demonstrably harmful effect on the human organism, the species of 
flora and fauna that are considered to be edible or inedible are very much the 
result of history and tradition. We cannot get nourishment from eating tree 
bark, grass, or straw. But we certainly could get it from eating frogs, ants, earth-
worms, silkworms, lizards, and snails. Most people in American culture might, 
however, respond with disgust at the thought of eating such potential food 
items. However, there are cultures where they are not only eaten for nourish-
ment, but also as part of symbolic traditions.
So, how does the contemporary fast food, and even junk food, that we eat 
every day fit in with all this, the reader might legitimately ask? In a society 
where “fast living” and “the fast lane” are metaphors for the system of every-
day life, everything seems indeed to be “moving too fast,” leaving little time 
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for classic traditional food rituals. Is this the reason why people go to fast-food 
restaurants, where the food is affordable and the service fast?
Junk food constitutes an anomaly when it comes to notions of cuisine and 
even edibility. So, the question of what function it has in modern societies is 
hardly a trivial one. Hamburger is beef and eating beef has always been a com-
mon occurrence in traditional meals. But whereas a beef steak is part of the 
historical food code, hamburger is not. In other words, a beef steak and a ham-
burger form a cultural opposition. Several decades ago hamburgers were hardly 
construed as part of a viable cuisine; they were termed part of “junk food cul-
ture,” aimed at young people by the fast-food industry. This situation has 
changed today. Hamburger is no longer viewed as “junk,” but as a simple food 
option for people of any age or class, even if it still somewhat harbors the mean-
ing of “unhealthy dietary food.” Restaurants and various eateries now offer ham-
burgers as part of regular fare. The cultural definition of junk food has changed 
and the reason lies not in any scientific discovery related to any previously unde-
tected nutritional benefits of junk food, but to shifts in the sociocultural order.
Some historical accounts of the hamburger indicate that it was sold at fairs, 
amusement parks, and other recreational venues in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century. The hamburger was produced for a specific purpose—to be 
part of a recreational venue. Any food item can be reconceptualized in this 
way. Take fried chicken. As such, it is part of traditional southern American 
cuisine where it would hardly be classified as fast food. But in the context of 
a Kentucky Fried Chicken food outlet, it would fall, even today, under that 
rubric. That same rubric would include not only fried chicken and hamburg-
ers, but also candy bars, hot dogs, cupcakes, and the like.
It is believed that the term “junk food” was coined by Michael Jacobson, the 
director of the Center for Public Interest, in 1972. But, to the best of my own 
recollection, the term was being bandied about already in the 1950s, when a 
fully formed youth culture came into being. The term was used to refer to the 
perception that food such as hamburgers and hot dogs was injurious to health, 
but that teenagers ate it anyhow because it was cooked quickly, it was inexpen-
sive, and it united adolescents as a distinct social group. It was commodified 
food for fast consumption and connected symbolically with youth culture.
Diners and fast-food eateries generally started appearing in the 1920s. They 
were locales serving mainly young people: hot dogs, milkshakes, and other fast 
foods were the core of the menu. Adults would visit such diners only on occa-
sion, perhaps to treat their children. By the 1950s, the teenagers had their own 
burger and milkshake joints—locales designed to be socializing sites for adoles-
cents. The food served at such places was viewed, correctly, to be “junk” injuri-
ous to one’s health and only to be consumed by young people, since their 
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metabolism could ostensibly break it down more quickly and since they could 
purportedly recover from its negative health effects more easily than older peo-
ple. However, very soon, junk food, promoted by effective advertising cam-
paigns, became an indulgence sought by anyone of any age, from very young 
children to seniors. The compulsion to consume junk food has, consequently, 
became a fact of contemporary life, inducing unhealthy eating habits.
Today, restaurant chains serving fast food have been rebranded as casual 
dining chains. They have thus been renamed quick-service restaurants (QSR). 
The total revenue of QSRs is estimated to amount to more than 200 billion 
US dollars annually. Junk food is no longer “junk.” It is part of popular cui-
sine—a cuisine with few if any historical ties to either the American settlers or 
to European cuisine traditions. The exception has become virtually the norm.
As indirect proof of this, it is interesting to note that fast foods or beverages 
have become themselves signs in pop culture. Pizza, for example, has played 
roles in movies such as Mystic Pizza (1988) and Pizza (2005). Coffee too has 
played a semiotic role in the movies. In the 1998 film You’ve Got Mail coffee 
is everywhere. The coffee bar in the bookstore offers a variety of flavors and 
preparations, mirroring the flavors and modalities of modern romance. As 
Tom Hanks explains in an email to Meg Ryan:
The whole purpose of places like Starbucks is for people, with no decision- mak-
ing ability what-so-ever, to make six decisions, just to buy one cup of coffee! 
Short, tall, light, dark. Café, decaf, low fat, non-fat, etc…So people don’t know 
what they are doing or what the hell they are getting, and only for $2.95, not just 
a cup of coffee but an absolute defining sense of self. Tall, decaf cappuccino.
Analogously, in the 2000 film What Women Want, Mel Gibson meets up 
with Marisa Tomei in the coffee shop where she works. Gibson orders a 
“mochaccino” with extra foam. Tomei then asks him to specify the size he 
wants: “tall” or “grande.” At this point there is a pause, allowing us to realize 
that the question is laden with sexual innuendoes. Gibson proceeds to tell 
Tomei that he is getting a promotion: “Come with me, celebrate, I’ll buy you 
a cup of coffee.” She replies: “Memo, for you: I work in a coffee shop!”
Quentin Tarantino chose a diner for the opening scene of his 1994 movie 
Pulp Fiction, introducing the main characters sitting across from each other as 
they sip coffee. The waitress politely interrupts by asking, “Can I get anyone 
more coffee?” Suddenly discussions of criminal activity between two charac-
ters become loud and a robbery ensues. We are taken back to the coffee shop 
at the end of the movie, where we see the conclusion of the first scene. Coffee 
is indeed a  symbol of modern-day society. The coffee shop is an oasis in a 
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 barren human wasteland, where conversation and social interaction can return 
to a previous dignified state (at least according to Hollywood). From an inti-
mate encounter in an upscale bistro between two past and future lovers in The 
Family Man (2000), to a seedy dark corner of a ghetto in A Man Apart (2003), 
coffee is a vehicle of conversation and human warmth—at least in the world 
of fantasy.
In sum, the story of food is a side story of human history itself. It shows 
that the only way to grasp the meaning of something is to relate it to its nar-
rative and mythic functions. These are constantly at work in human life, as 
Freud and Jung certainly understood.
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At Arm’s Length: The Meanings of Spaces
We shape our buildings: thereafter they shape us.
—Winston Churchill (1874–1965)
A later segment on Martha’s video shows the entrance of a third person, Mark, 
onto the scene. He is, apparently, one of Ted’s friends, who happened to be at 
the same restaurant. Seeing Ted and his companion, he decided to go over to 
their table and say hello. A typical greeting encounter ensues, whereby Ted 
introduces Mark to Cheryl. Now, before proceeding to view and analyze the 
greeting ritual let’s put the video on pause for a second to ponder a few rele-
vant questions. How close do you think the two strangers, Cheryl and Mark, 
will stand to each other? Will they shake hands delicately or with force, for a 
relatively short or for a drawn-out period of time? Will they touch any other 
part of each other’s bodies?
As we allow the video to go forward, we see that they stood, predictably, at 
arm’s length from each other, that they did not touch any part of their bodies 
other than their hands. To the semiotician, the predictability of these behav-
iors suggests the existence of a proxemic code, as it is called, regulating the 
zones Cheryl and Mark maintained between each other and a tactile code 
governing touch. Executing the greeting ritual at a close distance would have 
been perceived by both Cheryl and Mark to constitute a breach of “personal 
space.” It would have been interpreted as a transgression of an imaginary 
boundary line around the body that can only be traversed by those with whom 
a person is intimate. This is also why they did not touch any other body part, 
other than the hands. Now, since Cheryl’s and Mark’s behavior is semiotically 
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coded, it should come as no surprise to find that it is not universal. Indeed, 
people in other cultures touch much more upon meeting one another and 
stand closer to each other than people do in America.
Proxemics is the study of how people perceive and semiotically organize the 
zones they maintain between each other in culturally specific situations. The 
founder of this interdisciplinary science, which has become a target of research 
in anthropology, social psychology, and semiotics, was the American anthro-
pologist Edward T. Hall (1914–2009), whose research paradigm for studying 
interpersonal zones consists of very precise notions and procedures, which he 
developed after systematically studying people interacting during World War 
II when he served in the US Army in Europe and the Philippines. Hall came 
to realize that failures in intercultural communication arose typically from 
unconsciously coded differences in the ways that members of different cul-
tures perceived interpersonal zones and in the ways they acted within them.
As an example of how proxemic zones guide interpersonal behavior con-
sider the following typical scenario. Imagine entering an elevator on the fifth 
floor of a multi-floor skyscraper. There are three people already in the elevator, 
obvious strangers to each other, because they are in separate corners of the 
elevator, facing the door or looking down at the ground, and silent. Where 
will you stand? Near one of the others? Or will you probably go to the remain-
ing corner? In what direction will you orient your body? Will you face the 
other passengers or will you face the door? Without going into a detailed 
analysis of the situation, if you have been living in American society for a 
period of time, you will know exactly the answers to these questions. The 
proxemic code informs you to occupy the remaining corner, to face the door 
or look down at the floor to avoid eye contact with the others, and, of course, 
to maintain silence. So critical is this code in maintaining social harmony that 
if you decide to act in some other way—that is, to face the others, to look 
directly at them, to sing—they would become uneasy or angry with you, 
because they would interpret your behavior as being either conflictual or dis-
turbed. To cope with your breach of conduct, they might ignore your actions 
completely, as if they had not occurred.
In 1963, Hall defined proxemics broadly as the study of how we “uncon-
sciously structure microspace”—the distance between people in the conduct 
of daily transactions, as well as “the organization of space in houses and build-
ings, and ultimately the layout of towns.”1 A few years later he expanded its 
definition to include “the interrelated observations and theories of the use of 
space as a specialized elaboration of culture.”2 Hall’s proposal to study the 
zones people maintain between each other has led to a large body of data on 
this aspect of social behavior, most of it showing that such zones are m easurable 
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with statistical accuracy, varying predictably and systematically according to 
age, gender, and other social variables. Today, proxemics is a robust area of 
research pursued by all kinds of social scientists. Hall did not explicitly use 
semiotic notions to study proxemic behavior, but his whole outlook and 
framework are, de facto, semiotic in nature. The inclusion of proxemics as a 
branch of nonverbal semiotics started in 1968 with Umberto Eco, who 
defined each zone as a particular kind of spatial sign.3
 Interpersonal Space
To execute the greeting ritual, Mark and Cheryl extended their right hands, 
but kept their bodies at arm’s length from each other—a boundary that, as 
Hall discovered, could be measured fairly accurately, allowing for predictable 
statistical variation.4 In American culture, he found that a distance of less than 
six inches between two people was reserved for intimates. Within this zone 
the senses are activated and physical presence is tangible. It is a zone reserved 
for love-making, comforting, and protecting. A six- to twelve-inch zone 
between individuals is the space where interactions between family members 
and close friends unfold. A distance of one and a half to four feet is the mini-
mal comfort zone between non-intimate individuals. This is the space where 
handshaking and other forms of formal tactile communication are carried 
out. A distance of four to six  feet is considered non-involving and non- 
threatening by all individuals. This is the space in which people carry out 
casual social discourse. Formal discourse, on the other hand, occurs within a 
seven- to twelve-foot zone. Finally, Hall found that a distance of twelve feet 
and beyond is the zone people tend to keep between themselves and public 
figures. Discourse at this distance is highly structured and formalized (for 
example, lectures and speeches). Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that 
the social meanings associated with interpersonal zones are reflected in com-
mon idioms, such as Keep your distance, They’re very close, We’ve drifted far 
apart, You’re trespassing into my personal space, I can’t quite get to him, Please 
keep in touch, and so on.
Research has shown that such zones vary predictably. For example, younger 
people maintain closer zones when interacting than do older people; similarly, 
non-intimate individuals of the opposite sex stay farther apart than do those 
of the same sex. Also influencing interpersonal zones are factors such as the 
topic of discourse (pleasant topics draw  people closer together, unpleasant 
ones keep them farther apart), the setting (lighting, noise, available space), the 
physical appearance of an interlocutor (those perceived to be more attractive 
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draw in the other person more), the interlocutor’s personality (people tend to 
stay closer to a friendly person), and the status of the interlocutor (one with 
higher social status is given more space than one with a lower status).
Proxemic codes not only regulate interpersonal space, but also the orienta-
tion of the body and the social meanings ascribed to its relative location in the 
interaction context (above or below a platform, behind or in front of a desk). 
When someone is standing on a stage at the front of an audience, for example, 
they are perceived as being more important than someone sitting down. 
Speeches, lectures, classes, and various performances unfold in this way, with 
the speaker, performer, and teacher “at the front” or “on stage,” and the audi-
ence members seated (usually). Officials, managers, directors, and the like sit 
behind a desk to mark their importance and superiority. Only their superiors 
can walk behind it to talk to them. To show friendliness, the person behind 
the desk would have to come out and sit with the other person in a different 
part of the room.
 Touch
Similar to proxemic codes, tactile codes also regulate social interaction. Holding 
hands with a child entails a different tactility (variation in force or intensity) 
than holding hands with a lover. Patting a superior to convey approval or 
appreciation also involves a different tactile pattern  than touching a friend. 
Needless to say, tactility varies across cultures. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, the 
rate at which people touch each other during social discourse is much higher 
than it is in Paris, London, or New York. In Japanese society, during infancy 
and childhood a close tactile relationship among family members is encour-
aged, but at adolescence and beyond touch in general is discouraged.5
Tactile codes inform individuals who they are allowed to touch and who 
not to touch, where it is permissible to touch another person, and so on. For 
example, a doctor or nurse may touch a patient, but the reverse is normally 
perceived as inappropriate. An adult may pat a child on the head, but a child 
patting an adult on the head has no specifiable social meaning. Touching 
oneself in certain parts, such as the head and the face, is generally acceptable, 
but touching oneself in the genital area is construed as either offensive and, in 
some places, illegal. Linking arms normally indicates companionship; putting 
one’s arm around someone’s shoulder typically indicates friendship or inti-
macy; and holding hands conveys intimacy of some kind.
The most common form of initial tactile communication in American cul-
ture is handshaking. The zoologist Desmond Morris claims that this greeting 
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ritual may have started as a way to show that neither person in a greeting 
activity was holding a weapon.6 It thus became a “tie sign,” because of the 
social bond it was designed to establish. Throughout the centuries, it evolved 
into a symbol of equality among individuals, being used to seal agreements of 
all kinds. Indeed, refusing to shake someone’s outstretched hand will invari-
ably be interpreted, even today, as the opposite—a sign of aggressiveness or a 
challenge. Predictably, handshaking reveals a high degree of cross-cultural 
variation. People can give a handshake by squeezing the right hand (as 
Europeans and Americans do), shaking the other’s hand with both hands, 
shaking the right hand and then patting the other’s back or hugging the per-
son, leaning forward or standing straight while shaking hands, and so on. 
Handshaking is not a universal social protocol, though. Southeast Asians, for 
instance, traditionally press their palms together in a praying motion to carry 
out the greeting ritual. The fact that they now also use the handshake form of 
greeting bespeaks of the influence of one culture on another.
Anthropologists are unclear as to why touching patterns vary so much 
across cultures, at least traditionally. The reason may be the ways in which 
people perceive the meaning of the self in relation to the body. In some societ-
ies, people think of themselves as literally “contained” in their skin. The pri-
vacy zones that define “self-space” in such cultures, therefore, include the 
clothes that cover the skin. On the other hand, in other cultures—as, for 
example, in most Middle Eastern ones—the self is perceived as being located 
down within the body shell. This results in a totally different patterning and 
perception of proxemic and tactile actions. Middle Eastern individuals are in 
general more tolerant of crowds, of noise levels, of touch, of eye contact, and 
of body odors than are most North Americans.
Some psychologists claim that, in evolutionary terms, one of the original 
functions of touch was to initiate a mating encounter. Remnants of this 
mechanism can still be seen in the fact that lovers hold hands, touch each 
other on the hair and face, pat each other to convey affection, and so on. 
Sexual touching is universal, although its specific coding varies widely. In her 
book, The Gift of Touch, Helen Colton poses the following embarrassing situ-
ation to illustrate how culturally diverse the sexual coding of touch is.7 Let us 
say that someone comes upon a strange woman in her bath. Which part of her 
body would the woman touch in order to conceal it? According to Colton, it 
depends on which culture she belongs to. Clearly, as Colton’s argument 
implies, the specific bodily parts that are perceived to be sexually suggestive 
differ widely from culture to culture. What is considered as erotic or obscene 
touching behavior in some cultures is considered natural or desirable behavior 
in others.
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 Territoriality
According to some biologists and psychologists, interpersonal zones and 
touch patterns are remnants of an innate territoriality mechanism that allows 
an animal to gain access to, and defend control of, critical resources such as 
food and nesting sites found in certain habitats. This is why animals compete 
for territories, either fighting actual battles or performing ritual combats as 
tests of strength, with the defeated animal being excluded from holding a ter-
ritory or forced to occupy a less desirable locale. The victor then typically 
marks the boundaries of its conquered territory in a species-specific way. A 
cat, for instance, will urinate along the boundary that marks the territory it 
claims as its own. This sends out a scent to potential competitors signaling 
possession of a tract of land.
The Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz (1903–89) was among the first scien-
tists to identify and document territoriality patterns. He discovered that they 
were an important part of an animal’s repertoire of survival strategies, as critical, 
in evolutionary terms, as its anatomical characteristics. Lorenz also suggested 
that human aggression and warfare were explainable as residual territoriality 
impulses. Lorenz’s controversial theory gained widespread popularity through a 
best-selling book by Robert Ardrey published in 1966, Territorial Imperative. 
The book subsequently generated a heated debate in academia and society at 
large on the nature and origin of human aggression.8 The notion of “human 
territoriality” has an intuitive logic to it: intrusions into one’s home or car are 
perceived as signals of aggression, and humans mark off their territories with 
props such as landmarks, boundary lines, and fences, which would seem to have 
similar functions to the territoriality mechanisms of other species.
The instinct for securing territories as “survival spaces” became the target 
of psychological experiments with rats in the 1950s and 1960s. These received 
broad media coverage because of the implications they seemed to have for 
people living in crowded urban areas. The gist of the experiments can be 
condensed as follows. When two laboratory rats were enclosed in the same 
cage, the researchers found that each one would instinctively seize an area of 
approximately equal dimensions. When a third rat would be introduced into 
the same cage, then a tripartite arrangement of subdivided areas would seem 
to be negotiated among the three rats. However, there always seemed to be 
some initial reluctance to do so, as signaled by minor altercations among the 
three rats at the beginning of the negotiations. As each extra rat would be 
introduced progressively into the cage, more reluctance and aggression would 
ensue until a “critical mass” would apparently be reached whereby the rats in 
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the cage would either fight relentlessly or demonstrate some form of capitu-
lation behavior. The implications for “urban overcrowding” that those exper-
iments apparently had were not missed by journalists and reporters. They 
also seemed to provide an explanation as to why some people “snap,” as the 
expression goes, when this critical mass is surpassed; and why others seek 
rational solutions such as escaping into the suburbs, moving into the coun-
try, and so on.
 Maps
Humans represent their territories with texts known as maps. Semiotically, 
maps are visual texts of significant spaces—spaces that mean something to 
us in some way—constructed with the three basic types of representational 
processes—indexicality, iconicity, and symbolism (Chap. 2). A map is, at 
one level, an indexical “territorial text,” since it indicates where a territory 
is located on terra firma. Its layout is iconic because it shows the features in 
a territory in topographical relation to each other. It involves symbolic cod-
ing as well because it is decipherable on the basis of conventionalized nota-
tional systems (key, scale, and so on). All civilizations have developed 
map-making techniques to meet a host of social needs. These were elabo-
rated and refined in tandem with the rise and growth of the mathematical 
sciences, and especially in accordance with the principles of Cartesian 
coordinate geometry. In a fundamental way, maps are like words—they 
classify the world in specific ways. It is relevant to note that today, with 
GPS systems, the paper map has become virtually obsolete. The shift from 
paper to screen maps mirrors the larger shift away from Print Age textuali-
ties to electronic-digital ones.
How do we interpret a map? To say “I am here, but I want to get to there” 
on a map involves understanding (1) that here and there are indexes in map 
space standing for points in real space, and (2) that the movement from here 
to there on a map stands for the corresponding iconic (simulative) movement 
between two points in real space. However, this is only the denotative dimen-
sion of map interpretation, that is, the basic way in which we interpret it as a 
text composed of indexical, iconic, and symbolic signifiers. A map is also an 
interpretant of space. As Denis Wood aptly puts it: “the history of the map is 
our history because the connections from the map to the rest of the culture 
radiate from every part of it.”9 Moreover, as J. B. Harley observes, this is the 
reason why they are “persuasive”:10
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Like all other texts, maps use signs to represent the world. When these become 
fixed in a map genre, we define them as conventional signs…Maps are also 
inherently rhetorical images. It is commonplace to say that cartography is an art 
of persuasion. What goes against modern wisdom is to suggest that all maps are 
rhetorical…They are part of persuasive discourse, and they intend to convince.
The first known maps were made by the Babylonians around 2300 BCE. 
Carved on clay tablets, they consisted largely of land surveys made for the 
purposes of taxation. More extensive regional maps, drawn on silk and dating 
from the second century BCE, have been found in China. The precursor of 
the modern map is believed to have been devised by the Greek philosopher 
Anaximander (c. 610–547 BCE). It was circular and showed the known lands 
of the world grouped around the Aegean Sea at the center and surrounded by 
the ocean. Anaximander’s map constituted one of the first attempts to think 
beyond the immediate territorial boundaries of a particular society—Greece—
even though he located the center of the universe in the Aegean Sea, thus 
betraying his own worldview. Around 200  BCE, the Greek geometer and 
geographer Eratosthenes (c. 276–195 BCE) introduced the technique of par-
allel lines to indicate latitude and longitude, although they were not spaced 
evenly and accurately. Eratosthenes’ map represented the known world of his 
times, from England in the northwest to the mouth of the Ganges River in 
the east and to Libya in the south. Approximately 150 CE, the Greek scholar 
Ptolemy (c. 100–170  CE) published the first textbook in cartographic 
method, titled Geographia. Maps became the tools for planning travel and for 
exploration and the basis for naming new territories. In 1507, the German 
cartographer Martin Waldseemüller (c. 1470–1522) applied the name 
America to the newly identified transatlantic lands, further classifying America 
into North and South—a cartographic tradition that continues to this day—
and differentiating the Americas from Asia. In 1570, the first modern atlas—a 
collection of maps of the world—was put together by the Flemish cartogra-
pher Abraham Ortelius (1527–98). The atlas, titled Orbis Terrarum, con-
tained seventy maps. The world, it seemed, was now under the “control” of 
human semiotic skills.
An important development came in the sixteenth century when Gerardus 
Mercator (1512–94) developed the technique of cylindrical projection in 
1569. This allowed cartographers to portray compass directions as lines, at the 
expense, however, of the accurate representation of relative size. The new 
maps led, in the nineteenth century, to topographic surveys in Europe for 
determining political boundaries. In 1891, the International Geographical 
Congress proposed the political mapping of the entire world on a scale of 
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1:1,000,000, a task that occupied cartographers for more than a century. 
Throughout the twentieth century, advances in aerial and satellite photogra-
phy, and in computer modeling of topographic surfaces, greatly enhanced the 
versatility, functionality, accuracy, and fidelity of map-making and, thus, the 
geographic classification of geographical space. Towards the end of the cen-
tury, the Geographic Information System (GIF) and the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) were invented to produce sophisticated maps from stored data 
(in the case of the latter) or to guide drivers of moving vehicles. The GPS 
tracks a vehicle’s location by using signals from a group of space satellites. 
A computer in the vehicle combines the position data with stored street map 
data, producing optimal maps of the route to a destination.
Despite such technological sophistication, the basic premise underlying 
map-making has not changed since Mercator’s era—it inheres in the segmen-
tation of geographical space in terms of topological, political, and other cate-
gories. The traditional maps of North American aboriginal peoples, on the 
other hand, are designed to show the interconnectedness among the parts 
within the map space through a relation of distance, angulation, and shape. 
Western maps represent the world as an agglomeration of points, lines, and 
parts, related to each other in terms of the mathematics of the Cartesian plane; 
aboriginal maps represent the same world instead as a holistic unsegmentable 
entity. Arguably, the design of these kinds of maps has influenced the design 
of living areas. Aboriginal territories are interconnected to each other holisti-
cally; modern American territories (such as urban centers), on the other hand, 
are divided and subdivided into sections that are determinable in  discrete 
ways. Not only does the layout of the city of New York, for instance, mirror a 
Cartesian map, but the city also names many of its streets in terms of the grid 
system: for example, 52nd and 4th refers to the intersection point of two 
perpendicular lines in the city grid. In a fundamental semiotic sense, such cit-
ies are the “iconic byproducts” of the worldview that has been enshrined by 
the widespread use of grid maps since the early sixteenth century.
Maps are clearly much more than maps, so to speak. As Thrower observes, 
some of our greatest achievements have been made possible through carto-
graphic expression “from philosophical considerations on the nature of the 
earth to setting foot on the lunar surface.”11 The representational power of 
maps thus raises a fundamental philosophical question: Is scientific represen-
tation (diagram-making) an attempt to encode reality in a particular cultural 
way, or is it independent of culture? Geometry and trigonometry are basically 
diagram-making sciences that have allowed human beings to solve engineer-
ing problems since ancient times, and the science of cartography has allowed 
explorers to solve travel problems with amazing accuracy. In the past, e xplorers 
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set out on a journey without knowing what they would encounter along the 
way, nor whether they would reach a land mass or a body of water. However, 
they still took their journeys of discovery with a high degree of assurance that 
they would find the intended destination, thanks to their maps.
What is even more remarkable is that cartography has permitted us to 
describe the positions of heavenly bodies and to calculate their distances from 
Earth with great exactness. It is truly mind-boggling to think that with the aid 
of a simple representational text (the map), we have been able to set foot on 
the moon and will no doubt be able to visit other places in the skies in the 
not-too-distant future.
What is the main implication of the foregoing discussion, semiotically 
speaking? It is a truly amazing one—namely, that discovery is guided by semio-
sis. Signs give shape to formless ideas, not in an arbitrary fashion, but in 
response to inferential processes that are tied to our experience of reality. 
Knowledge systems vary throughout the world. However, such variation is, 
upon closer scrutiny, superficial. Below the surface of these systems are sign 
creation processes that reflect imaginative universals in how reality is  perceived. 
The problem is that we never get the “whole picture” at once. This is why spe-
cial theories of the physical universe are possible and highly useful, but general 
ones are not. In other words, our knowledge systems can only give us partial 
glimpses of reality. What is important to note is that discoveries cannot be 
forced by logical analysis. They simply happen. However, they are not totally 
random or fortuitous, as cartographically directed exploration shows. Discovery 
is tied to unconscious modes of interconnecting experiences and their implica-
tions—implications that are captured in representational forms such as maps.
A perfect example of the relation between signs and discovery is the story 
of π (pi) = 3.14. Pi is the ratio that results when the circumference of a circle 
is divided by its diameter. Serendipitously, π appears in a number of mathe-
matical calculations and formulas, such as the one used to describe the motion 
of a pendulum or the vibration of a string. It also turns up in equations 
describing the DNA double helix, rainbows, ripples spreading from where a 
raindrop falls into water, waves, navigation calculations, and the list could go 
on and on. Does this mean that the circle form is implicit in these domains? 
If so, what is the connecting link between the circle form that produced the 
notion of π and other forms such as rainbows?
The enigma of discovery is examined in a fascinating 1998 movie, titled π: 
Faith in Chaos, by American director Darren Aronofsky. A brilliant mathema-
tician, Maximilian Cohen, teeters on the brink of insanity as he searches for 
an elusive numerical code that he believes is hidden in π—a code that might 
provide answers to the great questions of philosophy (What is life? Is there a 
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hidden pattern in nature? etc.). For the previous ten years, Cohen had been 
attempting to decode the numerical pattern beneath the ultimate system of 
ordered chaos—the stock market. As he verges on a solution, real chaos is 
swallowing the world in which he lives. Pursued by an aggressive Wall Street 
firm set on financial domination and a Kabbalah sect intent on unlocking the 
secrets hidden in their ancient holy texts, Cohen races to crack the code, hop-
ing to defy the madness that looms before him. As the movie’s subtext implies, 
the stream of digits after the decimal point in π seems to challenge us to try 
and find a pattern within them. Does a pattern exist? If so, how do we dis-
cover it? What is the attraction to this number? Is it perhaps the fact that a 
circle is probably one of the most perfect and simple geometric forms known 
to human beings? Why does π appear in nature, biology, and in many other 
domains of reality? It simply keeps cropping up, reminding us that it is there, 
and defying us to understand why. Very much like the universe itself, the 
more technologically advanced we become and as our picture of π grows 
larger, the more its mysteries grow. Because of  this simple representational 
device—π—derived from taking a ratio, we are led to make discoveries seren-
dipitously. That is, perhaps, the greatest mystery of all.
As a final word on maps, it is interesting to note that they have played a 
significant role not only in exploration, but also in narratives. Stories with 
maps showing where treasure is buried abound. In his introduction to Treasure 
Island, Robert Louis Stevenson describes how he sketched the island’s imagi-
nary shorelines, providing a framework for the reader to use in reading the 
text. The map traces the strategic movements of the pirates and the others in 
their search for the treasure. Sir Thomas More, Jonathan Swift, John Bunyan, 
Daniel Defoe, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Thomas Hardy, Joseph Conrad, 
William Faulkner, Michael Ondaatje, among others have similarly used maps 
as integral components of their plots.
 Signifying Spaces
The discussion of territories and maps brings us logically to the topic of space 
itself as constituting a semiotic code. All societies build and design their streets, 
marketplaces, abodes, and public edifices with specific designs and culturally- 
focused meanings. Indeed, a building is hardly ever perceived by the members of 
a society as simply a pile of bricks, wood, or straw put together to provide shelter. 
Rather, its shape, size, features, and location are perceived to be s ignifiers that 
refer to a broad range of meanings. The rituals and behaviors that govern activi-
ties in private and public spaces are the outcome of these meanings: in American 
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society one knocks on the door of private dwellings, but not on the door of retail 
stores, to seek permission to enter (because a store is perceived to be a building 
that is literally open for business); one sits and waits for someone in a public 
foyer, atrium, or lobby, but not normally in a public bathroom (because the latter 
is a secretive personal space); one walks on a public sidewalk, but not on some-
one’s porch without permission (because the porch is a private space).
We perceive a particular society as a communal space and by extension a 
communal body. This is why we refer to societies as being healthy, sick, vibrant, 
beautiful, or ugly. Indeed, visitors habitually judge a society instinctively as 
they would judge a human person, namely, on how its public spaces appear to 
the eye—neat, dirty, organized, chaotic, and so on. This is also why a soci-
ety  feels violated “as a single body” if someone defaces its public or sacred 
places. Conflicts among peoples or nations are often triggered by such trans-
gressive acts against the “communal body.”
This perception would also explain why we talk of a city’s roads as having 
arteries, of its downtown core as its heart, of its design as being warm or cold. 
In ancient Greece religious and civic structures in cities were designed to give 
a sense of aesthetic balance; streets were arranged in a grid pattern and hous-
ing was integrated with commercial and defense structures to give a feeling of 
organization and security. Renaissance city planners built radial streets leading 
to a central point, like spokes of a wheel, so as to promote social interaction. 
To this day, the downtown core is known as centro in Italy, reflecting the 
Renaissance design of cities as circles. The city of Siena is a classic example of 
this kind of design; so too is the city plan of seventeenth-century London and 
the streets of Mannheim and Karlsruhe in Germany. After the Industrial 
Revolution, the concept of the Cartesian grid started to gain a foothold on 
city designs (as mentioned earlier). Modern grid cities are the semiotic struc-
tural byproducts of Cartesian geometry.
The gist of the foregoing semiotic story is that cities, shelters, buildings, 
and communal sites are built in specific ways that bear culture-specific mean-
ings. This is why the buildings of a particular university stand for that institu-
tion visually; why St. Peter’s basilica symbolizes a specific religion; and so on. 
Market squares, sacred sites, and other kinds of communal places are invari-
ably perceived as meaningful by the members of a society. Public spaces are 
those sites where communal or social interactions of various kinds take place; 
private spaces are those places that individuals have appropriated or desig-
nated as their own; and sacred spaces are those locales that are believed to have 
metaphysical, mythical, or spiritual attributes. Spatial codes also inform peo-
ple how to act and behave in such places: the way one dresses for church is 
different from the way one dresses for work; the way one behaves in a restau-
rant is different from the way one behaves at home, and so on.
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As a concrete example of the meanings that are attributed to buildings and 
sites, consider the shopping mall. In all societies, past and present,  certain 
spaces are set aside for community interaction. In villages, the market square 
is a locus for people to enact certain rituals, to exchange goods and services, to 
socialize. These same kinds of functions are served, in modern urban societies, 
by the shopping mall. The mall, therefore, is much more than just a locus for 
shopping. It satisfies several semiotic needs at once. It is a signifying space that 
imparts a feeling of security and protection against the outside world of cars, 
mechanical noises, and air pollution. It also provides shopping solutions to 
personal problems. It has transformed shopping into a social activity, rather 
than one based on need. People in malls perceive shopping typically as a form 
of recreation, buying things that they may not need, but finding the act plea-
surable in itself. Cinemas, restaurants, and amusement parks are found within 
some malls, enhancing the entertainment factor. The Mall of America in 
Bloomington, Minnesota, for instance, has more than 400 stores, around fifty 
restaurants, several night clubs, and a giant roller coaster, drawing millions of 
visitors per year, equal or greater in number than Walt Disney World, the 
Grand Canyon, or Graceland (the home of rock legend Elvis Presley). Malls 
have morphed, in effect, into self-contained “fantasylands,” where one can 
leave the problems, dirt, and hassles of modern life literally outside.
 Buildings
Buildings are not only shelters. As in all things human, they are also perceived 
as signs with connotative values literally built into them. We typically react to 
our home, for instance, as if it were an extension of self-space. At a denotative 
level, a home, whether a crude hut or an elaborate mansion, has a straightfor-
ward meaning: it is a shelter providing protection from weather and intruders. 
It also demarcates territory, constituting a privately bounded space that 
ensures safety and preserves sanity. When one steps inside, one feels as if one 
has retreated into the safety of one’s own body. This is why intrusion into a 
home is felt as a violation of the self.
However, denotation stops there. Within the home, each room elicits a 
specific type of connotative meaning. Take the bedroom as an example. 
Concealing a bedroom has a practical basis: we are extremely vulnerable when 
we are sleeping, and so it is judicious to keep sleeping areas concealed or 
secret. The ancient Egyptians hid their bedrooms at the back or the sides of 
their homes. North American families also prefer to keep their bedrooms 
away from the line of sight. However, bedrooms are also signs of the self. It is 
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the room where we display our persona, through decoration, accoutrements 
(photos, objects) and other meaning-bearing objects. This is why only inti-
mates are allowed to share that space literally and symbolically. Conceptions 
of “clean” and “dirty” in a home are also interpretable at the level of connota-
tion. Dirt is really no more than displaced matter. An object “out of its proper 
place” must be put back or reallocated, otherwise it might be perceived as 
litter or debris. This is particularly true with regard to our kitchens, because 
we think of them as “dirt-free” or “dirt-removal” spaces. We can tolerate 
“dirty” bedrooms much more because food is not involved and because they 
are out of the line of sight.
The experience of the home space contrasts with the experience of other 
kinds of spaces, especially those designated as sacred. When one enters a 
church, a chapel, a synagogue, a temple, or a mosque, one tends to speak with 
a lower voice, to walk more quietly, to feel a sense of respect and reverence. 
The configuration and set-up of the sacred space is also laden with meanings. 
In a Catholic church, for example, the altar is more sacred and therefore less 
traversable than the area containing the pews. A confessional is a very intimate 
enclosure. It cannot be lit or made overly amenable. It imparts a feeling of 
intimate reflection, providing a physical space within which one can look into 
the dark depths of the soul to reveal to God one’s weaknesses. The way the 
altar faces is also highly meaningful. As a table for eating spiritually along with 
Christ, it was once put against the wall of the church with the priest’s back to 
the people. The language spoken was Latin, which further imbued the cere-
mony with a detached, abstract, and yet, seemingly spiritual, quality. 
Nowadays, the altar and the priest are oriented towards the faithful. This new 
configuration conveys a feeling of communion with and among the people, 
not just of communion with God. The change in orientation of the altar 
reflects, clearly, a change in emphasis on the part of the Church and its 
members.
Sacred buildings make individuals feel that they have entered a special 
place, a place where contact with the deities is real and meaningful. Indeed, 
the word church comes from Greek ekklesia, meaning “those called out,” that 
is, those called by God away from their communities to form a new and spiri-
tually deeper community. New Testament metaphors bear this out. Christians 
refer to the body of Christ, to Christ as the head, and to the faithful as members 
(originally meaning “limbs”). This feeling that the congregation is part of a 
communal body has spawned its own architectural traditions. In some 
modern- day designs of churches the altar is placed in the center of a circular 
arrangement, allowing people to face each other and thus to feel united 
through the ongoing ceremony.
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Churches, temples, mosques, and other sacred buildings stand out clearly 
from their surroundings and have a pronounced architectural character. Since 
the dawn of history, people have sought to establish their relationship to the 
forces of nature by building substantial structures commanding attention, in 
places where the divinities are thought to reside, and where miracles and super-
natural events are thought to take place. Around these, the ceremonies of wor-
ship were elaborated. As a result, priests and rulers became very powerful 
because they were thought to have direct access to the divinities. Egyptian 
rulers built elaborate tombs in the form of mastabas, rectangular masses of 
masonry that were transformed into the great pyramids around 1500 BCE. These 
immense buildings testify to the vast social control that Egyptian pharaohs 
exerted over the populace. Other cultures have similar monuments. In India, 
the commemorative monument takes the form of a large hemispherical mound, 
called a stupa; in Southeast Asia it is called a wat—a richly sculptured stone 
complex that is approached by a ceremonial bridge. In the Mayan and Inca 
cultures, ceremonial monuments resembled the Egyptian pyramids, in that 
they used the same kinds of architectural design.
Churches were the tallest buildings of medieval European cities and towns. 
The spires on those churches rose majestically upwards to the sky, imparting a 
sense of awe as people looked up. There was no doubt as to which group had 
political and social power in medieval Europe. The churches were, literally and 
symbolically, places of power and wealth. As the churches started to lose their 
clout and wealth after the Renaissance, other kinds of buildings emerged to 
reflect in their architecture the new cultural order. The tallest buildings were 
the palaces of aristocrats and the emerging bourgeoisie. Today, the tallest struc-
tures in cities such as Dallas, Toronto, Montreal, New  York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, and London are owned by large corporations and banks. Wealth and 
power now reside in these institutions. Inside these mammoth buildings there 
is a structure that mirrors the social hierarchical structure implicit within it—
the jobs and positions with the lowest value are at the bottom of the building; 
the more important ones at the top. The company’s executives reside, like the 
gods on Mount Olympus, on the top floor. The atmosphere on this level is 
perceived to be rarefied and other-worldly. This architectural symbolism is the 
reason why we use expressions such as “to work one’s way up,” “to make it to 
the top,” “to climb the ladder of success,” “to set one’s goals high,” and so on.
It is often the case that not only buildings, but also entire cities are believed 
to represent a form of heaven on earth. As Humphrey and Vitebsky note:12
Many ancient civilizations believed that it was the reproduction of the structure 
of the cosmos in sacred architecture that made human life possible by providing 
a model for the laws of society on earth. This view applied to the city as well as 
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to the temple and it made the spiritual and political dimensions of power virtu-
ally identical. In Mesoamerica, the city was often laid out as an exact model of 
a heavenly city. The Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán was constructed according to 
a divine ideogram, while at Teotihuacan, the entire city, containing thousands 
of temples, was itself equivalent to a great temple.
Overall, buildings are semiotic texts. This is why, in addition to size and 
shape, a building’s location bears meaning. An office building in the  downtown 
core signifies, in general, more prestige than a building on the outskirts of 
town. Head offices are normally located downtown. Since the late 1960s, the 
design of such buildings has been influenced by the style known as postmod-
ernism. The AT&T building in New  York City, built in 1984, is a classic 
example of this style. With its allusions to Renaissance architectural forms and 
design features evoking Chippendale furniture, it combines historical tradi-
tion with satirical style, the old with the new, the important with the trivial. 
Postmodernists strive for individuality, mocking those who seek standardized 
ways of constructing buildings.
In a sense, architecture is all about imposing order on space or in giving it 
an “aesthetic feeling,” so to speak. It  reflects the general  semiotic-aesthetic 
principle that when things look right, they are right. In ancient Greece, reli-
gious and civic citadels were oriented in such a way as to give a sense of aes-
thetic balance to the inhabitants—streets were arranged in a grid pattern and 
housing was integrated with commercial and defense structures. In the 
Renaissance, the design of cities around piazzas was in sharp contrast to the 
narrow, irregular streets of medieval cities. Renaissance city planners stressed 
wide, regular radial streets forming concentric circles around a central point, 
with other streets radiating out from that point like spokes of a wheel. To this 
day, the downtown core of many Italian cities reflects this Renaissance view 
of city design. In China, the principle of “things looking right” has even been 
given expression in the form of the “art of placement,” known as Feng Shui. 
Practitioners of this art use an octagonal template called the ba-gua to assess 
an area, since the orientation, layout, and placement of objects within the area 
are considered to be significant in metaphysical terms.
Today hotels and recreational buildings (for example, casinos) are taking on 
some of the symbols of power that were once associated exclusively with 
churches, aristocratic palaces, banks, and corporations. The city of Las Vegas 
is a perfect example of a city designed to cater to our modern-day craving for 
recreation and consumption. The tall hotel towers that mark its landscape are 
symbols of a world of fast money, quick recreational fixes, and consumerist 
delights.
M. Danesi
 161
Overall, we perceive territories, spaces, and shelters as signs and sign sys-
tems—systems that have allowed us to exercise some control over nature. This 
has, of course, had many positive consequences. However, it has also brought 
about some extremely negative ones as well. One of these is the level of pollu-
tion and overcrowding that has put survival of the earth at risk. The effort to 
free the world of pollution and to control population growth is leading more 
and more to futuristic scenarios that are more frightening than anything ever 
written in science fiction. Entire urban communities may be enclosed in 
 plastic domes in the future. Temperature and humidity inside the domes 
would be controlled, and electronic filters would keep the air clean and fresh. 
The world, however, would be a terrifying place. Let’s hope that this will not 
occur and that rather than attempting to control nature, we can come to some 
co- existential modus vivendi with her.
 Cyberspace
The concept of space in the age of the Internet has become amplified—there 
are now two spatial realities in human life, real and virtual. The current world 
of digital communication technologies impels all of us to become more 
involved with one another, no matter what language we speak, what culture 
we come from, where we live physically, and who we are. We are all denizens 
of the same digital global village. Everything from purchasing goods, access-
ing and recording information, seeking recreation and even courtship takes 
place through the space in which the village exists—cyberspace. This has 
engendered a new perception of what information, communication, and lit-
eracy are—retrieving many of the features of orally based tribal life. The new 
media have, indeed, become the new message—to paraphrase McLuhan. 
They have offset the individualistic and privatizing forces of the Print Age, 
allowing people to engage with each other in a more communal way, decon-
structing authorship and the primacy of canonical texts. Even sources of 
authoritatively coded knowledge, such as print encyclopedias, have now 
become open to the participation and collaboration of everyone, not just 
individual experts—as can be seen by the advent and spread of the various 
“wikis” on the Internet, which, going against all traditions of the past, allow 
for the collaborative editing of content by users. The advent of the global vil-
lage signals that the world is morphing gradually into a paradigmatically dif-
ferent one from any imaginable social system of the past. The whole semiotics 
of space is in fact in need of revision or at least some amplification.
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Computers and various digital devices allow users to move and react in 
simulated environments, manipulating virtual objects in place of real objects. 
Constant engagement in such environments is conditioning us more and 
more to perceive the body as separable from the mind. Everything from court-
ship on websites to self-presentation and diary-keeping on social media, now 
illustrates the role of cyberspace as a connecting space—a veritable electronic 
village. The term cyberspace was coined by American writer William Gibson 
(b. 1948) in his 1984 science fiction novel Neuromancer, in which he described 
cyberspace as a place of “unthinkable complexity.” Human lives are literally 
becoming unthinkably complex in that space, which Baudrillard called the 
hyperreal space of the mind (as mentioned), seeing it as more real than real 
space. Cyberspace now has its own communities and virtual spaces with their 
own set of conventions for communicating and interacting. As Mikael 
Benedikt observed a while back, in cyberspace “the tablet becomes a page 
becomes a screen becomes a world, a virtual world. Everywhere and nowhere, 
a place where nothing is forgotten yet everything changes.”13
Neuromancer was the inspiration for the emergence of cyberpunk science 
fiction writing. Cyberpunk narratives take place typically in a bleak, dehu-
manized future world dominated by technology and robotic humans. Gibson’s 
description of cyberspace is worth repeating here:14
Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by millions of legiti-
mate operators. A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of 
every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of Light 
ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters of constellations of data. Like city 
lights, receding.
The Internet promises a type of immortality that only religions in the past 
could have ensured. Although the form of immortality is devoid of conscious-
ness (which religions pledge), it is nonetheless a real possibility that most 
people would never have been able to contemplate previously. What is online 
about ourselves will define us well beyond our mortal lives. In the past, only 
artists, writers, musicians, and other “important” individuals would have 
been able to leave behind their “selves” for posterity through their work; now 
virtually anyone can do something similar. Our Facebook pages and our 
tweets define us, remaining in cyberspace well beyond our physical lives. In 
cyberspace we can leave a record of ourselves for future generations to read. 
This is affecting not only how we remember and grieve, but also how we view 
mortality. Cyberspace, like Gibson claimed, is indeed an infinite one, in both 
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the physical and spiritual senses—it is a virtual universe without physical 
boundaries and it provides a bizarre sense of reassurance that life will go on 
even after we are dead in the real world.
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What a Beautiful Ring!: The Meaning 
of Clothes and Objects
I believe in the total depravity of inanimate things, the elusiveness of soap, the 
knottiness of strings, the transitory nature of buttons, the inclination of suspenders 
to twist and of hooks to forsake their lawful eyes, and cleave only unto the hairs of 
their hapless owner’s head.
—Katharine Walker (1840–1916)
Martha’s video has still much more to offer the semiotician. For example, we 
can see Cheryl wearing an enticing red skirt and matching black lace blouse, 
Ted an elegant dark-blue suit, white shirt, and matching blue tie. Also, some-
thing that Ted said at one point is worthy of our attention: “Oh, what a beau-
tiful ring, Cheryl! Who gave it to you?” “It’s a friendship ring,” Cheryl replies. 
“I’ve worn it since I was 14.” Why is it, a semiotician would ask, that we are 
so attached to, and meticulous about, our clothes and our trinkets of jewelry? 
More generally, why is it that people find so much significance in the objects 
they make (as discussed briefly in Chap. 3)? What role do objects play in 
human life? Do clothes make the person, as the expression goes? Why do we 
associate clothing with ritual behaviors, such as the courtship display unfold-
ing between Cheryl and Ted?
“Things” have special value in many consumerist societies, becoming 
fetishes as Karl Marx once claimed. A fad is an object, a fashion style, or some 
trend that becomes extremely popular relatively quickly, but tends to lose 
popularity just as quickly. Some fads may come back if a subsequent genera-
tion finds out about them through media retrospectives and nostalgic portray-
als. For instance, the fad of karate lessons in the 1980s was due in large part 
166 
to the popularity of the Bruce Lee movies and, later, of the set of Karate Kid 
movies. Blue jeans and T-shirts became clothing fads for young people in the 
mid-1950s because they were worn by actors such as James Dean and Marlon 
Brando. The T-shirt as fad made its debut in the 1951 movie, A Streetcar 
Named Desire that featured Marlon Brando wearing a T-shirt in highly erotic 
scenes that finally catapulted the T-shirt into the realm of pop culture. A simi-
lar story can be told about any major fad. In the 1950s, Hula Hoops became 
truly popular after Georgia Gibbs sang The Hula Hoop Song in a 1958 episode 
of the Ed Sullivan Show on CBS, associating the hoop with the emerging 
youth culture. The fad of black clothing, hair, and cosmetics, popular in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, came from several sources, including vampire 
movies and goth culture.
 Clothes and Dress
Suppose you have a twenty-something-year-old brother who has an important 
job interview at the head office of a bank. During his adolescent years, your 
brother had become accustomed to dressing like a rap musician. Aware that he 
must present a vastly different persona at the interview, he decides to ask you 
to help him get dressed appropriately for the occasion. To put it in semiotic 
terms, your task is to acquaint him with the dress code that will allow him to put 
together an appropriate clothing text through which he can present an accept-
able persona to his potential employer. As you know, the code suggests that he 
must be well-groomed; that he should wear a white or blue, long- sleeved shirt, 
with no designs on it, with a suitable tie. It also suggests that he should wear a 
gray or blue jacket with matching pants, and, finally, that he should wear black 
shoes, preferably with shoelaces. Of course, he should remove all traces of his 
previous lifestyle clothing. Like any code, there is some latitude in the choices 
and combinations of signifiers (clothing items) your brother has in construct-
ing his apparel text, but not very much. He certainly cannot ignore the basic 
structure of the dress code, for if he does—if he decides to wear a tuque, or if 
he decides to put on sneakers, for instance—the chances are that he would not 
even get past the door of the job interviewer. Deploying the appropriate dress 
code will not guarantee him a job, but it will at least get him past that door. 
Dressing for the occasion is a semiotic social act.
Now, let’s switch the situation from the standpoint of gender. Suppose that 
this time your sister is the one with an important job interview at the head 
office of a bank. Once again, as an adolescent she had become accustomed to 
dressing in a youthful style with nose rings, ripped jeans, and so on. Like your 
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brother, she comes to you for help. In her case, the code suggests that she also 
set her hair in an appropriate way, avoiding her neo-punk hairstyle; that she 
wear a blouse with soft colors, preferably white; that she wear a gray or blue 
jacket with a matching skirt or pants; and that she put on shoes, preferably, 
with high or semi-high heels. Although there are some paradigmatic (selec-
tional) differences in the female dress code with respect to the male one, there 
are also many similarities. This suggests that the type of job both are seeking 
cuts across gender categories. In such cases, dress codes tend to be more flex-
ible or “unisexual.”
Clothes supplement the body’s biological resources (bodily hair, skin thick-
ness) for counteracting environmental fluctuations, such as weather changes. 
At this rudimentary denotative level, they are specific kinds of amplifications 
of these resources, as clothing variation in relation to different climates testi-
fies. However, in the system of everyday social life clothing items also function 
as signs, and therefore are organized conceptually and metaphorically into the 
various dress codes (from Old French dresser “to arrange, set up”) that are 
interconnected with the other codes of this system.
At the connotative level, clothes convey persona (identity, gender, age, sta-
tus, ideology, and so on) and regulate social interaction. To someone who 
knows nothing about Amish culture, the blue or charcoal Mutze of the Amish 
male is just a jacket, but within the Amish community the blue one indicates 
that the wearer is between sixteen and thirty-five years of age, and the charcoal 
one that he is older than thirty-five. Similarly, to an outsider the Russian kal-
bak appears to be a brimless red hat; to a Russian living in rural areas, it once 
meant that the wearer is a medical doctor.
Dress codes have an enormous range of historically based meanings. In 
ancient Rome, for instance, only aristocrats were allowed to wear purple- 
colored clothes; in religiously oriented cultures, differentiated dress codes for 
males and females are regularly enforced to ensure modesty; and the list could 
go on and on. When people put clothes on their bodies, they are not only 
engaged in making images of themselves to suit their own eyes, but also to 
conform to cultural models, such as gender codes. Before the middle part of 
the twentieth century, females in Western culture did not wear pants. The one 
who wore the pants in a family meant, denotatively and connotatively, that the 
wearer was a male. With the change in social-role structures during the 1960s, 
women too began to wear pants regularly in acknowledgment of the change. 
The reverse situation has not transpired. Except in special ritualistic circum-
stances—for example, the wearing of a Scottish kilt—men have not openly 
worn skirts in America. If they do, then we label it an act of transvestitism. 
Today, with our expansion of the notion of gender to include LGBTQ 
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 individuals, our perceptions of clothing are also changing. In effect, as the 
clothes change so too do other sign systems associated with them.
The identification of gender through clothes is characteristic of cultures 
across the world. As children develop a sense of gender, they often want to 
experiment with the dress code of the other gender. In doing so, children are 
trying to cull from such cross-dressing episodes a better understanding of 
their own sexual persona; by assuming the gender of the other sex through the 
dress code, children are attempting to unravel what it is like to be the other 
sex, contrasting it with their own sense of sexual identity, and thus coming to 
a better grasp of its meaning. In transgender individuals, who identify with a 
gender other than their biological one, clothing experiments are more than 
simple gender role experiments; they are vital activities that help them under-
stand themselves semiotically.
The power of dress as conveyor of persona becomes particularly noticeable 
at puberty. In tribal cultures, the clothes that individuals are expected to wear 
when they come of age are dictated by the elders or leaders of the collectivity. 
In modern industrialized cultures, pubescent youth are left alone to develop 
their own dress codes. Indeed, the history of youth dress styles since the mid- 
1920s is the history of contemporary adolescence and even of contemporary 
society. In that era, the so-called flappers were distinguished by the hat they 
wore as well as by their short dresses and stylish shoes, introducing a new kind 
of sexy fashion that was unthinkable in the Victorian era. In the 1950s, young 
people imitated the clothing and hairstyles that characterized early rock-and- 
roll culture (with pompadour hairstyles for males, poodle skirts and pony tails 
for females). In the 1960s, the fashion trends came out of the hippie culture, 
epitomized by long hair for both males and females and the wearing of blue 
jeans for both, in a unisex fashion style. Like all fads, fashion styles tell side 
stories of a culture and of social trends generally. Flapper hats defined the era 
of the Roaring Twenties, representing an emerging women’s liberation move-
ment; blue jeans symbolized the beginnings of gender and class equality.
Often, clothing is ideological, social, or political statement. The dress codes 
adopted by totalitarian regimes, with their dull uniformity, is a case in point. 
On the other side, a dress code such as the hipster one, exudes individualism. 
Hipsters are associated with indie or alternative music styles, and are often 
compared to the hippies and Beat writers (who were the first to be called hip-
sters in the 1950s). Hipsters are all about a flight from conformity, a way to 
put oneself in contrast to it, to stand out, to look and be different.
The Beat writers of the 1950s who broke from literary and moral traditions, 
emphasizing freedom of lifestyle and expression, also broke away from clothing 
fashions, introducing minimalist clothing that was later adopted by the h ippies. 
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They were concentrated in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and in Greenwich 
Village in New York City. They held “happenings,” which included a reading 
of their works combined with jazz, drugs, and sexuality. The best- known writ-
ers were Allen Ginsberg, especially famous for his poem Howl (1956), and Jack 
Kerouac, for his novel On the Road (1957). Other writers included William 
Burroughs, Gregory Corso, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, and Gary Snyder. Critics 
accused the writers of promoting anarchy and obscenity for their own sake. 
But the movement captured the post-war generation’s dissatisfaction with dull 
conformity and what they called the false values of “square” society. The beat-
niks, as they came to be called, also advocated peace and civil rights, which set 
the stage for the counterculture movement of the 1960s and 1970s.
 Nudity
The human being is the only animal that does not “go nude,” so to speak, 
without social repercussions (unless, of course, the social ambiance is a nudist 
camp or perhaps a sexual locale such as a striptease joint). Nudity is the semi-
otic counterpart of clothing. What is considered “exposable” of the body will 
vary significantly from culture to culture, even though the covering of genita-
lia for modesty seems, for the most part, to cross cultural boundaries. As 
anthropologist Helen Fisher aptly observes, even among Yanomamo tribal 
members, who live in the jungle of Amazonia, and wear very little clothing 
because of the climate, a woman would feel as much discomfort and agony at 
removing her vaginal string belt as would a North American woman if one 
were to ask her to remove her underwear; and a man would feel just as much 
embarrassment at his penis accidentally falling out of its encasement as would 
a North American male if he were to be caught literally “with his pants down.”1
Clearly, nudity is imbued with meaning. Consider the performance art of 
strip-teasing. A semiotician would ask: Why do we attend (or desire to attend) 
performances whose sole purpose is the removal of clothing to reveal the 
naked body? The act of “suggestive clothing-removal” in an audience setting 
has, first and foremost, a profane ritualistic quality to it. The dark atmosphere, 
the routines leading up to the act, the predictability of the performance with 
its bodily gyrations imitating sexual activities, and the cathartic effects that it 
has on spectators are all suggestive of a rite worshipping carnality and fertility. 
There is no motive for being at such performances other than to indulge in a 
fascination with the nude body. Of course, sexual perversions can also be real-
ized at such locales, but this is rarer than one would think. The Internet now 
offers much more opportunity to engage in sexual perversion.
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This semiotic take on nudity would explain, arguably, why visual artists 
have always had a fascination for the nude figure and for erotic representation 
generally. The ancient Greek and Roman nude statues of male warriors, 
Michelangelo’s powerful David sculpture (1501–4), Rodin’s The Thinker (c. 
1886), are all suggestive of the brutal power of the nude male body. On the 
other side of this paradigm, the female body has historically been portrayed as 
soft, sumptuous, and submissive, as can be seen in the famous ancient Greek 
statue known as the Venus de Milo, which represents Aphrodite, the Greek 
goddess of love and beauty (Venus in Roman mythology). However, there has 
always been some ambiguity with regard to the female body. Feral and power-
ful women have always existed, as can be seen in the sculptures of Diana of 
Greek mythology.
The modern-day fascination with erotic materials is a contemporary testa-
ment to our fascination with nudity as a semiotic code in our system of every-
day life. Those who see exploitation in such materials, and seem prepared to 
censor them, are probably more overwhelmed by the connotative power of 
this code than are most people. Depicting the human body in sexual poses or 
activities reveals, to the semiotician, a fascination with nudity as a signifying 
text that blends sexuality with historical meanings. Only when such depic-
tions are repressed does this fascination become perilous.
 The Sacred and the Profane
The topic of nudity brings us to one of the more important themes in the 
semiotic study of culture today—the dichotomy between the sacred and the 
profane across cultures, usually interpreted concretely as a distinction between 
the body and the soul. This distinction manifests itself in rituals and symbol-
ism.2 In many religious traditions, for instance, there are periods of fasting 
(such as Lent in Catholicism) preceded by periods of indulgence into all kinds 
of carnal pleasure (the Carnival celebration  that precedes Lent). This dual 
dimension is intrinsic to understanding the role of many spectacles and cere-
monies in contemporary cultures.
The concept of the carnival is especially relevant, as elaborated by Russian 
literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin.3 The festivities associated with carnivals are 
tribal and popular; in them the sacred is “profaned,” and the carnality of all 
things is proclaimed. At the time of carnival, everything authoritative, rigid, 
or serious is subverted, loosened, and mocked. Bakhtin’s carnival theory 
would assert that acts of transgression or mockery against social norms are 
instinctual, paradoxically validating them. In effect, we come to understand 
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the role of those norms through a mockery of them. This would explain why 
vulgar forms of pop culture, such as erotic movies and strip-teasing, do not 
pose (and never have posed) any serious subversive challenge to the moral 
status quo. They are not really transgressive in a true political subversive sense; 
they just appear to be. Flappers, punks, goths, gangsta rappers, Alice Cooper, 
Kiss, Eminem, Marilyn Manson, strippers, porn stars, and all the other “usual 
transgression suspects” are, according to this theory, modern-day carnival 
mockers who take it upon themselves to deride, confuse, and parody author-
ity figures and sacred symbols, bringing everything down to an earthy, crude 
level of theatrical performance.
Carnival theory asserts that mockery actually institutes a vital dialogue 
between those who feel that expressing the sacred in human life is the only lofty 
goal to pursue, and those who want to mock it. Through this form of “poly-
phonic” dialogue we come to understand the meaning of social life intuitively. 
It is an oppositional dialogue, pitting the sacred against the profane in a system-
atic gridlock, and it is polyphonic because in it there are no voices of authority, 
but all voices. It makes it obvious that this kind of dialogue goes on all the time 
in human life. It is so instinctive and common that we hardly ever realize con-
sciously what it entails in philosophical and psychological terms. It even mani-
fests itself in conversations, chats, and even internally within ourselves. It 
manifests itself as well in the theatrical and narrative arts, from drama and com-
edy to rock concerts and social networking websites. Carnival displays are part 
of popular and folkloristic traditions that aim to critique traditional mores and 
idealized social rituals, bringing out the crude, unmediated links between 
domains of behavior that are normally kept separate. Carnivalesque genres sati-
rize the lofty words of poets, scholars, and others. They are intended to fly in the 
face of the official, sacred world—the world of judges, lawyers, politicians, 
churchmen, and the like. Another main tenet of carnival theory regards the role 
of occultism in culture. Occultism was rampant throughout the ancient world 
and the Middle Ages. Even eminent  scholars such as thirteenth-century Italian 
theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) believed in the powers of occult 
symbolism. Carvings of animals on roofs and walls, along with sculptures of 
mysterious animals and female figures, go back tens of thousands of years. 
According to some estimates, the earliest known visual-symbolic artifact might 
even be 135,000 years old. By and large, the belief in literal occultism has disap-
peared from contemporary secular societies, even though it has left some nota-
ble residues in practices and artifacts, such as the popularity of daily horoscopes, 
the widespread wearing of lucky charms and amulets, and the omission of thir-
teenth floors on high- rise buildings (or more accurately, the intentional 
 misidentification of t hirteenth floors as fourteenth floors). The embracing of 
 What a Beautiful Ring!: The Meaning of Clothes and Objects 
172 
occultism (or occult symbolism) by specific groups and cults comes as little 
surprise to carnival theorists. It is essentially part of carnivalesque or “profane 
theater” complete with appropriate costume (dark clothes and cosmetics) and 
sacrilegious activities and rituals (such as the devil-worshipping rituals).
Bakhtin introduced his concept of the carnival around 1929. People attend-
ing a carnival, he claimed, do not merely make up an anonymous crowd. 
Rather, they feel part of a communal body, sharing a unique sense of time and 
space. Through costumes and masks, individuals take on a new identity and, as 
a consequence, renew themselves spiritually in the process. It is through this 
carnivalesque identity that the “grotesque” within humans can seek expression 
through overindulgent eating and laughter, and through unbridled sexual act-
ing. In such behaviors, people discover who they really are. The dark clothes 
and cosmetics worn by goths are steeped in carnival traditions. The color con-
stitutes a pictography of danger, mystery, the unexplained, and other occult 
meanings. The outlook of the goths is more than a simple lifestyle choice, but 
a more fundamental reactive carnivalesque one. The goths of the recent past 
were engaged in a kind of shadow culture that implied an acceptance of the 
dark side of the human soul, not its concealment. In a way, goth culture was 
(and still is) an attempt to  obliterate distinctions between life and death, 
between the sacred and the profane. Moreover,  the gender distinctions that 
society has imposed on all of us are deleted through the dark masks that goths 
wear. The blending of masculine and feminine symbols is actually an ancient 
occult practice—expressed in myths and belief systems throughout the world.
A particularly interesting modern-day play on occultism and its carni-
valesque nature is the so-called Rocky Horror Picture Show, which was at one 
level a parody of 1950s rock-and-roll culture and bourgeois America wrapped 
into one, utilizing occult symbolism in an ironic way. As Greenwald remarks, 
it was an attempt “to shock by departing from the tradition of rock and roll 
machismo established by Elvis,” vaunting a new form of sexual theater that 
favored “makeup, cross dressing, and an overall smearing of the lines between 
the sexes.”4 The show debuted in 1975 in Britain. It continues as a tradition 
in many areas of the world at midnight on Halloween, when patrons show up 
dressed in drag and lingerie. Like the ancient and medieval carnivals, the audi-
ence is not only part of the show, it is the show. Audiences dance and sing, 
shout lewd comments at the screen, and throw objects at certain points in the 
film, such as toast, toilet paper, water, or rice. The master of ceremonies, called 
sardonically Dr. Frank-N-Furter, instructs and exhorts the audience, saying, 
“Give yourself over to absolute pleasure. Swim the warm waters of sins of the 
flesh—erotic nightmares beyond any measure, and sensual daydreams to trea-
sure forever. Can’t you just see it? Don’t dream it, be it.”
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To his entreaty, audience members start to indulge themselves in “absolute 
pleasure” by drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes (among other things). 
The show never made it into mainstream movie theaters at first because its 
carnivalesque elements were so weird and transgressive at the time that, as the 
movie itself warns, in parodic imitation of censorship ratings: “Society must 
be protected. You’re lifestyle is too extreme.” The use of the word horror in the 
spectacle is significant. Horror movies have the same psychological function 
as the freak shows of the carnivals. Like P. T. Barnum’s sideshows, with its 
displays of Siamese twins, bearded ladies, eight-foot wrestlers, and eight- 
hundred- pound individuals, the horror genre taps into our fascination with, 
and fear of, the grotesque and the possibility that there is nothing beyond 
extinction. As British film critic Robin Wood aptly observes, “One might say 
that the true subject of the horror genre is the struggle for recognition of all 
that our civilization represses and oppresses,” including our inability to face 
our “nothingness and probable purposelessness.”5
 Fashion
Why are fashion shows popular in many modern societies? Until relatively 
recently, fashion trends were primarily the concern of the aristocracy, while 
the dress codes of ordinary people changed far less regularly and radically. 
Even among the upper classes of Medieval and Renaissance Europe, clothing 
was costly enough to be cared for, altered, reused, and passed from one gen-
eration to the next, more so than it is today. Indeed, radical changes to this 
pattern occurred infrequently until the Industrial Revolution of the nine-
teenth century made the production of both cloth and clothing far easier and 
less expensive.
Let us return briefly to the dress code with which we started this chapter—
the business suit—to see how fashion trends are formed and institutionalized. 
The message underlying this apparel text is, of course, dress for success. How 
did this message crystallize in our culture? As you might know by now, the 
semiotician would look at the history of the business suit to seek an answer.
In seventeenth-century England there existed a bitter conflict to gain polit-
ical, religious, and cultural control of society between the Royalist Cavaliers, 
who were faithful to King Charles I, and the Puritans, who were followers of 
Oliver Cromwell and controlled the House of Commons in Parliament. The 
Cavaliers were aristocrats who only superficially followed the teachings of the 
Anglican Church. Their main penchant was for flair and the good life. They 
dressed flamboyantly and ornately, donning colorful clothes, feathered hats, 
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and long flowing hair. The romantic figure of the cavalier aristocrat has been 
immortalized by novels such as The Three Musketeers (Alexandre Dumas, 
1844) and Cyrano de Bergerac (Edmond Rostand, 1897). The Puritans, on the 
other hand, frowned on ostentation and pomp. Known as the Roundheads, 
Cromwell’s followers cropped their hair very closely, forbade all carnal plea-
sures, and prohibited the wearing of frivolous clothing. They wore dark suits 
and dresses with white shirts and collars. Through their clothes they hoped to 
convey sobriety, plainness, and rigid moral values.
The Cavaliers were in power throughout the 1620s and the 1630s. During 
this period the Puritans fled from England and emigrated to America, bring-
ing with them their lifestyle and rigid codes of conduct and dress. Then in 
1649, the Puritans, led by Cromwell, defeated the Royalist forces and exe-
cuted the king. The king’s son, Charles II, escaped to France to set up a court 
in exile. For a decade, England was ruled by the Puritans. Frowning upon all 
sorts of pleasure and frivolous recreation, they closed down theaters, censored 
books, and stringently enforced moralistic laws. Unable to tolerate such a 
strict way of life, many Cavaliers emigrated to America. The Puritans had set 
up colonies in the northeast; the Cavaliers settled in the south. With 
Cromwell’s death in 1658, the Puritans were eventually thrown out of power 
and England welcomed Charles II back. Known as the Restoration, the sub-
sequent twenty-five-year period saw a return to the adoption of a general cava-
lier lifestyle. For two centuries the Puritans had to bide their time once again. 
They were excluded from political office, from attending university, and from 
engaging in any official social enterprise. Throughout those years, however, 
they never strayed from their severe moral philosophy and lifestyle.
By the time of the Industrial Revolution, the Puritans had their final 
revenge. Their thrift, diligence, temperance, and industriousness—character 
traits that define the “Protestant work ethic”—allowed Cromwell’s descen-
dants to become rich and thus take over the economic reins of power. Ever 
since, Anglo-American culture has been influenced by Puritan ethics in the 
work force. The origins of modern corporate capitalism are to be found in 
those ethics. The belief that hard work, clean living, and economic prosperity 
are intrinsically interrelated became widespread by the turn of the twentieth 
century, and continues to undergird American social worldview.
The business suit is a contemporary version of the Puritan dress code. The 
toned-down colors (blues, browns, grays) that the business world demands are 
the contemporary reflexes of the Puritan’s fear and dislike of color and ornament. 
The wearing of neckties, jackets, and short hair are all signifiers of solemnity and 
self-denial. During the hippie era of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the office 
scene came briefly under the influence of a new form of cavalierism. Colorful 
suits, turtle-neck sweaters, longer hair, sideburns, Nehru jackets, medallions, and 
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beards constituted, for a time, a transgressive dress code that threatened to radi-
cally change the ethos of corporate capitalism. However, this fashion experiment 
failed, as the cavalier 1960s were overtaken by neo-puritanical forces in the late 
1970s and 1980s. The Puritan dress code became once again prevalent in the 
business world, with only minor variations in detail. Today, “geek computer capi-
talists” have revived the informal dress code, donning jeans and other signifiers of 
“cool dress” to work. However, the workplace is much too much grounded in the 
Puritan ethic to allow a broad deviation from this ethic. It remains to be seen if 
the traditional business suit will indeed disappear from the workplace because of 
lifestyle changes brought about by technology. 
The story of the business suit makes it obvious that fashion is a product of 
semiotic forces at work and, thus, like any other code, can be used for a host 
of connotative reasons. Military dress, for instance, connotes patriotism and 
communal values; but outside the military world it can convey a counter- 
cultural statement, a parody of nationalistic tendencies. Consider the case of 
blue jeans. In the 1930s and 1940s, blue jeans were cheap, strong, and mass- 
produced blue-collar working clothes. High-fashion articles, on the other 
hand, were manufactured with expensive fancy materials and fabrics. As early 
as the mid-1950s, the youth culture of the era adopted blue jeans as part of its 
thematic dress code. By the 1960s and 1970s, blue jeans were worn by the 
new generation of young people to proclaim equality between the sexes and 
among social classes. By the 1980s, this subversive meaning was forgotten, 
and the same clothing item became fashion statement. Blue jeans became 
much more expensive, much more exclusive, often personalized, and available 
at chic boutiques. Today, jeans are just jeans—comfortable clothing worn by 
people of all ages in informal settings. Clearly, the hippie view that they con-
note equality of all kinds has finally prevailed, at least semiotically speaking.
 Objects
Recall Cheryl’s friendship ring. It is indeed remarkable that a simple object 
can have such meaning. To the semiotician, however, this comes as no sur-
prise. Any human-made object is perceived as a sign and is thus imbued with 
meaning. Marshall McLuhan claimed that objects are extensions of the human 
body and mind that evolve by themselves and, in turn, influence the evolu-
tion of the species.6 From the invention of basic tools to the invention of 
computers, human evolution has indeed been shaped by the objects people 
make. The rapidity of social change is due to the nature of the technology 
itself. As Donald Norman puts it: “Human biology and psychology do not 
change much with time. High technology changes rapidly.”7
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From the dawn of civilization, objects have had great personal and cultural 
significance for no apparent reason other than they appeal to people. 
Archeologists reconstruct ancient cultures on the basis of the artifacts they 
uncover at a site. The reason why they are able to do this is because they reveal 
personal and social meanings and, thus, social organization by extension. 
Archeologists can imagine the role that any object they find played in the 
society by stacking it up against the other objects at the site. This helps them 
reconstruct the system of everyday life of the ancient culture.
To see how intrinsic objects are to this system, consider the case of toys. 
Denotatively, toys are objects made for children to play with; but toys connote 
much more than this. At no other time in North America did this become 
more apparent than during the 1983 Christmas shopping season. That season 
is now often described by cultural historians as the Christmas of the Cabbage 
Patch doll. Hordes of parents were prepared to pay almost anything to get one 
of these dolls for their daughters. Scalpers offered the suddenly and unexplain-
ably out-of-stock dolls for hundreds (and even thousands) of dollars through 
classified ads. Adults fought each other in line-ups to get one of the few remain-
ing dolls left in some toy store. How could a simple doll have caused such mass 
hysteria? Only something with great connotative power, the semiotician would 
reply. What is that connotative power? The Cabbage Patch dolls came with 
“adoption papers.” Each doll was given a name, taken at random from 1938 
state of Georgia birth records. Like any act of naming, this conferred upon the 
doll a human personality (Chap. 2). Thanks to computerization, no two dolls 
were manufactured alike, emphasizing their “human meaning” even more. The 
doll became alive in the child’s mind, as do generally objects with names. The 
dolls were “people signs.” No wonder they caused such hysteria. The children 
had adopted a real child (in the imagination at least). And this adoption was 
sanctioned and acknowledged by the doll makers and givers. What more could 
the child, and especially the parents, ask for?
The Cabbage Patch incident is a case of the power of latent animism, the 
attribution of human qualities to inanimate objects. North Americans are not 
unique in animating dolls. In some societies, as mentioned previously, people 
believe that harm can be inflicted on a person by damaging a doll constructed 
to resemble that person. The Cabbage Patch doll craze was, really, a modern 
version of animism, or the view that objects have an inner being. In 1871, the 
British anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917) described the 
origin of religion in terms of animism.8 According to Tylor, primitive peoples 
believed that spirits or souls are the cause of life in both human beings and 
objects. The difference between a living body and an object, to such peoples, 
was one of degree of animism, not lack thereof.
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Before the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, most people lived in agricultural communities. Children barely out of 
infancy were expected to share the workload associated with tending to the 
farm. There was, consequently, little distinction between childhood and adult 
roles. Society perceived children to be adults with smaller and weaker bodies. 
Indeed, in the medieval and Renaissance periods, the “babes” and “children” 
that appear in portraits look more like little adults  than they do children. 
During the Industrial Revolution the center of economic activity shifted from 
the farm to the city. This led to a new social order in which children were left 
with few of their previous responsibilities, and a new conceptualization, or 
more accurately mythology, emerged, proclaiming children as vastly different 
from adults, needing time for school and play. Child labor laws were passed 
and the public education of children became compulsory. Protected from the 
harsh reality of industrial work, children came to have much more time at 
their disposal. As a result, toys were manufactured on a massive scale so that 
children could play constructively in the absence of parental tutelage.
Since then, toys have become inseparable from childhood, and thus reveal 
how adults relate to children and what kinds of values they want to instill in 
them. Toys, as the logo for a major toy chain once stated, “are us” (Toys ’R Us). 
Aware of the signifying power of toys, manufacturers make them primarily 
with parents in mind. Toys symbolize what the parent wishes to impart to the 
child: educational toy makers cater to parents who emphasize learning, musi-
cal toy makers to those who stress music, doll makers to those who give 
emphasis to nurturing values, and so on. Children, on the other hand, often 
seem to prefer playing with objects they find around the house than with the 
toys that are bought for them. The adult fascination with toys is also a clear 
sign that the distinction between young and old is being blurred more and 
more in our culture. Toys are being designed with layers of meanings aimed at 
adults. Today, grown-ups enjoy children’s music, comic books, and motion 
picture heroes such as Batman and Superman—all once considered strictly 
kid stuff. Toys are still for children, but childhood isn’t as childish as it used to 
be, and adulthood tends to be a lot less adultish than it once was.
 Video Games
In contemporary society, where electronic technologies can turn objects into 
beings through digital animism, the semiotics of objects is expanding its pur-
view. Take the case of video games. Video games (VGs) played on a video con-
sole started out as arcade games, as far back as the 1920s. A modern computer 
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VG is really an arcade game with expanded technical capabilities. In the early 
1970s, an electronic tennis game named Pong introduced the video- game indus-
try to the United States. After this industry nearly collapsed in the mid-1980s, 
Japanese companies, such as the Nintendo Corporation, assumed leadership, 
improving game technology and introducing popular adventure games such as 
Donkey Kong and Super Mario Bros. Since then a VG culture has crystallized that 
is blossoming into one of the most profitable of all media ventures. As a result, 
concern over the effects of VGs on the mind and on behavior have cropped up 
across the social landscape.
The term video game is now used to refer to any electronic game, whether 
it is played on a computer with appropriate software, on a console, on some 
portable device (such as a cellphone, an iPhone, and so on), or through some 
Internet venue. There are now genres of VGs, and various formats in which 
they can be played. One of the most significant ones, for the purposes of the 
present discussion, is the so-called role-playing game (RPG), which gained 
popularity with the Dungeons and Dragons game in the 1980s. Players pretend 
to be in a situation or environment, such as a battle or newly discovered place; 
each simulated situation has its own rules and each participant is expected to 
play a specific role or character in the scenario. Occult and horror themes, 
along with related fantasy themes, are also common. The increase in the pop-
ularity of online gaming has resulted in subgenres appearing, such as multi-
player online role-playing games.
In a typical RPG, participants create a character, known as an avatar, by 
inputting descriptions of appearance and behavior into a communal online 
space for the game. Other characters have no way of knowing if the avatar’s 
appearance is the real physical appearance of the player, or not. In this way, 
reality and fantasy overlap. The simulacrum effect seems to be occurring con-
stantly in VG worlds. As Gary Fine observed already in the early 1980s, for 
many players such games constitute the main reality. For the game to work as 
an aesthetic experience, the “players must be willing to bracket their natural 
selves and enact a fantasy self.”9 Thus, VGs provide “a structure for making 
friends and finding a sense of community.”10 When players enter into the RPG 
world they assume a fantasy identity, abandoning the real-life one. It allows 
players to “endow themselves with attributes that in reality they do not possess: 
strength, social poise, rugged good looks, wisdom, and chivalric skills.”11
Video gaming has a broad appeal because it is simulated reality and thus a 
means of creating imaginary worlds autonomously. For many it is replacing 
the traditional media and genres—adventure, spy, war, sports, and so on—
making the escapism provided by the traditional media even more powerful 
by taking the make-believe element from the author and putting it directly 
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into the hands of the player. In RPGs, the player(s) is the scriptwriter, actor, 
and director at once. It is virtual cinema, and now has its own culture, with 
attendant websites, blogs, magazines, and the like. VGs give players the feel-
ing of being immersed in a simulated world that resembles the real world. 
Today, VGs also record and send the speech and movements of the participant 
to the simulation program. This feature, which relays the sense of touch and 
other sensations in the virtual world, is making the VG world virtually indis-
tinguishable from real life. Baudrillard’s simulacrum, as mentioned several 
times, is revealing itself to be more of a description of the modern mind rather 
than a theory of it.
Steven Johnson has argued that VGs are not just a play on fantasy, but may 
actually be producing new forms of consciousness and increasing intelligence, 
since they provide a channel for the same kind of rigorous mental workout 
that mathematical theorems and puzzles do.12 As a consequence, they improve 
the problem-solving skills of players. The complex plots and intricacies of 
video games are making people sharper today because of a “Sleeper Curve.” 
Johnson took the term from Woody Allen’s 1973 movie Sleeper, in which a 
granola-eating New Yorker falls asleep, waking up in the future, where junk 
and rich foods actually prolong life rather than shorten it. According to 
Johnson, the most apparently debasing forms of mass culture, such as VGs, 
are turning out to be nutritional after all. This may or may not be true. Will 
our next scientists, artists, and geniuses be addicted VG players? It is quite a 
stretch of the imagination to say that VGs enhance problem-solving skills and 
that these are helping our species evolve.
 Technology
The methods and techniques that a society employs to make its objects are 
known cumulatively as technology. The term is derived from the Greek words 
tekhne, which refers to an “art” or “craft,” and logia “a system of logic.” 
Although it is a product of culture, technology eventually becomes itself a 
contributing factor to the culture’s development, transforming traditional sig-
nifying systems, frequently with unexpected social consequences. The earliest 
known human artifacts are hand-ax flints found in Africa, western Asia, and 
Europe. They date from approximately 250,000 BCE, signaling the b eginning 
of the Stone Age. The first toolmakers were nomadic groups of hunters who 
used the sharp edges of stone to cut their food and to make their clothing and 
shelters. By about 100,000 BCE the graves of hominids show pear-shaped 
axes, scrapers, knives, and other stone instruments, indicating that the or iginal 
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hand ax had become a tool for making tools. The use of tools is not specific to 
the human species; it can be observed in other animal species. However, the 
capacity for creating tools to make other tools distinguishes human technol-
ogy from that of all other animals.
Perhaps the biggest step forward in the history of technology was the con-
trol of fire. By striking flint against pyrites to produce sparks, early people 
could kindle fires at will, thereby freeing themselves from the necessity of 
perpetuating fires obtained from natural sources. Besides the obvious benefits 
of light and heat, fire was also used to bake clay pots, producing heat-resistant 
vessels that were then used for cooking, brewing, and fermenting. Fired pot-
tery later provided the crucibles in which metals could be refined. No wonder 
then that  the Prometheus myth is about the discovery of fire. As the story 
starts, the god Zeus plotted to destroy humanity by depriving the earth of fire. 
Prometheus, a member of the Titans (an early race of gigantic gods), stole fire 
and gave it to human beings. Zeus punished him by ordering him bound to a 
remote peak in the Caucasus Mountains. An eagle came to devour Prometheus’ 
liver every day, and the liver grew back each night. After Prometheus had suf-
fered for many centuries, the hero Hercules killed the eagle, setting Prometheus 
(and by implication technology) free.
Early technologies were not centered only on practical tools. Colorful min-
erals were pulverized to make pigments that were then applied to the human 
body as cosmetics, and to other objects as decoration. Early people also learned 
that if certain materials were repeatedly hammered and put into a fire, they 
would not split or crack. The discovery of how to relieve metal stress eventually 
brought human societies out of the Stone Age. About 3000 BCE, people also 
found that alloying tin with copper produced bronze. Bronze is not only more 
malleable than copper but also holds a better edge, a quality necessary for mak-
ing such objects as swords and sickles. Although copper deposits existed in the 
foothills of Syria and Turkey, at the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers, the largest deposits of copper in the ancient world were found on the 
island of Crete. With the development of ships that could reach this extremely 
valuable resource, Knossos on Crete became a wealthy mining center during 
the Bronze Age. Humans had embarked on a major cultural revolution—a 
shift from a nomadic hunting culture to a more settled one based on agricul-
ture. Farming communities had actually emerged near the end of the most 
recent Ice Age, about 10,000 BCE. Their traces can be found in widely scat-
tered areas, from southeastern Asia to Mexico. The most famous ones emerged 
in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) near the temperate and fertile river valleys of 
the Tigris and Euphrates. The loose soil in this fertile crescent was easily 
scratched for planting, and an abundance of trees was available for firewood.
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The purpose of the foregoing schematic historical excursus has been to 
emphasize the theory that technology shapes cultural evolution and worldview. 
Take as a simple example of this theory the invention of the clock in 1286. The 
invention meant that, from that moment on, people would no longer have to 
live in a world based primarily on reference to the daily course of the sun and 
the yearly change of the seasons. The precise measurement of time made it 
p ossible for people to plan their day and their lives much more exactly. The 
repercussions of this event are being felt to this day. We plan our entire day, 
week, and even life around precise “time signifiers,” that would have been 
unthinkable before the invention of the clock. “Meet you at 8:30” would have 
had no meaning in, say, the year 868. In that era, the more likely expression 
night have been “Meet you at sunset.” Today, everything from class times and 
movie times to wedding dates are planned exactly on the basis of clock time.
Such nineteenth- and twentieth-century inventions as the telephone, the 
phonograph, the wireless radio, motion pictures, the automobile, television, 
the airplane, and the computer have added to the nearly universal respect that 
society in general has come to feel for technology. With the advent of mass- 
production technology, not only has the availability of objects for mass con-
sumption become a fact of everyday life, but mass consumption has itself 
become a way of life. Not everyone thinks that this social outcome is a blessing. 
Since the middle part of the twentieth century, many people have reacted 
against the very consumerist lifestyle and worldview that it has engendered, 
believing that it threatens the quality of life. Supporters of this viewpoint pro-
pose a value system in which all people must come to recognize that the earth’s 
resources are limited and that human life must be structured around a commit-
ment to control the growth of industry, the size of cities, and the use of energy.
 “Babbage’s Galaxy”
No other invention since the printing press has changed society more radi-
cally than the computer. The computer has transferred the human archive of 
knowledge from paper to electronic storage. Today, information storage is 
measured not in page numbers but in gigabytes. Common computers and 
digital devices can now store the equivalent of millions of books. They can 
retrieve information from the Internet within seconds. The Web 2.0 world in 
which we live has literally connected all knowledge into one huge database of 
information. In effect, we no longer live in “Gutenberg’s Galaxy,” as McLuhan 
called the age of print, but in “Babbage’s Galaxy,” to coin a parallel phrase in 
reference to the nineteenth-century British mathematician who worked out 
the principles of the modern digital computer, Charles Babbage (1791–1871).
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Living in Babbage’s Galaxy, the modern human being is now more inclined 
to learn from the screen than from the book or from any other source. The 
mystique associated with the author of a published work is starting to fade as 
the world’s texts become available literally at one’s fingertips. The whole 
notion of authorship is being drastically transformed as a consequence. 
Journalists, students, instructors, and many more professionals can now com-
pose their verbal texts electronically and communicate them to others from 
remote locations. Many people work at home (or anywhere else for that mat-
ter) and communicate with fellow workers with their digital devices.
The computer has also introduced a new form of text-making and text- 
usage known as hypertextuality. Reading a printed page is, at the level of the 
signifier (that is, of deciphering the actual physical signs on the page), a linear 
process, since it consists in decoding the individual words and their combina-
tions in sentences in the framework of a specific signification system (a novel, 
a dictionary, and so on). Information on any specific sign in the printed text 
must be sought out physically: for example, if one wants to follow up on a 
reference in the text, one has to do it by consulting other printed texts or by 
asking people. This is also what must be done when one wants to determine 
the meaning of a word found in a text. Dictionaries serve this very purpose. 
The computer screen has greatly facilitated such tasks by introducing a hyper-
textual dimension. The term hypertext was coined in 1965 to describe an 
interlinked system of texts in which a user can jump from one to another. This 
was made possible with the invention of hyperlinks—portions of a document 
that can be linked to other related documents. By clicking on the hyperlink, 
the user is immediately connected to the document specified by the link. Web 
pages are designed in this way, being written in a simple computer language 
called HTML (Hypertext Markup Language). A series of instruction tags are 
inserted into pieces of ordinary text to control the way the page looks and 
these can be manipulated when viewed with a Web browser. Tags determine 
the typeface or act as instructions to display images, and they can be used to 
link up with other Web pages.
As opposed to the linear structure of printed paper texts, hypertextuality 
permits the user to browse through related topics, regardless of the presented 
order of the topics. The links are often established both by the author of a 
hypertext document and by the user, depending on the intent of the docu-
ment. For example, navigating among the links to the word language in an 
article contained on a website might lead the user to the International Phonetic 
Alphabet, the science of linguistics, samples of languages, and so on. 
Hypertextuality was introduced as a regular feature of computers in 1987 
when Apple began distributing a new program called Hypercard with its new 
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machines. This was the first program to provide a linking function permitting 
navigation among files of computer print text and graphics by clicking key-
words or icons. By 1988, compact disc players were built into computers.
Interpreting a text involves three types of cognitive processes. First, it entails 
the ability to access the actual contents of the text at the level of the signifier, 
that is, the ability to decode its signs paradigmatically as words, images, and 
so on. Only someone possessing knowledge of the codes (verbal and nonver-
bal) with which the text has been assembled can accomplish this. If it is in 
Finnish, then in order to derive an interpretant (a specific kind of meaning) 
from it, the decoder must know the Finnish language, the conceptual meta-
phors that characterize Finnish modes of speaking, and so on and so forth. 
The second process entails knowledge of how the semiotic organization 
unfolds in the specific text, that is, of how the text generates its meanings 
through a series of internal and external semiotic processes (denotation, con-
notation, and so on). This requires some knowledge on the part of the inter-
preter of cultural codes. This is, in fact, the level of the signified that is implicit 
in the question: What does it mean? Finally, various contextual factors enter 
into the entire process to constrain the meaning. Such things as the reason for 
accessing a text, the purpose of the text, and so on will determine what the 
individual interpreter will get from the text. When viewed globally, these pro-
cesses suggest that text-interpretation is, de facto, hypertextual, because it 
involves being able to navigate among the three processes simultaneously. In 
effect, the physical structure of hypertextuality on the computer screen may 
constitute a kind of “mirror model” of how people process all kinds of texts.13
 Technopoly
Living in the Internet age, one cannot but admire and take delight in the stag-
gering achievements made possible by the computer revolution. However, our 
naive faith in the computer is really no different from other forms of animism. 
The computer is one of Homo sapiens’ greatest technological achievements. As 
a maker of objects and artifacts, the human species has finally come up with 
an object that is felt more and more to have human-like qualities. This, too, 
reflects an ancient aspiration of our species. In Sumerian and Babylonian 
myths there were accounts of the creation of life through the animation of 
clay. The ancient Romans were fascinated by automata that could mimic 
human patterns. By the time Mary Shelley’s grotesque and macabre novel, 
Frankenstein, was published in 1818, the idea that robots could be brought to 
life horrified the modern imagination. Since the first decades of the twentieth 
century the quest to animate machines has been relentless. It has captured the 
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imagination of many image-makers. Movie robots and humanoids have 
a ttributes of larger-than-life humans. Modern human beings are experiencing 
a feeling of astonishment at finding themselves for the first time ever at the 
center of everything, having recreated themselves in the form of robots. 
However, there is a risk here. It is easy to forget that we are much more than 
machines, possessing a consciousness imbued with fantasia, sensitivity, intu-
ition, and pathos, which comes with having human flesh and blood.
This can be called a simulacrum illusion, to paraphrase Baudrillard. The 
human brain is a connective organ that comes to an understanding of things 
through amalgams of various kinds. Given the connective structure of the 
Internet it is easy to believe in a new mythology—the human brain can be 
easily reproduced through technology. As the world has become constantly 
more linked through new digital technologies, the linkage of people through 
electric circuitry has brought about a new depth and breadth of people’s 
involvement in world events and has broken down the traditional boundaries 
that kept them apart. Interaction through technology is becoming more and 
more the default of daily life.
But all this could lead to what Neil Postman called, in 1962, the emergence 
of a technopoly.14 Postman defined technopoly as a society that has become 
totally reliant on technology and seeks authorization in it, as well as deriving 
recreation from it, and even taking its orders from it. This is a coping strategy 
that results when technology saturates the world with information. In a way, 
technopoly theory is the counterpart of connected intelligence theory. 
Postman is, if course, aware of the principle that tool-using is a technology 
that has brought about paradigm shifts throughout human history, since it 
leads to amplifications of human skills and attributes, as discussed earlier. He 
identifies three shifts based on this principle:
 1. Tool-using cultures invent and employ tools to solve physical problems of 
existence and to serve an emerging world of ritual symbolism and art. 
These cultures are theocratic and unified by a metaphysical view of the 
world.
 2. Technocratic cultures invent and employ cognitive tools, such as the alpha-
bet, for creating a particular worldview or “thought-world,” as he called it. 
This serves to overthrow the previous metaphysical thought-world—for 
example, heliocentricity overthrew the belief in the Earth as the center of 
the universe. Technocracy impels people to invent, hence the rise of science 
and literacy. A technocratic society is still controlled “from above,” that is 
by religious, educational, scientific, and other social institutions.
 3. Technopoly is a “totalitarian technocracy,” evolving on its own. It reduces 
humans to seeking meaning in machines and in computation.
M. Danesi
 185
Postman also saw negative consequences for education in a technopoly, 
viewing the world of mass communications as a system that would turn soci-
ety into an amorphous mass of non-thinkers. He altered McLuhan’s phrase of 
“the medium is the message” to “the medium is the metaphor,” insisting that 
new media are mind-numbing tools. Postman was particularly concerned 
about children’s upbringing in a technopoly. While children were once seen as 
little adults, the Enlightenment brought broader knowledge of childhood, 
leading gradually to the perception of childhood as an important period of 
development. Since children now have easy access to information intended 
for adults, the result is a diminishment of their developmental potential. He 
thus warned that those who do not see the downside of technology, constantly 
demanding more innovation and therefore more information, are in effect 
silent witnesses to a new cognitive form of mind control. The only way to 
improve the situation, as Postman saw it, would be to get students to use 
technology smartly by being educated in the history, social effects, and psy-
chological biases of technology. The dangers of technology have arrived. But 
the semiotician would say that the human imagination has always been one 
that was immersed in its own objects—it especially believes as true what it 
itself makes. The implication is that as the technology changes, so too will our 
world-making ways.
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Art Is Indistinguishable from Life: The 
Artistic Nature of the Human Species
Art is not to be taught in Academies. It is what one looks at, not what one listens 
to, that makes the artist. The real schools should be the streets.
—Oscar Wilde (1854–1900)
Martha’s video contains yet other segments that are of direct interest to the 
semiotician. There is one scene, for instance, where Cheryl shows a picture on 
her cellphone of a sculpture that she had made, showing it proudly to her 
amorous partner. Ted looks at it with admiration, remarking, “How beautiful, 
Cheryl. I didn’t know you were so talented.” “I have always loved to draw and 
sculpt,” she responds. “For me art is indistinguishable from life, as the saying 
goes.” The semiotician would agree completely.
The making of art is likely unique to the human species. The capacity to 
draw and appreciate pictures, to make music, to dance, to put on stage perfor-
mances, to write poetry, is a truly extraordinary and enigmatic endowment of 
our species. Art not only gives pleasure and delight, but also affords a truly 
profound perspective on the human condition. The subfield of semiotics (and 
other disciplines) that deals with art is called aesthetics; the related subfield of 
art interpretation is called hermeneutics. The two are concerned with such 
phenomena as human responses to sounds, forms, and words and with the 
ways in which the emotions condition such responses.
It should be mentioned that there are apparently examples of art made by 
animals other than humans. Already in the 1950s, anthropologists were col-
lecting paintings made by non-human primates, which seemed to show a 
kind of intrinsic motivation to simply create abstractions on a surface. Many 
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of these paintings were exhibited in art galleries in the 1960s. These soon 
disappeared, given the problem of interpretation. What do they mean? Since 
these could be simply markings on a surface, rather than visual texts in the 
human sense, they are no longer seen as “art.” Elephants in captivity have been 
trained to paint, producing some rather remarkable works. Again, it is not 
clear what the paintings are about, nor what the elephants themselves are 
actually doing. Since the elephants draw the same painting over and over, 
conditioning effects (mentioned earlier) cannot be ruled out.
 What Is Art?
Art is so much a part of human life that it is impossible to define it adequately 
as separate from it. There is no culture that does not have its own repertoire of 
art forms. Art expresses the entire range of human feelings and spiritual beliefs. 
It is indisputable evidence of the workings of what Vico called the fantasia, 
the human capacity for knowing from within. No one knows exactly why, but 
everyone loves certain pieces of music, certain poems, some dance styles, and 
so on. Art works can be seen, heard, touched, experienced in different ways; 
art gives pleasure, excites the senses, and “moves” the spirit. Art survives 
because it is valued as precious, because it is perceived as transcending time, 
because it is seen as saying something about human nature. Art is something 
that everyone knows and recognizes, but which defies definition with words.
The word art is derived from the Latin ars (“skill”). Art is, at one level, skill 
at performing a set of specialized actions, such as, for example, those required 
to be a gardener or to play chess competently. We also refer to such skills as 
“gardening art” and “chess art.” Art provides the person or people who pro-
duce it and the community that observes it with an experience that is both 
emotional and intellectual. In classical and medieval times, poets and other 
writers who used linguistic skills expertly were usually ranked above dancers, 
musicians, painters, and sculptors, who used physical skills. From the 
Renaissance on, as all aspects of human creativity came to be valued, those 
skilled in the visual and performing arts gradually gained greater recognition 
and social prestige. Today, art in all its categories is considered an essential 
part of human achievement, and all types of artists are ranked among the 
most prominent citizens of the world. Traditionally, art has combined practi-
cal and aesthetic functions. In the eighteenth century, however, a more sophis-
ticated public began to distinguish between art that was purely aesthetic and 
art that was mainly practical. The fine arts (beaux arts in French)—literature, 
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music, dance, painting, sculpture, and architecture—came to be distinguished 
from the decorative or applied arts, such as pottery, metalwork, furniture, 
 tapestry, and enamel, which were later “demoted,” so to speak, to the rank of 
crafts. Since the mid-twentieth century, however, greater appreciation of crafts 
and folk traditions has tended to blur this distinction. Both categories are 
valued as art once again.
Because many prehistoric paintings seemingly symbolizing rites or mean-
ingful events of some type have been discovered, it is probable that art origi-
nated in ritual. The notion of artists as individualists and eccentric creators 
crystallized in the Renaissance. Since then, artists of all kinds created art for 
its own sake—to be put in galleries, to be performed in public settings, to be 
read by common folk, and so on. In ancient cultures, art was part of ritual, of 
magic ceremonies, and thus a form of creative behavior meant to please the 
gods. It was made and performed by various members of the community, 
rather than by professionals alone. Art was anonymous because it belonged to 
everyone. In aboriginal cultures of North America, art continues to be per-
ceived as one aspect of community rituals that are designed to ensure a good 
harvest or to celebrate a significant life event such as a birth.
Even in the Internet age, art continues to reverberate with ritualistic con-
notations. At a performance of a piece of classical music, there is ritualistic 
silence and stillness in the audience. At a rock concert, on the other hand, 
there is ritualistic shouting and movement. Hanging a painting in an art gal-
lery invites an individualistic interpretation; drawing something on a city 
wall, on the other hand, invites social participation (graffiti, commentary, 
annotations, and so on). In the first cities, art was meant to decorate the pub-
lic square, to give communal life a sense of purpose through sculpture, to 
commemorate some meaningful event with wall carvings of various kinds, 
and to invite opinions through wall painting. Anonymous, participatory art is 
much more ancient than the “private” or “authored” art that has become the 
standard since the Renaissance. In a public space, art is open to “contribu-
tions” from observers. In a gallery setting, on the other hand, interpretation 
focuses on the intentions of the individual artist; and any “contribution” to 
the painting by an observer would constitute defacement.
Archeologists trace the origin of visual art to the Old Stone Age 
(20,000–15,000 BCE). The well-known figure of a bison painted on the rock 
wall of a cave in Altamira, Spain, is one of the first examples of art-making in 
human history. What it means remains a mystery, but the features that make 
it art are easily noticeable. It is not just a reproduction of a bison, but of a 
bison in motion, seemingly scared, perhaps running away from something or 
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someone. It is, in a word, a reflective representation, an interpretation of an 
event that attempts to provide a particular perspective of its broader meaning 
to human life.
As American philosopher Susanne Langer insightfully pointed out, art is 
powerful because it works on our perceptions and our feelings. It is a “feeling 
form” of representation. We experience a work of art not as an isolated event, 
but in its entirety as a unitary emotive form, and thus as interconnected with 
personal life events.1 Trying to understand what it means forces us, however, 
to analyze why the art work so moved us. However, no matter how many 
times we try to explain the experience, it somehow remains beyond analysis. 
One can analyze the opening movement of Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata as a 
series of harmonic progressions and melodic figures based on the key of C# 
minor. However, the elements of melody and harmony come into focus as 
components of the work only during an analysis of the sonata’s structure. 
When one hears it played as an artistic performance, on the other hand, one 
hardly focuses on these constituent elements. One will experience the music 
holistically. This is what makes it emotionally moving. In effect, no theory of 
art is really possible. Langer remarked, further, that because of its emotive 
qualities, great art transforms human beings and cultures permanently. It is 
truly a “mirror of the soul.” The course of human history was changed perma-
nently after Michelangelo sculpted his David, Shakespeare wrote his King 
Lear, Mozart composed his Requiem, Beethoven composed his Ninth 
Symphony, and so on and so forth. The spiritual meanings and the aesthetic 
effects in such great art works are constantly being experienced across time, 
across cultures. Such works seem to have been constructed with the universal 
spiritual blueprint of humankind.
The word aesthetic requires some commentary. It means, literally, “perceiv-
ing with all the senses.” More generally, it refers to a sense of beauty or a feeling 
of meaningfulness. The first aesthetic theory of any scope was that of Plato, who 
believed that reality consists of ideal forms, beyond human sensation, and that 
works of art are imitations of those forms. He claimed that forms already 
existed in the world and that it was the role of the artist to flesh them out. For 
example, the human form is already present in a slab of marble. However, it 
can only be seen by the eyes of sculptors, who literally draw it out with their 
hands. If the form resonates with viewers, then the artist has extracted from 
matter an ideal form (or a form that is felt to be meaningful). However, fearing 
the power of art to move people, Plato wanted to banish some types of artists 
from his ideal republic because he thought their work encouraged immorality, 
caused laziness, or incited people to immoderate actions. Aristotle also spoke 
of art as form, but not in the Platonic sense. For Aristotle, the role of art was to 
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complete what nature did not finish by  imitating it. The artist separates the 
form from the matter of objects, such as the human body or a plant, and then 
imposes that form on another material, such as canvas or marble. Thus, imita-
tion is not just copying an object; rather, it is a particular interpretation of an 
aspect of the object. Because Aristotle held that happiness was the aim of life, 
he believed that the major function of art was to provide satisfaction. In the 
Poetics, his great work on the principles of dramatic art, Aristotle argued that 
tragedy so stimulates the emotions of pity and fear, which he considered mor-
bid and unwholesome, that by the end of the play the spectator is purged of 
them. This catharsis, as he called it, makes the audience psychologically health-
ier and thus more capable of happiness.
The third-century philosopher Plotinus (205–70 CE), born in Egypt and 
trained in philosophy at Alexandria, also gave art great philosophical and psy-
chological importance. In his view, art revealed the true nature of an object 
more accurately than ordinary experience did, thus raising the human spirit 
from the experience of the mundane to a contemplation of universal truths. 
According to Plotinus, the most precious moments of life are those mystical 
instants when the soul is united, through art, with the divine.
Art in the Middle Ages was viewed as serving religious functions. Visual 
artists and playwrights were hired by the Church to create art texts designed 
to extol Christian themes. The choice to be an artist was a matter of social 
custom, not of some esoteric inclination at birth. Artists, like other people, 
customarily followed their fathers’ profession. It was during the Renaissance 
that it reacquired its more secular role. The Renaissance also saw little differ-
ence between the artist and the scientist. Indeed, many were both: Leonardo 
da Vinci (1452–1519), for example, was a painter, writer, and scientist. After 
the Enlightenment and Romantic movements, a division emerged, pitting 
artists against scientists. However, this is a misguided view, the semiotician 
would remark, because both are “seekers of meaning,” trying to represent the 
world and to convey their experience of the world to others in their own ways.
The view of the artist as an eccentric genius impelled by inner creative ener-
gies, free of the yoke of culture, is very much a product of Romanticism. 
Traditionally, artists were considered employees of society. Sumerian priests and 
Renaissance princes, for instance, provided sufficient wealth to professional art-
ists to enable them to work comfortably. Even the kind of art that artists created 
was dictated by social needs and conditions. The Romantic Movement, which 
lasted from about 1800 to 1870, changed all this dramatically. The Romantics 
praised subjectivity and the passions. The individual artist’s work was seen as 
intrinsic to their life. From this period we have  inherited our modern a ssumptions 
about the primacy of artistic freedom, originality, and self-expression.
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 Dadaism and Pop Art
But almost right after the Romantic movement, artists started to explore differ-
ent functions of art, moving it away from its spiritual quest to a more mundane, 
almost ironic, domain of representation. From this new Zeitgeist Dadaism sur-
faced. This was an art and literary movement, starting around 1916 and fading 
by the early 1930s. The artists rejected traditional forms of art by creating non-
sensical images. The term dada is itself indicative of the movement—it is a 
French baby-talk word for “hobbyhorse,” chosen arbitrarily by writer Tristan 
Tzara (1896–1963). In discarding all accepted values in traditional art-making, 
Dadaists produced works that were deliberately provocative and outrageous. 
Their approach is sometimes paralleled to various aspects of pop culture, which 
often produces forms that provoke or befuddle. The mammoth sculpture by the 
Dadaist artist Marcel Duchamp, The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even 
(1923)—a work that defies any simple or singular interpretation—is sometimes 
pegged as the first example of a Dadaist painting. Duchamp was the originator 
of conceptual art and “ready-made,” mass-produced objects selected at random 
and displayed as works of art. Defying any standardized aesthetic interpretation, 
perhaps this painting, and Dadaist art generally, was a way to mirror the inanity 
of the modern world in the form of the art text itself. The mosaic-pastiche tech-
nique brings out the heterogeneous and disconnected cultural structure of mod-
ern urban societies and their commodity-based worldview, wherein everything 
from actual goods to art and ideas are conceived and distributed as if they were 
commodities. The Dadaist imprint in aesthetic thinking can be seen conspicu-
ously everywhere today in cultural representations.
More significantly, it led seamlessly to the pop art movement, which actu-
ally used commercial objects and pop culture texts (such as comic books) as 
its subject matter. The movement emerged shortly after World War II. It was 
inspired not only by Dadaism, but also by the mass production and consump-
tion of objects. For pop artists, the factory, supermarket, and garbage can 
became their art school. It was an artistic reaction to consumerism. So, despite 
its apparent absurdity, modern people have always loved pop art, no matter 
how controversial or crass it appeared to be, because it emerged from a com-
mercial environment to which people can relate directly. In a certain sense, 
the pop art movement bestowed on common people the assurance that art 
was for mass consumption, not just for an élite class of cognoscenti. Some 
artists duplicated beer bottles, soup cans, comic strips, road signs, and similar 
objects in paintings, collages, and sculptures; others simply incorporated the 
objects themselves into their works. Using images and sounds that reflected 
the materialism and vulgarity of modern consumerist culture, the first pop 
artists sought to provide a view of reality that was more immediate and 
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 relevant than that of past art. It rendered it obsolete as an artistic sign s ystem 
that related to the modern world.
Pop art reached the zenith of its popularity from the 1940s to the 1960s, 
when painters like Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns strove to close the 
gap between traditional art and mass consumerist culture. Rauschenberg con-
structed collages from household objects such as quilts and pillows, Johns 
from American flags and bull’s-eye targets. The first full-fledged pop art work 
was Just What Is It That Makes Today’s Home So Different, So Appealing? (1956) 
by the British artist Richard Hamilton. In this satiric collage of two ludicrous 
figures in a modern-day and cluttered living room of useless objects, the pop 
art hallmarks of crudeness and irony are emphasized.
Pop art developed rapidly during the 1960s, as painters started to focus 
their attention on brand-name commercial products, producing garish sculp-
tures of hamburgers and other fast-food items, blown-up frames of comic 
strips, or theatrical events staged as art objects. Pop artists also appropriated 
the techniques of mass production. Rauschenberg and Johns had already 
abandoned individual, titled paintings in favor of large series of works, all 
depicting the same objects. In the early 1960s, the American Andy Warhol 
carried the idea a step further by adopting the mass-production technique of 
silk-screening, turning out hundreds of identical prints of Coca-Cola bottles, 
Campbell’s soup cans, and other familiar subjects, including identical three- 
dimensional Brillo boxes. It is unclear if there are any true pop artists painting 
or sculpting today. Pastiche and collage are elements that anyone can execute 
with computers, through appropriate software. Indeed, if there is any move-
ment that is a possible descendant of the pop art one, it is likely to be com-
puter art, based on the utilization of digital technologies. An artist may 
combine traditional painting techniques with digital (algorithmic) ones. This 
has also led to robot-produced art, whereby a robot is programmed to pro-
duce paintings that are indistinguishable from artist-created paintings.
The question a semiotician would ask the robot is: What does it mean? Now, 
a programmer may anticipate this question and program it into the robot. But 
without that human-made program, the robot would have no way to answer 
this fundamental semiotic question. Indeed, answering  unprogrammed ques-
tions is the basis of the art of semiotic interpretation. This is unique to humans.
 The Performing Arts
Performance is, literally, the  enactment of an artistic form (from Latin per 
“through” and forma “form”) before an audience. Performances are given spa-
tial prominence, through a raised stage or a platform, or else on a screen where 
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the same enactment can be seen; they generally involve using props and para-
phernalia such as costumes, masks, and artifacts of various kinds; they occur 
within a socially defined situation (they are scheduled, set up and prepared in 
advance, or else made available permanently today on YouTube or through 
streaming); they have a beginning and an end; they unfold through a struc-
tured sequence of parts (for example, acts in a play); and they are coordinated 
for public involvement.
From the very beginning of time, performances have been mounted to 
serve ritualistic and other social functions: to get people to reflect upon the 
values and goals of the culture, to critique them, to convey the “will of the 
gods,” and so on. The type of performance called theater extends right back to 
the origins of culture. Theatrical performances reenact some event in human 
life, involving actors and a spatial location, such as a raised stage, around 
which an audience can view and hear the performance. The term theater 
describes both the performance itself and the place where it takes place, 
because the stage setting is intrinsically intertwined with the dramatic text. 
The performance involves both words and actions, but it can also be based 
purely on bodily movement. The latter is referred to more precisely as panto-
mime, or the art of dramatic representation by means of facial expressions and 
body movements rather than words. Pantomime has always played a basic 
part in theater generally. In the open-air theaters of ancient Greece and Rome, 
where the audience could see more easily than it could hear, it was a critical 
element of acting. Ancient actors used stylized movements and masks to por-
tray a character to the accompaniment of music and the singing of a chorus.
The most common form of theater is the drama, which comes from the 
Greek word dran meaning “to do.” The first notable dramas—those of 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides in ancient Greece, for example—tell as 
much, if not more, about the meaning of life than do the writings of philoso-
phers. Most theories on the origin of drama point to ancient religious rites 
and practices. The first evidence that drama became autonomous performance 
art was in ancient Greece in the sixth century BCE. The plays of the Greek 
dramatists were drawn from myth and legend, though their focus was not a 
simple reenactment of mythic stories but a portrayal of the tragedy or comedy 
of human actions. The oldest extant comedies are by the Greek satirist 
Aristophanes, who ridiculed public figures and the gods equally. A few centu-
ries later, the emerging Christian Church attacked ancient genres as profane. 
With the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 CE, classical theater forms were 
banished, replacing them subsequently with the liturgical drama, which was 
based on Bible stories, evolving, by the fifteenth century, into the morality 
plays performed by professional actors.
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The roots of the modern drama can be traced to the Renaissance when the 
Florentine statesman and writer Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) wrote and 
staged The Mandrake, which revived the farcical comedy genre. At around the 
same time (and probably earlier), there emerged in northern Italy a form of 
theater, called the Commedia dell’arte, which emphasized improvisation. 
Troupes of Commedia actors relied on stock characters, masks, broad physical 
gestures, and clowning to entertain large, diverse crowds. The characters were 
instantly recognizable—lecherous, cunning Arlecchino (Harlequin) wore a 
black, snub-nosed mask; gullible Pantalone disguised his old age by wearing 
tight-fitting Turkish clothes, hoping to attract young women; the pot-bellied 
rascal Pulcinella (Punch) concocted outrageous schemes to satisfy his desires; 
and so on. Although some governments attempted to censor and regulate this 
vulgar form of theater, the characters of the Commedia were so popular they 
eventually were incorporated into conventional theater.
To use a cliché, drama is psychologically powerful. For example, take Samuel 
Beckett’s (1906–89) late 1940s play, Waiting for Godot, a dramatic “countertext” 
to the morality plays, which portrayed life as a spiritual journey, and the world 
as a place created by God for humans to earn their way back to the paradise lost 
by Adam and Eve. Those plays depicted human actions as centered on God’s 
plan and desires, guaranteeing that death is not extinction.
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot is a disturbing parody of this inherent narrative. 
In Beckett’s world there is only a void. Human beings fulfill no particular 
purpose in being alive. Life is a meaningless collage of actions, leading to 
death and a return to nothingness. The play revolves around two tramps 
stranded in an empty landscape, passing the time with banalities reminiscent 
of slapstick comedians or circus clowns. The tramps, Vladimir and Estragon, 
seem doomed to repeat their senseless actions and words forever. They call 
each other names, they ponder whether or not to commit suicide, they remi-
nisce about their senseless past, they threaten to leave each other but cannot, 
they perform silly exercises, and they are constantly waiting for a mysterious 
character named Godot, who never comes. A strange couple, Lucky and 
Pozzo, appears, disappears, reappears, and finally vanishes. Pozzo whips Lucky, 
as if he were a cart horse. Lucky kicks Estragon. The two tramps tackle Lucky 
to the ground to stop him from shrieking out a deranged parody of a philoso-
phy lecture. Vladimir and Estragon talk endlessly about nothing in particular, 
and keep on waiting, pointlessly, for Godot. Allusions in their dialogue to the 
Bible are sardonic and acrimonious. There is a bare tree on stage ironically 
suggestive of the biblical tree of life. The tramps engage in trivial theological 
discourse. On and on it goes like this throughout the play, which ends with 
no resolution. The theme is transparent. Life is meaningless; a veritable circus 
farce. The God we are supposed to meet will not come.
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Beckett’s bleak portrait spurs us on, paradoxically, to search for the very 
meaning it seems to deny. Beckett’s text impels us to think “Please, let there 
be a God!” We may be condemned to waiting for Godot, and the rational part 
of our mind might tell us that existence is absurd, but at a more profound 
spiritual level we seem to sense that there is meaning to life. This is how drama 
works. The ancient tragedies portrayed life as a mythic struggle between 
humans and the gods. Medieval morality plays put on display actions and 
themes that informed the populace how to live according to a divine plan. 
Playwrights like Beckett capture the modern angst, the fear of nothingness, all 
the while stimulating in us a more desperate search for meaning.
Waiting for Godot questions traditional assumptions about certainty and 
truth. It satirizes language, portraying it as a collection of words that refer only 
to other words. It also deconstructs classic theater, which drew its stories and 
characters from myth or ancient history. The objective of the ancient dramas 
was to consider humanity’s place in the world and the consequences of indi-
vidual actions. The classical actors wore costumes of everyday dress and large 
masks. Movement and gesture were stately and formal. The plots emphasized 
supernatural elements, portraying how humans and the gods struggled, inter-
acted, and ultimately derived meaning from each other. Waiting for Godot is a 
deconstruction of this kind of theater. The ancient dramas portrayed a world 
full of metaphysical meanings; Godot portrays a world devoid of them.
 The Musical Arts
Music plays a role in all societies, existing in a large number of styles, each charac-
teristic of a geographical region or a historical era. Like any art, music is not easy 
to define, and yet most people recognize what it is and generally agree on whether 
or not a given combination of sounds is musical. The great works of musical art of 
all cultures transcend time and are performed again and again, inducing listeners 
to extract meaning about themselves and the world they inhabit. In a fundamen-
tal sense, music is an international language, since its structures are not based on 
word meanings and combinations, but on melody, rhythm, and harmony, which 
seem to evoke the same pattern of feelings universally.
Three basic forms of music are now commonly distinguished: classical music, 
composed and performed by trained professionals originally under the patron-
age of aristocratic courts and religious establishments; folk music, shared by the 
population at large and transmitted informally; popular music, performed by 
professionals and disseminated through radio, television, YouTube, social 
media, and the like, and consumed by a mass public. Although most of our 
musical performances are text-based (composed by someone in advance), some 
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involve improvisation. The latter usually proceed on the basis of some previ-
ously determined structure, such as a tone or a group of chords, as in jazz. In 
other cultures, however, improvisation schemes can be devised within a set of 
traditional rules, as in the ragas of India or the maqams of the Middle East.
An interesting amalgam of music and theater is opera, which traces its ori-
gins to the chorus of Greek tragedy whose function was to provide commen-
tary on the drama being performed. A similar genre exists throughout the 
world. The puppet drama, wayang, of Indonesia is a musical-dramatic reen-
actment of Hindu myth. Acting, singing, and instrumental music are mingled 
with dance and acrobatics in many varieties of Chinese musical theater. In 
Japan, the theatrical genres of No and kabuki represent a union of drama, 
music, and dance. In Europe and Britain, the few secular medieval plays to 
survive, such as Le jeu de Robin et Marion (The Play of Robin and Marion, 
1283), alternate spoken dialogue and songs. During the Renaissance, aristo-
cratic courts staged performances that mixed pageantry, recitation, and dance 
with instrumental, choral, and solo vocal music. Out of these, opera became 
a staple in Florence near the end of the sixteenth century. A group of musi-
cians and scholars who called themselves Camerata (Italian for “salon”) decided 
to revive the musical style used in ancient Greek drama and to develop an 
alternative to the highly contrapuntal music (the technique of combining two 
or more melody lines in a harmonic pattern) of the late Renaissance. 
Specifically, they wanted composers to pay close attention to the texts on 
which their music was based, to set these texts in a simple manner, and to 
make the music reflect, phrase by phrase, the meaning of the text.
The first composer of genius to apply himself to opera was the Italian 
Claudio Monteverdi (1567–1643). He molded songs, duets, choruses, and 
instrumental sections into a coherent operatic text based on purely musical 
relationships. Monteverdi thus demonstrated that a wide variety of musical 
forms and styles could be used to enhance the drama. Opera spread quickly 
throughout Italy. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it had become 
popular in most parts of Europe. What is particularly interesting is that tradi-
tional opera—that of Mozart, Rossini, Verdi, Puccini—has perhaps never 
achieved more favor with the general public than it has today. This is because 
technology has exposed new audiences to it, especially through the prolifera-
tion of recordings and through Internet sites. Today, opera as a popular spec-
tacle has become a thriving enterprise.
The power of music to transform people was brought out brilliantly by the 
1984 movie Amadeus directed by Milos Forman (1932–2018). The movie is 
based on the 1979 play by British playwright Peter Shaffer (1926–2016) about 
the purported eighteenth-century rivalry between Austrian composer Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart and Italian composer Antonio Salieri. The play plumbs the 
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meaning of musical art and genius in the life of human beings. It captures these 
themes by juxtaposing the sublime music of Mozart against the backdrop of 
dramatized events in his life and the truly splendid commentaries of Salieri, 
who guides the audience through the musical repertoire with remarkable 
insight and perspicacity. Forman’s close-ups, angle shots, tracking shots, and 
zooming actions allow us to literally probe Mozart’s moods (his passions, his 
tragedies, his successes, his disappointments) on his face as he conducts or 
plays his music, as well as those of his commentator Salieri (his envy, his deep 
understanding of Mozart’s art) as he speaks through his confessor to us. 
Amadeus thus blends music, biography, and aesthetic commentary through 
camera artistry to create a truly effective mise-en-scène that is narrative, drama, 
musical performance, and historical documentary at once. The movie conveys 
the power of music to transform human evolution. A world without the music 
of Mozart can be envisioned, but it would be a greatly impoverished one.
Whatever the style, and whatever its function, music has great significance 
to people because it speaks to them emotionally. The ancient philosophers of 
Classical Greece believed that it originated with the gods Apollo and Orpheus, 
and that it reflected in its melodic and harmonic structure the mathematical 
laws that ruled the universe. They also believed that music influences human 
thoughts and actions. The question of what constitutes musical art is not an 
easy one to answer, because music appeals to our feelings more than it does to 
our intellect. However, one thing is for certain—only those works that are 
genuinely meaningful to one and all will remain. Beethoven’s Missa Solemnis 
and his last four string quartets, to mention but two examples, will remain 
because they convey a profound inner quest for meaning to life.
Some musical styles are connected with nations and historical epochs. This is 
true of much of classical music and it is true of jazz—the only genuinely novel 
American musical art form, or more accurately, African-American art form. 
African-American culture actually produced the first genres of popular American 
music, including jazz, blues, and gospel, at the turn of the twentieth century. From 
these other musical styles, dance trends, and overall lifestyles developed. This in 
itself should constitute a powerful unconscious antidote to racism, that African 
Americans have unfortunately always experienced and continue to experience.
Jazz emerged as a distinct musical form in the 1920s. The specific origins of 
jazz are not known. It was an amalgam of several styles in New Orleans at the 
start of the 1900s, including West African music, folk music, and light classical 
music popular in the late nineteenth century. Most early jazz was played by 
small marching bands or by solo pianists. In 1917, a group of New Orleans 
musicians called The Original Dixieland Jass (Jazz) Band recorded a jazz phono-
graph record, creating a sensation. The term “Dixieland jazz” was immediately 
attached to it. In 1922 the New Orleans Rhythm Kings, and in 1923 the Creole 
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Jazz Band, led by cornetist King Oliver, became popular throughout the United 
States. The term “cool jazz” surfaced 1948, when tenor saxophonist Stan Getz 
recorded a slow, romantic solo of Ralph Burns’ composition Early Autumn with 
the Woody Herman band. This style was adopted by a group of young musi-
cians that included Miles Davis, Lee Konitz, Gerry Mulligan, and arranger Gil 
Evans. Their recordings emphasized a lagging beat, soft instrumental sounds, 
and unusual orchestrations that included the French horn and the tuba. The 
recordings, with Davis as leader, were later released as Birth of the Cool.
The role of jazz in the evolution of American music and even society cannot 
be overemphasized. This was a major theme of the movie Chicago (2002), which 
starts off with the signature tune “All That Jazz.” Once strictly background 
music in the brothels of Kansas City and New Orleans, jazz started to spread 
and flourish as a mass musical art because people related to it and loved it. It was 
fun and it bespoke of a new freer lifestyle, in contrast to the stodgy one of the 
previous Victorian era. By the end of the 1920s, spurred by the cheapness and 
availability of mass-produced records and the emergence of the radio as a pro-
moter of popular music, jazz and its derivatives came to define early pop culture. 
To this day, recordings of jazz music sell in the millions, with updated versions 
played and sung by a new cadre of “retrospective” jazz artists.
 The Visual Arts
Visual art predates civilization. As discussed several times, art works of remark-
able expressiveness have been discovered by archeologists deep within caves of 
southern Europe that go back to the Paleolithic period, roughly between 
40,000 and 10,000 BCE. The invention of sharpened flint blades by Paleolithic 
humans also led to the first sculptures—small carved or incised pieces of 
wood, ivory, and bone. These symbolized a dependence on hunting and a 
worship of fertility.
Every culture has developed its own particular way of representing the 
world through visual forms. The aesthetic pleasure these give seems, by itself, 
to be a motivation for their creation. Paintings and sculptures betray an innate 
fascination in our species with what the eye sees and attempts to understand. 
In Italy and other parts of Renaissance Europe, painting became a s ophisticated 
visual art form with the development of the principles of linear perspective by 
various Italian architects and painters early in the fifteenth century. This 
enabled painters to achieve, in two-dimensional representations, the illusion 
of three-dimensional space. Renaissance artists also introduced innovations in 
how to represent human anatomy and new drawing media and methods, such 
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as oil painting and fresco (painting on fresh, moist plaster with pigments dis-
solved in water) techniques. Masters of the High Renaissance, such as 
Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, Michelangelo, and Titian developed these tech-
niques to perfection. Paradoxically, Leonardo left only a handful of paintings, 
so occupied was he with the scientific observation of natural phenomena and 
with technological inventions. Raphael perfected earlier Renaissance tech-
niques involving color and composition, creating ideal types in his representa-
tions of the Virgin and Child and in his penetrating portrait studies of 
contemporaries. The Vatican’s Sistine Chapel, with its ceiling frescoes of the 
Creation, the Fall, and the vast wall fresco of The Last Judgment attest to 
Michelangelo’s genius as a painter. Titian’s portraits include representations of 
Christian and mythological subjects, and his numerous renderings of the 
female nude are among the most celebrated of the genre.
Since the late nineteenth century, meaning-bearing visual communication 
has found a new medium—photography. Through the photographic image we 
can relive the moment or recall someone as they were at that point in time. 
The photographs that adorn tables and walls in homes, offices, and other 
buildings are visual testimonials of who we are, giving a visual form to human 
memory. This is one off the subtexts in the 2001 film Memento, written and 
directed by Christopher Nolan and based on a short story written by his 
brother Jonathan Nolan (Memento Mori). The main character, Leonard, is 
forced to live entirely in the present, unable to create new memories after a 
head injury. The movie revolves around his attempts to get revenge for the 
rape and killing of his wife. Leonard writes notes on his body, takes Polaroid 
photos, and keeps pieces of paper so that he can remember what he has dis-
covered—hence the name Memento to indicate that his memory is a series of 
external mementos, which he is unable to connect to any life story and there-
fore to any sense of reality. The time sequence of the narrative is presented in 
reverse manner, so that the audience is denied the key clues of which the 
protagonist is also deprived, due to his amnesia. The viewer is thus projected 
directly into the horror of having lost one’s memory. Fragmentation and dis-
location lead to doubt about the reality of consciousness and existence.
We get the idea that Leonard’s wife was killed at the very start. Leonard was 
hit on the head in the act, and is left without short-term memory. He carries 
a picture of a man he suspects of the murder. The death of this man, and the 
inference that he killed him, ends the tale. Leonard goes on to write a letter, 
in the style of previous mementos, perhaps to himself, knowing that he would 
otherwise forget that he was the one who wrote them.
The movie is replete with symbols of time—alarm clocks ringing, a wrist-
watch, notepads, and so on. The movie, however, destroys the sense of time 
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created by such artifacts by showing the plot in both forward and reverse time, 
distinguishing the two sequences by black-and-white and color cinematogra-
phy. Color sequences show what actually happened; black-and-white ones 
what Leonard believes happened. The first color scene, in which Leonard 
shoots and kills the suspected man Teddy is, in actual fact, the last scene of the 
narrative. In it we see a Polaroid undevelop, a bullet fly back into the barrel of 
a gun, and Teddy come back to life after the sound of a shot is heard. This is 
followed immediately by a black-and-white scene of Leonard in a motel room 
talking to an anonymous person on the phone explaining his circumstances.
To make the movie even more horrifying, Nolan intersplices the parallel story 
of a man named Sam Jenkins. As an insurance investigator, Leonard came across 
a medical claim from Jenkins, who eerily had the same memory problem that 
he has now. Leonard investigated the case and had the insurance company deny 
giving Jenkins the money he sought, believing that Jenkins was faking his con-
dition. Sam’s wife also wasn’t sure if her husband was putting on a charade. So, 
she devises a memory test, based on the fact that she suffered from diabetes and 
it was Sam’s job to administer shots of insulin to her. If she repeatedly had to ask 
for the shots, she would be able to prove that his condition was real. Sam admin-
istered the shots, forgetting however that he had just given her one. Eventually, 
she slipped into a coma from the overdoses and died, leaving Sam a patient in a 
mental institution. The Sam Jenkins subplot clearly creates a sense that Leonard 
may, himself, be a patient in the same mental institution, and that he also killed 
his wife. Ultimately, the movie raises ancient philosophical questions in a new 
way: What is truth? Is memory the essence of selfhood?
Movies such as Memento and Amadeus bring out the power of cinematic 
art. Cinema is perhaps the most influential visual art form of the contempo-
rary world. Today, movie actors and directors are better known, and certainly 
more popular, than writers and playwrights. Names such as Fellini, Spielberg, 
Polanski, Hitchcock, DeMille, Cocteau, to name but a few, are part of mod-
ern cultural lore. Cinema actors enjoy more fame and recognition than do 
scientists and philosophers.
Cinema historians trace the origins of this art form to French magician 
Georges Méliès. In 1899, in a studio on the outskirts of Paris, Méliès recon-
structed a ten-part version of the trial of French army officer Alfred Dreyfus 
and filmed Cinderella (1899/1900) in twenty scenes. He is chiefly remem-
bered, however, for his clever fantasies, such as A Trip to the Moon (1902), in 
which he exploited the movie camera’s capacities to capture the emotional 
subtleties of human expression through close-up and angle camera techniques. 
His short films were an instant hit with the public and were shown 
i nternationally. Although considered little more than curiosities today, they 
are significant precursors of an art form that was in its infancy at the time.
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American inventor Edwin S.  Porter produced the first major American 
silent film, The Great Train Robbery, in 1903. Only a little more than eight 
minutes long, it was to become a great influence in the development of motion 
pictures because of its intercutting of scenes shot at different times and in dif-
ferent places to form a unified narrative, culminating in a suspenseful chase. 
Most films of the era were short comedies, adventure stories, or filmed perfor-
mances by leading vaudevillian actors of the day.
Throughout the first century of its existence, cinema was experienced as a 
communal event, inside a movie theater, complete with intermissions, food 
fare, and other accoutrements of the traditional theater. On every corner of 
urban America one was bound to find a movie theater. It was often the center 
of attraction of the town. However, all that changed in the late 1980s with the 
advent of VCR technology, which threatened to make the movie-watching 
experience a more individualistic one and, thus, lead to the elimination of the 
movie theater. The new technology, combined with the advent of cable televi-
sion, which featured relatively current films on special channels, seemed in 
fact to seriously threaten the survival of movie theaters and created a climate 
similar to that of the early 1950s, when television also began to challenge the 
popularity of motion pictures. As a result, film companies increasingly favored 
large spectacles with fantastic special effects in order to lure the public away 
from home videos and back to the big screen. However, despite the challenge 
from video, and even new sites and platforms today like Netflix and HBO, 
the traditional movie theater has remained popular—a testament to the power 
of cinema as a “social art form.” Although one can now see movies on YouTube 
or stream them in some way, thus making it possible to enjoy movies indi-
vidualistically, the movie theater is still around.
In effect, today, the threat to the traditional movie theater is coming from 
the same sources that are threatening traditional paper book culture—cyber-
space and new electronic devices. It remains to be seen, however, if the social 
function of movie theaters will be transferred to other locales (whether indeed 
they will be replaced). As it has turned out, so far, the advent of videos, movie 
channels, Netflix, and other new devices for receiving movies has actually 
fostered a much wider audience for movies. All kinds of films, past and pres-
ent, are now available in different media and formats. With television cable 
networks and Internet platforms as additional sources of revenue, and func-
tioning in some cases as producers themselves, a substantial increase in feature- 
film production has ensued.
However, movie theaters have shown themselves to be resilient by becom-
ing more and more part of the overall experience. Indeed, to emphasize 
their entertainment function, today’s megaplexes feature not only movies 
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and the usual fast food fare, but also video game sections, restaurants, and 
other recreational accoutrements. The movie theater has become itself an 
amusement park.
 The Verbal Arts
As already discussed in Chap. 6, every culture has produced verbal accounts 
(tales, stories, and so on) to make sense of the world. The most ancient and 
universal verbal art is poetry—a form of expression that creates an aesthetic 
effect through the special sounds, rhythms, and imagery produced by its lan-
guage. These mark the difference between poetry and other kinds of verbal art.
Views on the nature and function of poetry in human societies have been 
varied. Plato asserted that poetry was divinely inspired, but that it was none-
theless a mere imitation of ideal forms in the world. Aristotle, on the other 
hand, argued that poetry was the most sublime of the creative arts, represent-
ing what is universal in human experience. The philosopher Vico saw poetry 
as the primordial form of language. He characterized the first speakers as 
poets. The texts found by archeologists at ancient Sumerian, Babylonian, 
Hittite, Egyptian, and Hebrew sites suggest that poetry originated alongside 
music, song, and drama as a communal form of expression to seek favor from, 
or give praise to, the divinities. This ritualistic aspect of poetry is still func-
tional in many societies. In the Navajo culture, for instance, poetic forms are 
used as incantations for rain. We use poetic form on greeting cards and on 
special kinds of invitations; we use poetry to impart knowledge of language to 
children (just think of the widespread use of nursery rhymes and children’s 
poetry books in our society).
Alongside poetry, the world’s cultures have also developed prose forms of 
verbal art. The novel, for instance, has become a major genre of literature. The 
word novella, from Latin novellus, “new,” was first used by the great Italian 
writer Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–75) to refer to the anecdotal tales that he 
spun in his Decameron of 1353. This collection of 100 stories is set within a 
framework of ten friends telling stories to one another. To escape an outbreak 
of the plague, the friends have taken refuge in a country villa outside Florence, 
where they entertain one another over a period of ten days with a series of sto-
ries told by each one in turn. As mentioned, Boccaccio called the stories, more 
specifically, novella, “new things.” The novel is an outgrowth of the novella.
Many of the tales that are part of our own literary traditions originated in 
Egypt. Narrations also enjoyed considerable popularity among the Greeks. 
The chief examples of “proto-novels” written in Latin are the Golden Ass 
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(s econd century CE) by Lucius Apuleius and the Satyricon (first century CE), 
which is generally considered the work of Petronius Arbiter. It must not be 
overlooked that in Japan, the Baroness Murasaki Shikibu (c. 978–1031) wrote 
what many literary scholars now regard as the first real novel, The Tale of 
Genji, in the eleventh century (translated 1935).
The long narrative verse tale, the equally voluminous prose romance, and the 
Old French fabliau flourished in Europe during the Middle Ages, contributing 
directly to the later development of the novel. Advances in realism were made 
in Spain during the sixteenth century with the so-called picaresque or rogue 
story, in which the protagonist is a merry vagabond who goes through a series 
of realistic and exciting adventures. Between 1605 and 1612, the Spanish writer 
Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616) wrote what is considered the first great novel 
of pre-modernity, Don Quixote de la Mancha. As the novel genre became increas-
ingly popular during the eighteenth century, writers used it to examine society 
and the human condition with psychological depth and breadth. They wrote 
revealingly about people living within, or escaping from, the pressures of society, 
and criticizing society for failing to satisfy human aspirations.
From the nineteenth century onwards, novels have become widely read texts, 
ranging from trashy bestsellers to works of great import and substance. In the 
latter category, one thinks, for example, of the novels  and short stories of 
Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Dickens, Hesse, Mann, Woolf, the Brontë sisters, Poe, 
Hemingway, Camus, Sartre, Kafka, Twain, and Joyce. Such writers used the 
novel and novella genre as a narrative framework for probing the human psyche.
To conclude the discussion of art, it is remarkable indeed that even in seem-
ingly commonplace situations, such as a courtship displays, human beings are 
constantly attempting to transcend their biological state to reach for some-
thing elusive, beyond the physical. Cheryl’s pride in her artistic abilities 
reminds us that there is more to life than flesh and blood. For humans, art is 
indeed indistinguishable from life. Art is a guarantee that our weary search for 
meaning is itself meaningful. Life would be inconceivable without art.
Note
1. Susanne K. Langer, Problems of art (New York: Scribner’s, 1957).
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There’s More to Perfume than Smell: 
Advertising, Pop Culture, and Meme Culture
Advertising is the greatest art form of the twentieth century.
—Marshall McLuhan (1911–80)
There is one final scene on Martha’s video that is worth discussing before sum-
ming up. Near the end of the evening, Cheryl turns inquisitively to Ted and 
says: “The cologne you’re wearing, Ted, smells very nice. What is it?” “Yes,” 
replies Ted. “It’s called Drakkar Noir. Do you like it? I decided to try it on 
because of an ad I saw a while back on a YouTube retrospective of historical 
ads.” “Oh, can you describe the ad to me?” retorts Cheryl. Ted’s description of 
the ad follows. “Well, actually, I remember the bottle was a ghastly, frightful, 
black color. It was placed right in the center of the ad against a dark back-
ground that was shattered by a beam of white light which just missed the 
bottle but illuminated the platform on which it stood. That had a bizarre 
effect on me. I felt as if I were in awe of the bottle!”
The semiotician would find Ted’s description of the ad text intriguing. With 
the themes of advertising, pop culture, and meme culture we have come full 
circle, back to the human fascination with apparently trivial, but still meaning-
ful, objects such as cigarettes, high heels, and cologne bottles. Ted’s reaction to 
the ad indicates that advertising images are effective. These are designed to 
 produce a need to buy—a compulsion that Roland Barthes called “neomania.”1 
The smartly constructed ads harbor a constant subtext: Buy this or that and you 
will not be bored; you will be happy; you will be famous; you will be liked.
The sad truth is that happiness cannot be bought, as an old proverb warns 
us. We are living in a world that often puts more of a premium on satisfying 
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desires than it does on gaining wisdom. Advertisers rely on a handful of 
themes—happiness, youth, success, status, luxury, fashion, and beauty—to 
promote their products, promising solutions to human problems in the form 
of cologne, deodorant, beer, cars, mobile phones, and the like.
Let’s start the discussion in this chapter by interpreting Ted’s Drakkar Noir 
ad. Darkness connotes fear, evil, mystery. This is why villains in classic adven-
ture stories are often dressed in black, and why forbidden or mysterious hap-
penings occur in the dark at night. The dark bottle and the dark background 
of the ad tap into these connotations. The bottle’s placement in the middle of 
the scene, as if it is on an altar, is suggestive of veneration, idolatry, of a dark 
ritual being performed secretively. This is reinforced by the sepulchral name 
of the cologne. Its guttural sound—obviously reminiscent of Dracula, the 
deadly vampire who mesmerized his sexual prey with a mere glance—arouses 
unconscious fear and desire at once. To complete the picture, the piercing 
beam of light (the paradigmatic opposite of dark) that just missed the bottle, 
illuminating the platform on which it stood, makes the bottle stand out as the 
“center of attention.” Since colognes and perfumes are worn to enhance one’s 
attractiveness and to entice a prospective mate, the ad elicits a web of sexual 
connotations: darkness = night = sexuality = forbidden pleasures = fear = desire 
= mystery = vampirism. This lacework of meanings is built into the visual sig-
nifiers of the ad. In a real sense, the ad is a small work of art, which has, how-
ever, the specific commercial purpose of enhancing sales.
The two main notions semioticians use to decipher such texts are those of 
subtext and intertext. The term subtext refers to any meaning, message, or 
interpretation that a given text evokes subconsciously and that is not immedi-
ately accessible to interpretation. The subtext in the Drakkar Noir ad is, as 
argued, darkness = night = sexuality = forbidden pleasures = fear = desire = mys-
tery = vampirism. The traces to this subtext are the visual signifiers discussed 
previously. Intertextuality refers to the parts of a text that are understandable 
in terms of other texts. The placement of the bottle in the center of the scene 
with a dark background broken by a beam of light recalls stories where light 
and dark are in tension, including origin myths in which light emerges from 
the dark. The most critical intertext here is, however, the Dracula myth, a 
vampire figure that has come to symbolize so many things to us, including 
forbidden pleasure and the search for immortality. This interweaving of allu-
sions and suggestions to other texts is what makes ads very powerful emotion-
ally. And it also opens up the number of possible interpretations. The one 
given here is only one interpretation; there are many others. Like art, it is 
impossible to pin down one and only one meaning to an ad text, which, 
clearly, is more than a simple announcement about a product.
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 Advertising
Why are such subtextual themes and images used by advertisers? What’s their 
relation to the product the ad promotes? Is the association itself between myth 
and product the trigger that gets people to buy the product? These are the 
questions that a semiotic approach to advertising attempts to answer.
The term advertising derives from the Medieval Latin verb advertere (“to 
direct one’s attention to”). It designates any type or form of public announce-
ment intended to direct attention to specific commodities or services. 
Advertising is, thus, a form of discourse, which is designed with rhetorical 
(persuasive) force. It exalts and inculcates consumption by playing on fears 
and archetypal desires—fear of poverty, sickness, loss of social standing, unat-
tractiveness, and so on. As Barthes claimed, in a society that relies on mass 
consumption for its economic survival, it is little wonder that the trivial has 
become art.2 One of the first known methods of advertising was the outdoor 
display, usually an eye-catching sign painted or attached on the wall of a 
building. Archaeologists have uncovered many such signs. A poster found in 
Thebes in 1000 BCE is thought to be one of the world’s first “ads.” In large 
letters it offered a gold coin for the capture of a runaway slave. An outdoor 
placard found among the ruins of ancient Rome offered property for rent; 
another, found painted on a wall in Pompeii, called the attention of travelers 
to a tavern located in a different town. Similar kinds of posters have been 
found scattered throughout ancient societies.
Throughout history, advertising in marketplaces has constituted a means of 
promoting the barter and sale of goods. Criers employed by merchants read 
public notices aloud to promote their wares. With the invention of the print-
ing press in the fifteenth century, fliers and posters could be printed easily and 
posted in public places or inserted in books, pamphlets, newspapers, and 
magazines. By the latter part of the seventeenth century, when newspapers 
were beginning to circulate widely, print ads became the primary means for 
the advertisement of products and services. The London Gazette became the 
first newspaper to reserve a section exclusively for ads, which showed consid-
erable rhetorical and graphic  skill aimed at persuading readers to buy the 
products. The era of modern advertising had clearly dawned. Print advertising 
spread rapidly throughout the eighteenth century, proliferating to the point 
whereby the writer and lexicographer Samuel Johnson (1709–84) felt impelled 
to make the following statement in the newspaper The Idler: “Advertisements 
are now so numerous that they are very negligently perused, and it is there-
fore become necessary to gain attention by magnificence of promise and by 
e loquence sometimes sublime and sometimes pathetic.”3 Ad creators were 
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s tarting to pay more attention to the language, design, and layout of the ad text. 
The art of coining and inventing new expressions to fit the ad text (now called 
slogans) was also becoming a basic technique. Advertising was thus starting to 
change the meaning of commodities. Everything, from clothes to beverages, 
was promoted as part of something more than the actual or practical functions 
of the product—as a key to success, popularity, and the like. These techniques 
transformed products into signs and codes standing for meanings that extended 
beyond their physical qualities. Advertising had become rhetorical art.
Near the end of the nineteenth century, the advertising agency came onto 
the scene. By the turn of the twentieth century, such agencies had themselves 
become large business enterprises, constantly developing new techniques and 
methods to get people to think of products as signifying structures rather than 
just products. Throughout the twentieth century, advertising focused on pro-
moting and ensconcing consumerism as a way of life, proposing marketplace 
solutions to virtually all psychological and social problems. No wonder, then, 
that the shopping malls are filled with thrill-seekers who would otherwise 
become stir crazy. Perhaps, as many social critics warn, we do indeed live in a 
world conjured up by lifestyle ads.
The pervasiveness of advertising today raises a number of issues. Has it 
become a force molding cultural mores and individual behaviors or does it 
simply mirror the cultural tendencies of urbanized, industrialized societies? Is 
it a legitimate form of artistic expression, as the Cannes Film Festival clearly 
believes (awarding prizes to the best advertisements)? The starting point of the 
debate on advertising was probably Vance Packard’s 1957 book The Hidden 
Persuaders, which inspired an outpouring of studies examining the purported 
hidden effects of advertising on individuals and on society at large.4 Packard 
argued essentially that advertising was brainwashing.
Is advertising to be blamed for causing culturally-based afflictions such as 
obesity and its tragic counterpart anorexia? Are advertising moguls the shapers 
of behavior that so many would claim they are? Are we all  the victims of 
advertising rhetoric, as Brian Wilson Key quips?5 There is no doubt that 
advertising plays a role in shaping some behaviors in some individuals. Any 
text, a semiotician would claim, has an effect on us because of semiosis—the 
interplay between signs and the mind. However, although people have become 
conditioned to mindlessly absorbing images, and although these may have 
some effects on behavior, people accept the images, by and large, only if they 
suit already established preferences. Advertisements are not in themselves dis-
ruptive of the value systems of the cultural mainstream; rather, they reflect 
shifts already present in that mainstream. If they are indeed psychologically 
effective, then it is primarily because they tap into the system of everyday life 
more successfully than do other forms of rhetorical discourse.6
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The messages in ad subtexts often offer the kind of hope to which religions 
and social philosophies once held exclusive rights: security against the hazards 
of old age, better position in life, popularity and personal prestige, social 
advancement, better health, happiness, eternal youth. The advertiser stresses 
not the product, but the psychological and social benefits that may be expected 
from its purchase. The advertiser is becoming more and more successful at 
setting foot into the same subconscious regions of psychic experience that 
were once explored by philosophers and artists. However, blaming advertising 
for social ills is like blaming the messenger for the message that is embedded 
in the materialistic ethos of consumerist societies.
Because of this ethos, it should come as little surprise to find that advertis-
ing, brands, and pop culture have become integrated today. Take, for example, 
the Disney Corporation cartoon character Mickey Mouse. In 1929, Disney 
allowed Mickey Mouse to be reproduced on school slates, effectively trans-
forming the character into a logo. A year later, Mickey Mouse dolls went into 
production and throughout the 1930s the Mickey Mouse brand was licensed 
with huge success. In 1955 The Mickey Mouse Club premiered on US network 
television, further entrenching the brand—and by association all Disney 
products—into the cultural mainstream. The case of Mickey Mouse has 
repeated itself throughout modern consumerist societies. The idea is to get the 
brand to become intertwined with cultural spectacles and trends (movies, TV 
programs, and so on).
Another way for product advertising to blend into the cultural mainstream 
is through the ad campaign, which can be defined as the systematic creation 
of a series of slightly different ads and commercials based on the same theme, 
characters, jingles, and so on. An ad campaign is comparable to the theme and 
variations form of music. One of the primary functions of ad campaigns is to 
guarantee that the brand’s  image will be  in step with the changing times. 
Thus, for example, the Budweiser ad campaigns of the 1980s and early 1990s 
emphasized rural, country-and-western ruggedness, and crude female sexual-
ity seen from a male viewpoint. The actors in the commercials were “Marlboro 
men,” and the women their prey. In the early 2000s, the same company 
changed its image with its “Whassup!” campaign to keep in step with the 
changing socio-political climate. The campaign showed young urban males 
who hung around together, loved sports, and did whatever such males seem-
ingly loved to do together in order to bond. So appealing was the “Whassup!” 
campaign that its signature catchphrase was joked about on talk shows, paro-
died or mimicked in various media, and used by people commonly in their 
daily conversations. The makers of Budweiser had clearly adapted their adver-
tising style to mirror social changes and trends.
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Indeed, the most effective strategy is not only to keep up with the times but 
also to co-opt them. In the 1960s, for example, the rebels and revolutionaries, 
referred to generally as hippies, who genuinely thought they were posing a 
radical challenge to the ideological values and lifestyle mores of the main-
stream consumerist culture, ended up becoming the incognizant trend-setters 
of the very culture they deplored, providing it with features of lifestyle and 
discourse that advertisers adapted and recycled into society at large. 
Counterculture clothing fashion was quickly converted into mainstream fash-
ion, counterculture music style into mainstream music style, counterculture 
symbolism and talk into society-wide symbolism and discourse—hence the 
crystallization of a social mindset whereby every individual, of every political 
and ideological persuasion, could feel that they were a symbolic participant in 
a constant revolution.7
Campaigns such as the Pepsi Generation and the Coca-Cola universal 
brotherhood (“I’d like to teach the world to sing in perfect harmony…”) ones 
directly incorporated the rhetoric and symbolism of the hippie countercul-
ture, thus creating the illusion that the goals of the hippies and of the soft 
drink manufacturers were one and the same. Rebellion through purchasing 
became the subliminal thread woven into the ad campaigns. The Dodge 
Rebellion and Oldsmobile Youngmobile campaigns etched into the nomen-
clature of the cars themselves the powerful connotations of rebellion and 
youthful defiance. Even a sewing company came forward to urge people on to 
join its own type of surrogate revolution, hence its slogan “You don’t let the 
establishment make your world; don’t let it make your clothes.” In effect, by 
claiming to “join the revolution,” advertising created the real revolution. This 
is why, since the 1970s, the worlds of advertising, marketing, youth trends, 
and entertainment have become synergistically intertwined. As Leiss, Kline, 
Jhally, and Botterill aptly put it, “there is no longer a separation between 
advertising and culture, culture and commerce, culture and politics.”8 This is 
particularly obvious in the realm of online ads, which pop up continually and 
thus surreptitiously. There are now websites that record advertising history 
and that discuss the aesthetics of ads. Ad culture has become virtually synony-
mous with pop culture.
The answer to curtailing the power of advertising is not to be found in 
censorship or in any form of state control, as some proclaim. Even if it were 
possible in a consumerist culture to control the contents of advertising, this 
would invariably prove to be counterproductive. The answer is, in my view, to 
become aware of how advertising produces meanings with semiotic analysis 
(as illustrated above). In that way, we will be in a much better position to fend 
off the undesirable effects that it may cause.
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 Pop Culture
The term pop culture was coined in analogy to pop art, which was discussed 
previously. Pop culture is, by and large, a carnivalesque culture. It is culture 
for the people by the people, that is, a form of culture produced by common 
people, not by artists commissioned by the nobility or the church on purpose 
to do so. Pop culture rejects the distinction between “high” and “low” culture. 
It is highly appealing for this very reason. It is populist and popular, subject 
not to aesthetic canons, but to the vagaries of the marketplace and of chang-
ing tastes.
The terms of “high,” “low,” and “popular” culture have been used to dif-
ferentiate between levels of representation within society. “High” culture 
implies a level considered to have a superior value, socially and aesthetically, 
than other levels, which are said to have a “lower” value. Traditionally, these 
two levels were associated with class distinctions—high culture was associated 
with the Church and the aristocracy in Europe; low culture with common 
folk. Pop culture emerged in the early twentieth century to obliterate this 
distinction. Already in the Romantic nineteenth century, artists saw “low” or 
“folk culture” as the only true form of culture, especially since they associated 
“high culture” with the artificial demands made of artists by those in author-
ity. Pop culture emerged shortly thereafter to efface any residue distinctions 
between levels of culture.
The inventors of early pop culture forms were young people. Setting them-
selves apart from the adult culture, the youths of the 1920s emphasized a new 
sexual freedom with musical trends such as the Charleston and jazz. Although 
the older generation initially rejected them, the trends eventually caught on 
for a simple reason—they held great appeal. Pop culture engages the masses 
because it takes the material of everyday life, as well as common emotions, 
and gives them expression and meaning. Everything from comic books to 
fashion shows have mass appeal because they emanate from people within the 
culture, not from authority figures. As such, pop culture makes little or no 
distinction between art and recreation, distraction and engagement.
The spread of pop culture has been brought about, in part, by develop-
ments in mass communications technologies. The rise of music as a mass art, 
for instance, was made possible by the advent of recording and radio broad-
casting technologies in the 1920s. Records and radio made music available to 
large audiences, converting it from an art for the élite to an art for one and all. 
The spread and appeal of pop culture throughout the globe today is due to the 
advent of Internet technologies. Pop culture is a transgressive culture, since it 
shatters authoritative  social structures, by giving voice to common people. 
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Satellite television, for example, is often cited as bringing about the disinte-
gration of the former Soviet system in Europe, as people became attracted to 
images of consumerist delights by simply tuning into American TV programs. 
McLuhan claimed that the spread of American pop culture images through 
electronic media has brought about a type of “global culture” that strangely 
unites people in a kind of “global village.”
Young people have always been the creative force behind pop culture’s 
trends and products. So, in a fundamental sense, there are few differences 
between youth and pop culture. However, since young people become old, 
trends change with new generations of youth. The main difference between 
pop and youth culture is that some of the trends of the former do not coincide 
with those of the latter. Youth culture and pop culture are thus different in the 
fact that previous youth culture is recycled by those who carry it over into 
their later years. There is, nevertheless, a constant dynamic between youth and 
pop culture. However, all this does not mean that pop culture is incapable of 
producing truly meritorious and lasting  art. Indeed, some of the modern 
world’s most significant artistic products have come out of pop culture. The 
comic book art of Charles Schultz (1922–2000) is a case in point. His comic 
strip Peanuts, which was originally titled Li’l Folks, debuted in 1950, appeal-
ing to mass audiences. Through the strip, Schultz dealt with some of the most 
profound religious and philosophical themes of human history in a way that 
was unique and aesthetically powerful.
The medium that has been the most effective in spreading pop culture into 
the mainstream, since the 1950s, is television. Television service was in place 
in several Western countries by the late 1930s. By the early 1940s, there were 
a few dozen television stations operating in the United States. It was not until 
the early 1950s, however, that technology had advanced far enough to make 
it possible for virtually every North American household to afford a television 
set. By the mid-1950s, television was becoming a force in shaping all of soci-
ety. TV personalities became household names and were transformed 
into  celebrities. People increasingly began to plan their lives around their 
favorite television programs. Performers like Elvis Presley and the Beatles 
became culture-wide icons after appearing on TV.
The role that television has played (and continues to play) in cultural evolu-
tion cannot be stressed enough. By the 1970s, television had become a fixture 
inside the household. Most people alive today cannot remember a time with-
out a television set in their homes. Like the automobile at the turn of the 
century, television has changed society permanently. Some social critics are 
even claiming that TV satellite transmission is leading to the demise of the 
nation-state concept as television images cross national boundaries. When 
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asked about the stunning defeat of communism in eastern Europe, the Polish 
labor leader, Lech Walesa, was reported by the newspapers as saying that it “all 
came from the television set,” implying that television undermined the stabil-
ity of the communist world’s relatively poor and largely sheltered lifestyle with 
images of consumer delights seen in Western programs and commercials.
Like any type of privileged space—a platform, a pulpit, and so on—televi-
sion creates icons by simply “showing” them. Think of how you would react 
to your favorite television personality if they were to visit you in your own 
home. You certainly would not treat their presence in your house as you would 
that of any other stranger. You would feel that it constituted an event of 
momentous proportions, an almost unreal and other-worldly happening. TV 
personalities are perceived as larger-than-life figures by virtue of the fact that 
they are “seen” inside the mythical space created by television  screen. The 
same reaction would apply to any celebrity, because of the power of the elec-
tronic screen.
TV is where moral issues and politics are showcased. The horrific scenes 
coming out of the Vietnam War, which were transmitted into people’s homes 
daily in the late 1960s and early 1970s, brought about an end to the war. A 
riot that gets airtime becomes a momentous event; one that does not is 
ignored. This is why terrorists have often been more interested in “getting on 
the air,” than in having their demands satisfied. The mere fact of getting on 
television imbues their cause with significance. Political and social protesters 
frequently inform the news media of their intentions to stage demonstrations, 
which are then carried out in front of the cameras. Television takes such events 
and fashions them into dramatic stories; and we call them reality.
In semiotic terms, television can be characterized as the medium that pro-
vides a social text, an authoritative textual point of reference for evaluating 
real-life actions, behaviors, and events. To grasp this concept, imagine step-
ping back in time, living in some village in medieval Europe. How would you 
conceive and organize your daily routines in that village? The routines of your 
day, week, month, and year would no doubt be centered on a Christian world-
view. Some of the offshoots of that worldview are still around today. This is 
why religious dates such as Christmas and Easter are celebrated in a predomi-
nantly secular culture. In medieval Europe, people went to church regularly, 
and lived by moral codes that were iterated in church sermons. The underly-
ing theme of the medieval “social text” was that each day brought people 
closer and closer to their true destiny: salvation and an afterlife with God. 
Living according to this text imparted a feeling of emotional shelter. All 
human actions and natural events could be explained and understood in 
terms of the text.
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With the scientific advances brought about by the Renaissance, the 
Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution, the Christian social text lost 
its grip on the system of everyday life. Today, unless someone has joined a 
religious community or has chosen to live by the dictates of the Bible or some 
other religious text, the social text by which people live is hardly a religious 
one. We organize our day around work commitments and social appoint-
ments, and only at those traditional “points” in the calendar (Christmas, 
Easter, etc.) do we synchronize our secular social text with the more tradi-
tional religious one. The need to partition the day into “time slots” is why we 
depend so heavily upon such devices and artifacts as clocks, watches, agendas, 
appointment books, and calendars. We would feel desperately lost without 
such things. In this regard, it is appropriate to note that in his 1726 novel, 
Gulliver’s Travels, Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) satirized the reliance of society 
on the watch. The Lilliputians were intrigued and baffled that Gulliver did 
virtually nothing without consulting his watch. Today, most people would 
similarly deem it unthinkable to go out of the home without a watch or a 
cellphone that records time in the same way. We always seem to need to know 
“what time it is” in order to carry on the business of our daily life.
When television entered the scene in the 1950s, it almost instantly became 
the modern world’s social text. With cable television, satellite dishes, HBO, TV 
streamlining, and the like, this text now appears to be a highly individualistic 
one, tailored to meet the needs of individuals, rather than of society at large. But 
there are still various social functions related to current TV, including that of 
village moral gossip. Talk shows are moral dramas, replacing the pulpit as the 
platform from which moral issues are discussed and sin is condemned publicly. 
The host has replaced the medieval priest, commenting morally on virtually 
every medical and psychological condition known to humanity.
Television has become so intertwined with life that we no longer distin-
guish between its contents and reality. This was brought out by the 1998 
movie The Truman Show directed by Peter Weir. The main character, Truman 
Burbank, is the unsuspecting star of his very own reality TV show. The first 
baby to be legally adopted by a corporation, the show’s creator has filmed and 
documented every moment of Truman’s life for a voyeuristic TV audience to 
witness. Truman goes about his life living in the largest studio ever constructed 
(without knowing it), a world within a world, filmed by more than 5000 
cameras all controlled from a room at the top of the domed studio. Truman’s 
friends and family are carefully selected actors. After becoming the most pop-
ular television show ever, with a gross national product equivalent to that of a 
small country—all revenues generated by product placement—a series of 
accidents and a dose of paranoia lead Truman to discover the truth, despite 
attempts to stop him from doing so.
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The world manufactured for Truman is that of the 1950s bolstered by cur-
rent technologies. Life is reassuring and inviting, even nostalgic. This mix of 
old culture and new technology, however, also signals to the audience that 
something isn’t quite right. Truman drives a 1990s-model Ford Taurus, uses 
an ATM card, and works on a computer. This technology seems anachronis-
tic when compared to the simplistic world of the 1950s era. The subtext of 
the movie is a transparent one—the hyperreal world of TV and actual reality 
are now psychologically the same. They have formed a simulacrum. TV pro-
gramming itself has morphed into a kind of has become a sort of Truman 
world. Starting in 2000 with Survivor, the reality TV genre exploded. A pro-
gram called The Joe Schmo Show followed a contestant, who was unaware that 
everyone else on the show was an actor. The most popular primetime series 
of the last couple of decades are reality shows such as American Idol, The 
Apprentice, and The Bachelor. The appeal of the unscripted program, which 
blurs the  difference between reality and fiction, lies in its “text-in-the mak-
ing” nature. As with Luigi Pirandello’s (1867–1936) great 1921 play Six 
Characters in Search of an Author, the audience is presented with real-life 
characters in search of a script and a narrative. The fun is in figuring out how 
this will come about.
Ultimately, however, reality TV is voyeurism plain and simple. And it is 
spreading. The boundaries between the private and the public have been 
eroded through the influence of TV and especially now by the Internet and 
social media. Everyone, from celebrities to housemakers, is airing personal 
laundry in public for everyone to see on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and 
the like. Virtually the entire globe now has access to the spectacle of human 
“reality” at its most trivial. Maybe at some deep unconscious level we are all 
trying to understand what human life is all about through the media simula-
crum. It certainly seems to be a bizarre way of doing so.
 Meme Culture
The medium that may be taking the place of TV as a social text is the online 
one. Indeed, as we find out at one point on Martha’s video, Cheryl and Ted 
initially made contact through a dating website. In the history of human com-
munications, no other medium has made it possible for so many people to 
interact with each other virtually instantaneously, irrespective of the distances 
between them. The Internet has also led to an online culture that may be 
bringing pop culture, as understood traditionally, to an end. The online cul-
ture is a virtual one with nano-celebrities, nano-spectacles, and nano-trends—
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that is, celebrities, spectacles, and trends that have a short shelf life. Andy 
Warhol’s “fifteen minutes of fame” prediction for everyone has become the 
norm. The Internet is blurring the lines between performer and audience, giv-
ing free reign to self-expression like never before, producing a DIY form of 
culture that is based on the viral video, rather than on a recurring program or 
event.
In the Internet Age what is popular can be something very different to 
every person. Certainly, the dichotomy between entertainment and engage-
ment is still there, since we can get both from online venues. Celebrities, 
narrative genres, lifestyles, fads, and other aspects of the popular are also still 
around, but in different ways. The primary use of the Internet is for individu-
alistic entertainment, that is, entertainment experienced as a person outside of 
an audience setting. And the time frame for a spectacle or event is measured 
in minutes, rather than hours. Even knowledge transmission is made to fit this 
the online mode, as the Ted (Technology, Entertainment, Design) Talks 
 indicate. These started in 1984, but in the contemporary Internet Age they 
have evolved into online presentations  blending knowledge and entertain-
ment  that last  around fifteen  minutes—recalling Andy Warhol’s prophetic 
aphorism.
In previous eras of pop culture, a few people—agents, radio announcers, 
TV producers, and the like—decided who or what would be put on a stage, 
played on radio, or shown on television in view of achieving popularity. Now 
the decision of what becomes popular is influenced by memes. Memes have 
replaced agents and the other previous makers of pop culture. Memes are the 
new marketers. However, they carry only the content that is fleetingly popu-
lar, as decided by social media users. This implies that pop culture is now 
likely giving way to mem  culture. Posting a photo of people involved in 
humorous situations is replacing Funniest Home Videos and people dancing 
some new style on YouTube is replacing previous dance shows—at least in 
part. Television networks, artists, and musicians also have Facebook sites for 
communicating with fans, followers, and audiences generally. Facebook has 
become a major agency for the spread of trends in entertainment culture.
Social media are, in sum, where memes  are created  and disseminated 
throughout cyberspace; but in its vast expanse they have little chance of gain-
ing stability. The life span of Internet memes through social media sites became 
dramatically obvious, when in December of 2012, the  so-called Gangnam 
Style video became the first YouTube clip to be viewed more than one billion 
times. Thousands responded by creating and posting their own variations of 
the video on YouTube and on Facebook. But the meme quickly evanesced in 
cyberspace. The same story can be told for virtually any meme that surfaces on 
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the Internet. There are now even popular meme genres, which reveal how the 
Internet and participatory Web 2.0 culture are redifining the meaning of 
popular.
Sometimes, however, an Internet meme can crossover into the traditional 
art world. The best example of this is the Grumpy Cat meme—which has 
migrated from the Internet to other areas of society, including to art museums 
and other referential points in pop culture: that is, it has made its way into 
other media and other channels of dissemination. One can claim this is the 
ultimate in banality, but there is much more to it than literally meets the eye. 
The cat fits in with contemporary perceptions of animals as pets and ersatz 
humans, which has always been a part of pop cultural representations—from 
the Disney animated movies to the Looney Tunes cartoons. Grumpy Cat is a 
meme that has become a celebrity, in the style of other animal celebrities. 
Walter Benjamin addressed this issue already in the 1930s when mechanical 
reproduction technology made art reproductions common. He suggested that 
this was part of an ever-growing democratization of art, leading to a demise in 
the notion of originality and the ways in which art was viewed and appreci-
ated as something truly unique. A successful meme is, in fact, something that 
is highly reproducible, recognizable, and easily shared.
 Lying
There is an aspect of the Internet that is worth emphasizing here, in the era of 
so-called fake news. The Internet has made lying, dissimulation, and confabu-
lation respectable modes of interacting. The Internet has enabled the patho-
logical or compulsive liar to gain a voice that can be spread widely. Can we 
ever know the truth of anything in a world where lying is simply an alternative 
way of communicating information? It is little wonder that the scientific 
study of lying has become widespread in academia, crisscrossing various disci-
plines. This includes semiotics. Recall Umberto Eco’s definition of semiotics 
as anything that can be used to lie. It is relevant to note that the historical 
father of semiotics, St. Augustine, had written two books on lying—De man-
dacio and Contra mendacio, in which he divided lying into eight categories 
according to the harmful effects these brought about:
• Lies in how religion is taught and presented.
• Lies that are harmful and serve no foreseeable social purpose.
• Lies that are harmful but are intended to help others.
• Lies told for the pleasure of lying.
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• Lies told in conversations to make the discourse fluid and smooth.
• Lies that harm no one but help someone materially.
• Lies that harm no one but help someone spiritually.
• Lies that harm no one and that protect someone from some form of 
defilement.
Augustine concludes that all lies are sinful, no matter how severe or benefi-
cial their effects. They are unethical and impermissible. Not until Eco had 
Augustine’s particular purview on how lies affect behavior been contem-
plated by semioticians. A lie, in fact, can be recast as a fabrication, an inven-
tion, a piece of fiction, a falsification—all features that are present in the 
current era of political populism. As Eco put it, a lie is itself a sign function: 
“Every time there is possibility of lying there is a sign function; which is to 
signify (and then to communicate) something to which no real state of things 
corresponds. The possibility of lying is the proprium of semiosis.”9 People lie 
all the time, often to avoid negative outcomes or to gain some advantage. 
Moreover, people typically tend to ignore the signs of lying when speaking 
with others. As psychologist Ken Ashwell observes:10
Often lies go undetected because we do not attempt to detect them, a phenom-
enon dubbed the “ostrich effect” by psychologist Aldert Vrij. It may reflect the 
emotional cost of recognizing and dealing with lies—in other words, people do 
not always want to hear the truth.
Given the power of mendacious memes to influence outcomes, from elec-
tions to choices in friends and dates, at no time like the present has semiotics 
emerged as an important—indeed critical—science. By unmasking some-
thing as purposefully mendacious we can hopefully instill or restore truth in 
the world. The analysis of the ad with which we started this chapter is an 
example of how to approach and unmask what is essentially a lie—the prom-
ise of attractiveness through a cologne. Eco was right after all—the study of 
lying is the study of semiosis.
 Of Cigarettes and High Heels, Again
My purpose in this book has been to illustrate what a semiotic study of every-
day life would entail, what things it would focus on, and what insights it 
might provide into the human condition. My treatment has left out many of 
the technical details of semiotic analysis, and many of the debates (such as 
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structuralism versus post-structuralism), which inform its current practice. 
My objective has been simply to show how “interesting” the study of meaning 
can be and how many areas of human activity it embraces. My underlying 
premise has been that there is an innate tendency in all human beings to 
search for, and to make, meaning in the world. The task of the semiotician is 
to look everywhere for the signs that render this tendency manifest. My hope 
is that this excursus into semiotic analysis has engendered in readers an inquis-
itive frame of mind with which to view their own society up close, unimpeded 
by habits of thought. In a fundamental sense, semiotics is a dialectic exercise 
in knowing oneself.
I contrived my presentation of the subject matter of semiotics around an 
imaginary courtship display. The gestures, bodily postures, dialogue, and 
other features that characterize such a display testify to the fact that humans 
carry out their everyday life schemes with a skillful deployment of signs. This 
display also testifies to the fact that we live our lives like characters in a play, 
constantly rehearsing, acting out, and at times changing our social roles. 
Semiotics catalogues the features of the play’s unconscious script. Our imagi-
nary scene occurs in bars, restaurants, and cafés throughout American society. 
I must emphasize that the characters in my vignette, Cheryl and Ted, are 
prototypical characters. Changing their ages, race, ethnicity, or adapting the 
lifestyle codes they deployed in the vignette to meet contemporary standards 
will not change the basic message of this book. On the contrary, it will con-
firm one of its themes: that semiotic codes are dynamic, flexible sign systems, 
adaptable to the whims of individuals and entire societies.
The overarching theme of this book has been that systems of everyday life 
provide networks of shared meanings that define human cultures. Such net-
works have come about in our species, arguably, to make possible the formu-
lation of answers to the basic metaphysical questions that haunt humans 
everywhere: Why are we here? Who or what put us here? What, if anything, 
can be done about it? Who am I? As philosopher Johan Huizinga has put it, 
these questions constitute the psychic foundations of cultural systems: “In 
God, nothing is empty of sense; so, the conviction of a transcendental mean-
ing in all things seeks to formulate itself.”11 The goal of semiotics is, ultimately, 
to unravel how culture guides the human search for larger meaning and, thus, 
how it influences the ways in which people think and act. By seeing the 
answers of any one culture to the questions of existence as tied to a meaning 
network, semiotics provides a strong form of intellectual immunization 
against accepting those answers as the only ones that can be devised. It also 
encourages acceptance of the “Other,” which in a troubled world has become 
a critical necessity.
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Carl Jung, the great Swiss psychoanalyst, was fond of recounting how cul-
ture had the power to affect even what one sees. During a visit to an island 
tribal culture that had never been exposed to illustrated magazines, he found 
that the people of that culture were unable to recognize the photographs in 
the magazines as visual representations of human beings. To his amazement, 
he discovered that the islanders perceived them, rather, as smudges on a sur-
face. Jung understood perfectly well, however, that their interpretation of the 
photographs was not due to defects of intelligence or eyesight; on the  contrary, 
the tribal members were clear-sighted and highly intelligent hunters. Jung 
understood that their primary assumptions were different from his own, and 
from those of individuals living in cultures where magazines were common, 
because they had acquired a different form of semiosis that blocked them 
from perceiving the pictures as visual signs.
Overall, I have attempted to argue and show that the thoughts and actions 
of human beings are shaped by forces other than the instincts. The most pow-
erful argument against reductionist theories of humanity is the fact that 
humans can change anything they want, even the theories they devise to 
explain themselves. This is made possible by the human imagination—the 
creative force behind the great works of art, the great scientific discoveries, the 
profound ideas contemplated by philosophers, and, of course, cultural change. 
There is no way to explain the human condition. We can, of course, develop 
philosophies, mythical narratives, or scientific theories to explain it, but these 
are of our own making. The twentieth-century poet T. S. Eliot argued that 
knowledge of who we are starts with understanding the past, with compre-
hending the historical forces that have made us what we are today.
Semiotics attempts to make good on Eliot’s idea. We can know ourselves 
today only by knowing how we got here. The history of cigarettes, of words, 
of names, of rituals, of art works, tells us where our search for meaning has 
led. History is nothing if not a record of our search for meaning. Hopefully, 
this book has shed some light on how we search for it, and why we will con-
tinue to do so.
Notes
1. Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1957).
2. Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1957) and Système de la mode (Paris: 
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3. Cited in Marcel Danesi, Interpreting advertisements: A semiotic guide (Ottawa: 
Legas Press, 1995), 16.
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5. Brian Wilson Key, The age of manipulation (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), 13.
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